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1. Introduction 
Finland has, by the time of writing this thesis, developed its capacity in international peace 
mediation in a more systematic manner roughly for a decade (MFA 2017). In guidelines 
published in 2010 it was stated that ‘[p]eace mediation augments the range of instruments 
used in Finland’s comprehensive crisis management efforts and development policy’ (MFA 
2010, 8). Interestingly, religious approaches have become an increasingly important 
component in the country’s efforts to raise its effectiveness – and profile – in the mediation 
field. This can be seen, for instance, in the increased cooperation between the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) and faith-based NGOs like Finn Church Aid (FCA) and the 
Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (Felm), let alone their contributions to international 
projects such as the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and the Syria 
Initiative. (MFA s.a., 2017, 2018.) However, there are no indications that the increased 
awareness and usage of religious approaches to conflict resolution would have translated into 
concrete actions within the military and civilian crisis management circles. Yet, maybe 
slightly surprisingly, there is a group of personnel within the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) 
which has, already for decades, made efforts to support their troops in understanding and 
dealing with local religious elements and actors in international peacekeeping and crisis 
management operations. The attention is thus now drawn to the hitherto mostly unnoticed 
conflict resolution potential of Finnish military chaplains. 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to introduce and analyse Finnish military chaplains’ and 
commanders’ conceptions and experiences concerning the utilisation of Finnish military 
chaplains as religious experts – i.e. advising personnel on religion and culture and engaging 
local religious leaders and communities – in international military operations. Although a few 
Finnish chaplains likely have gained some experience of such roles, as well as participated in 
humanitarian activities and other duties which concern local populations, in the Middle East 
already since the 1980s and in the Balkans since the 90s (see e.g. Helin 2008, 174–176), this 
study focuses on recent experiences from Lebanon and Afghanistan, where Finnish chaplains 
have been principally deployed during the second decade of the 21st century.1 By doing so, it 
                                               
1 With the exceptions of at least Chad and Kosovo, where there were chaplains still in 2010 (Suomen evankelis-
luterilainen kirkko 2011), before the Finns withdrew from the operations the same year (YLE 2010a, 2010b), and 
the coast of Somalia, where there was a chaplain on board of a Finnish warship in 2011 (Pesonen 2016). 
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is intended to provide the freshest insights into the phenomenon, hopefully serving those who 
engage in this field in the near future, whether it be researchers or practitioners. 
The topic is timely and relevant for multiple reasons. Already for many years Finnish 
peacekeepers have served in areas of operation (AO) where religious elements have been a 
significant factor in conflicts. The ability to understand these elements and to respond to them 
accordingly has had direct effects on the troops’ chances to build trust and settle disputes 
constructively with local populations. As implied above, at times Finnish chaplains have been 
able to support their troops in doing this, but these cases have been left unstudied so far. As it 
seems probable that religious elements continue to be a significant factor in future conflicts as 
well, investigating Finnish military chaplains’ endeavours has a practical aspect: if the 
dynamics of religion and conflict are better understood and relevant expertise more efficiently 
utilised, it might help Finnish peacekeepers to address conflicts more comprehensively in the 
operations to come. 
In academia religion and conflict resolution have been an object of increased interest 
since the 90s, raising truly into prominence in the beginning of the millennium. For instance, 
in an article called Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement (2003) Douglas 
Johnston and Brian Cox discussed the need for new practical approaches which take religion 
into account. They called for more attention and research on the topic and argued for the 
integration of religious experts – military chaplains included – into various conflict resolution 
activities. They asserted that even if religion was not the main factor in some of the 
contemporary conflicts, it may still need to be considered in order to achieve more durable 
results. (Johnston & Cox 2003, 11–26.) 
Since then such practical applications have been developed: Religious Area Analysis 
(RAA) and Religious Leader Engagement (RLE) are introduced by Dr. Steve K. Moore in his 
book called Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Environments (2013). Similar concepts called Religious Advicement (RA) 
and Religious Leader Engagement/Religious Leader Liaison (RLL) are presented in a 
publication, edited by Dr. Eric Patterson, called Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Beyond: Advicement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments (2014). To 
clarify the concepts briefly at this point, the purpose of RAA/RA is to provide relevant 
information about the religious environment within a given AO for decision making purposes 
(Moore 2013, 98; Patterson 2014, 14–15, 19), while the aim of RLE/RLL is to build peaceful 
relations with local populations and support positive interaction between conflicting parties 
by encountering local religious leaders (Moore 2013, 2, 293; Patterson 2014, 14, 19). 
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The primary data of this research concerning Finnish military chaplains’ involvement in 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL activities consists of ten semi-structured interviews. The study 
participants included six former military chaplains and four former commanders of Finnish 
contingents. Half of them, three of the military chaplains and two of the commanders, were 
interviewed due to their experience from Lebanon, and the other half of them, likewise three 
military chaplains and two commanders, due to their experience from Afghanistan.  
By conducting a qualitative content analysis on their interview contributions, I aim to 
answer the following research questions: First, how do Finnish military chaplains and 
commanders perceive the utilisation of Finnish military chaplains 1) as advisors for the 
command and other personnel in regard to religious elements and their effects in areas 
of operation and 2) as liaison personnel between Finnish contingents and local religious 
leaders and communities? Second, what sort of experiences do they have of such 
endeavours from the Finnish Defence Forces’ international operations in Lebanon and 
Afghanistan since the year of 2010? Simultaneously the study intends to contribute to the 
broader discussion on religious approaches and actors in conflict resolution, especially in the 
framework of comprehensive crisis management (CCM). 
Beyond increasing knowledge, the study intends to raise awareness concerning the 
topic. The motivation for this stems from my previous studies and limited work experience in 
conflict resolution. Based on my preliminary understanding I found it probable that, although 
by no means completely ignored, religious elements may not always be dealt with in a fully 
analytic manner by conflict resolution actors and organisations. The thematic is challenging – 
and divisive – even for notable scholars (see e.g. Atran 2010; Appleby 2015; Omer 2015; 
Dawson 2017). Therefore, rather than simply describing the phenomenon, I also hope to 
pinpoint some of the factors which may influence the utilisation of religious expertise, in this 
case within the FDF. Although unlikely that such a limited study like this would have much 
impact in terms of development, should some issues be revealed, I do hope it could serve as 
an inspirator for new ideas and more thorough examinations. 
In the following paragraphs I illustrate the broader societal relevance of the study by 
explaining how RAA/RA and RLE/RLL situate conceptually into the frameworks of military 
operations and the comprehensive approach (CA), and by assessing how religion has been 
considered in the context of CCM in Finland. In the second chapter, which aims at presenting 
the background and context of this study, I introduce the Finnish Military Chaplaincy’s 
contributions to international operations, FDF’s participation in the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and FDF’s contributions to the International Security Assistance 
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Force (ISAF) and the operation Resolute Support (RS) in Afghanistan. In the third chapter I 
first introduce the scholarly history of Religion and Conflict Resolution and then outline the 
theoretical framework of the study. The starting points and preconditions of the study, the 
data collection process, the analysis of the data, and the discussion concerning the reliability, 
validity, and generalisability of the study are presented in detail in the fourth chapter. The 
fifth and the sixth chapter are dedicated to the analysis. Finally, I summarise the study 
findings and discuss the potential for further research in the last chapter. 
1.2 Operational Military Chaplains – An Emerging Capacity of 
Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Forces? 
In military terms RLE (/RLL) fits into the category of Key Leader Engagement (KLE)2, the 
practice of deliberately meeting with people of influence with the aim of creating effects 
which support the realisation of mission objectives. Some religious leaders possess notable 
capacity to shape public opinion and will of local populations, and thus count as such people. 
Moore argues that engaging and building relationships with these leaders in accordance with 
the principles of RLE could prove to be of strategic importance due to the potential it has for 
fostering stability in the given AO. (Moore 2013, 106.)3 Concerning another way for armed 
forces to engage with locals, CIMIC (Civilian Military Cooperation)4, which often manifests 
as development projects, Moore writes that it has a potential interface with RLE and argues 
that these initiatives could be seen as complementary with each other’s (Moore 2013, 241). 
Although not being new ideas in Finland either (see e.g. Helin 2008), conceptually 
Moore takes them some steps further. Regarding the broader framework, he situates the 
conflict resolution and humanitarian activities of military chaplains into the context of the 
comprehensive approach (CA), i.e. the coordination of efforts of different actors – military, 
government, and civilian – towards a common goal. The increased complexity of modern 
conflicts, which are often of intrastate nature and contain insurgency elements, has forced 
national and international organisations to look for better integrated strategies to deal with the 
various root causes of conflicts more efficiently. For Moore the main question in all of this is 
how RLE could support various conflict resolution and other organisations with relation to 
affected societies’ religious actors prominent at communal, regional, and national levels. 
(Moore 2013, 1–10.) 
                                               
2 For more on Key Leader Engagement, see e.g. Hull 2009. 
3 Hirvelä and Huhtinen (2013) write about the increased strategic and operative level significance of KLE 
activities as a part of strategic communication of state actors. 
4 For more on Finnish CIMIC endeavours, see e.g. Holma 2018. 
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In Moore’s vision, chaplains would work as interfaces between their own troops, 
government departments and agencies, local religious leaders and communities, NGOs, and 
even indigenous peace endeavours. By doing so chaplains could support them in reaching 
higher levels of interoperability in accordance with the principles of the CA. (Moore 2013, 
250–253.) He argues that RLE could create conflict resolution opportunities which would be 
otherwise missed (Moore 2013, 103, 110), but maintains that chaplains should focus mainly 
on initiating the processes, working as facilitators who bring relevant actors together: 
In bringing RLE forward, the intention has never been to make conflict resolution experts out of 
chaplains. Aiding in resolving the conflict, as a facilitator, is a more accurate depiction of the chaplains – 
staying in their own lane. Where RLE ministry brings religious leaders from estranged identity-groups 
together, the long view maintains placing such initiatives in the hands of those with the expertise in 
peacebuilding – indigenous to the local population if at all possible. (Moore 2013, 256.) 
Moore finds that, in an ideal case, chaplains would be connected to suitable peacebuilding 
actors already before their deployments so that these actors could be easily called to aid 
during operations if needed. At other times, when local structures of peacebuilding already 
exist, chaplains could facilitate support for them, if the situation allows. (Moore 2013, 256.) 
John Paul Lederach’s Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies 
(2013), first published in 1997, is one of the earlier conceptual explorations on the integration 
of various conflict resolution activities and actors – the religious ones included. However, the 
development of the CA in military context started gaining wider traction only after the Riga 
Summit of 2006 as NATO’s experiences from Afghanistan, Balkans, and – although mainly 
outside the Alliance’s framework – Iraq had proven that it needed to enhance its conflict 
resolution capabilities. Even if there has been a wide consensus of the need for the CA in 
multinational organisations, such as NATO and the EU, from early on, initially its 
development and implementation was slow due to political and organisational obstacles. 
However, individual countries like Denmark, which started pushing the CA to the agenda of 
NATO already in the end of 2004, took significant steps at the national level from early on. 
(Petersen & al. 2010, 75–80; Pirozzi 2013.) 
Since then there has been progress within NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and some 
African organisations, although challenges remain (Puolustusvoimat 2018, 71). As to the 
potential of chaplains and their religious expertise within the CA framework, it was 
considered already in 2011 – in an article by Moore – in the book called Security Operations 
in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach (2011), edited 
by Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski. However, it looks like the integration of religious 
approaches to conflict resolution within the CA framework has been very limited, if not non-
existent, in any of the international organisations and even individual countries.  
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1.3 Religion and Comprehensive Crisis Management in Finland 
In Finland, a country which can be argued as having been at the forefront of development of 
the CA, or comprehensive crisis management (CCM)5, similar considerations to military 
chaplains’ potential in conflict resolution have not been given. In general, the interest in 
religion has been quite limited in the Finnish research of CCM. This trend can be seen, for 
instance, in the publications of Wider Security Network and its predecessor (WISE – 
previously known as KATU)6.  
In Siviilit kriisejä hallitsemassa – Matkalla kokonaisvaltaiseen kriisinhallintaan 
(Civilians Managing Crises – On the Way to Comprehensive Crisis Management, Kopola & 
Palm 2012 – translation J.P) religion is merely a side issue noted in a couple of articles, but its 
engagement is not explored at all. In Rauhanvälitys – suomalaisia näkökulmia (Peace 
mediation – Finnish Perspectives, Siirtola & Palm 2014 – translation J.P) the work of FCA 
and Felm, along with the peacebuilding capacity of local religious leaders, is introduced (see 
Nissinen 2014; Rytkönen 2014; Rintakoski 2014), but the ideas how to conceptually and 
practically integrate these actors’ efforts to the broader framework of CCM remain absent. 
Similarly, in Yhdessä enemmän – Kriisien hallintaa kokonaisvaltaisesti (More Together – 
Managing Crises Comprehensively, Siirtola & Palm 2018 – translation J.P) religious aspects 
receive some attention, but the contributions are not significant. Laura Lindgren from the 
MFA highlights Finland’s role and expertise in faith-based conflict resolution and notes that 
the MFA supports mediation work of actors like FCA and Felm (Lindgren 2018, 121–122). 
Outi Hakkarainen tells about the Syria Initiative of Felm, which has been Finland’s biggest 
operative peacebuilding project (Hakkarainen 2018, 140–144). Yet, both note that there is still 
room for improvement in the cooperation of governmental and civil society actors. Arto 
Mutanen has another focus and his remarks about religion concern the importance of 
understanding symbolical meanings in dialogue processes (Mutanen 2018, 164–165). 
In some other publications cultural awareness and communication competence come up 
when the question of improving Finnish conflict resolution actors’ ability to deal with local 
populations is studied (see e.g. Ådahl 2009). In her doctoral dissertation Enhancing Human 
Security Through Crisis Management – Opportunities and Challenges for Learning Ulla 
                                               
5 The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, a framework for cooperative between 
the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) and the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
(FINCENT), was founded in 2008 (see e.g. Kerkkänen 2015, 35), and the country has had a strategy for 
comprehensive crisis management – the Finnish version of CA –  since 2009 (see e.g. Häikiö 2018, 153). 
6 ‘Wider Security Network (WISE) is a civil society network established in October 2015 that brings together 
Finnish NGOs and parliamentary groups, to work together to promote peacebuilding, crisis management and 
conflict prevention both nationally and internationally.’ (WISE website.) 
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Anttila argues that these skills help getting locals involved in peace processes and contribute 
to human security (Anttila 2012, 183). Religion and its role in conflicts – and possibly in their 
resolution – is noted specifically in Reijo E. Heinonen’s article Bridging the Gap of 
Understanding: Dialogue Competence in the Renewal of UN Peacekeeping and Civil Crisis 
Management (2017). He explores the challenge of establishing constructive interaction with 
and between alienated religious and sectarian groups in a way that it would support conflict 
resolution in peacekeeping and civilian crisis management settings. He maintains that more 
focus must be laid on the quality of the communications skills which are required in missions. 
In his article he divides dialogue competence into three elements: 
[D]ialogue rules based on knowledge of religions and cultures; second, a system of symbol theory based 
on the abstraction level of the concepts, which can be comprehended dependently of their context. The 
third element of the dialogue competence is the awareness of the combining universal ethical principles 
and norms (global ethic), which can connect people and create mutual understanding. This element of 
dialogue competence is necessary also for readiness to embrace openness and for ability to change one’s 
attitudes, worldview, and values. (Heinonen 2017, 65.) 
As to considerations for practical applications, the situation looks even scarcer. The 
potential of religious leaders is discussed in an article called Multi-Tracking Peacebuilding – 
Adding Mediation and Transformative Dialogue to Civilian Crisis Management (2012) as 
Pirjo Jukarainen ‘plays with the idea’ of the EU cooperating with Afghan religious leaders in 
the questions of rule-of-law and women’s human rights. All in all, the lack of research and 
explorations on the topic seems striking when one thinks of ‘Finland’s CCM strategy’ from 
the year 2009. In it ‘dialogue between cultures and religions’ was defined as one of the cross-
cutting themes in crisis management, and the need for paying attention to local religions, 
cultures, and values is brought up in the context of the training of crisis management 
personnel (Suomen kokonaisvaltainen kriisinhallintastrategia 2009, 21, 29, 51). I would asses 
it being likely that there are gaps not only in research, but also in implementation. 
Obviously, neither Moore’s visions nor Finnish military chaplains’ potential role in 
conflict resolution can be taken for granted. Still, due to the growing need to consider and 
address local religious – and cultural – conditions in peacekeeping and crisis management 
settings it would seem reasonable to suppose that the knowledge and experience of those 
Finnish military chaplains who have served in international operations could be of use. After 
all, they are possibly, first, among the most educated peacekeepers when it comes to academic 
studies of religion; second, open and used to consider and reflect issues such as symbolical 
language, ethics, values, worldviews, and the like which Heinonen (2018) argues to be of 
importance in the process of dialogue with local populations; and third, already experienced 
when it comes to encounters with indigenous religious leaders and actors. Hence, this study. 
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2. Background and Context 
This chapter serves as a background and context for my study, as in it I introduce briefly the 
Finnish Military Chaplaincy’s involvement in international operations, the Finnish Defence 
Forces’ (FDF) participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and 
the FDF’s contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the 
operation Resolute Support (RS) in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there is very limited amount 
of material available about the topics, but I believe that it is possible to provide a general 
picture of them. In the first part of the chapter I am relying heavily on Juha Poteri’s research 
(2018), which presents the history of Finnish Military Chaplaincy, and on Seppo Kangas’ 
doctoral dissertation (1999), which looks at the FDF’s ecclesial work in the United Nations 
Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) in Golan from 1979 until 1993. Concerning the 
latter parts of this chapter, I rely mainly on two recent publications which present the history 
of Finnish peacekeeping and crisis management: an article by Kalle Liesinen’s (2018a) and a 
book by Heikki Holma and Juha Jalkanen (2018) – Holma being the chief editor of the 
publication. 
2.1 Finnish Military Chaplaincy and International Operations 
Finnish military chaplains have a long and rather international history. A Finnish Priest called 
Pietari Kaukovalta is known to have served German crusaders in the Baltics in the beginning 
of the 13th century. Since the 16th century, during the Swedish rule, there were Finnish 
military chaplains serving in the Swedish Army. The change to the Russian rule in 1809 did 
not initially affect the situation of Finnish chaplains much, and they continued serving as 
usual. Only when the Finnish Army was dissolved in 1905, so was the Chaplaincy. (Poteri 
2018, 9–10, 14.) The history of the Military Chaplaincy of independent Finland goes back to 
the year 1918 when it was reorganised amid the Finnish Civil War. (Poteri 2018, 28–33.) Less 
than 50 official military chaplains served in the Civil War, but in the wars of 1939–1944 with 
the Soviet Union the number was almost 900 military chaplains (Poteri 2018, 24, 83, 109; 
Niskanen & al. 2004, 184). After the World War II it did not take long that Finnish military 
chaplains would see conflict zones again, although in a much smaller scale, this time the 
context being peacekeeping operations further away from home. 
The first Finnish company to serve in a United Nations peacekeeping mission was sent 
to Suez in 1956 (First United Nations Emergency Force, UNEF I). Initially the troops did not 
get a chaplain with, but Chaplain Olavi Ojala visited them for a week in the spring of 1957 
and was reportedly well-received by the peacekeepers. When the troops rotated in the summer 
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the same year, a chaplain was added to the unit’s strength. Thus, the first Finnish military 
chaplain deployed to an international peacekeeping mission was Pastor Toivo Kuusiola from 
the Parish of Jalasjärvi. As to his duties, he was responsible for organising church services, 
devotions, teaching activities, distribution of information, and personal counselling 
opportunities for the troops. (Poteri 2018, 201; see also Liesinen 2018a, 448.) 
When a Finnish peacekeeping battalion was deployed to Cyprus (United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP) almost a decade later in 1964, a chaplain was 
deployed with them. Within a couple of years, the chaplain’s role became a consolidated part 
of the peacekeeping organisation. The exact content of the chaplain’s work was dependent on 
the visions of the commanding officer and the chaplain himself, but it may be said that it 
consisted of two main elements expressed explicitly in 1967: 1) church services and 2) 
counselling, teaching and leisure activities. It was also defined that the purpose of the 
chaplain in peacekeeping operations was to serve Finnish UN troops by providing them 
possibilities to receive the sacraments and to hear the word of God so that they may feel 
connected to the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland and receive the spiritual care it 
provides. Accordingly, regular church services and a communion once a month created the 
basis for the chaplain’s work. In addition to that evening devotions and Sunday devotions 
were common. Counselling sessions could be held practically anywhere, as the chaplain 
visited personnel at different places: in guard posts, detentions, hospitals, recreational 
facilities, and so forth. Peacekeepers could also visit the chaplain in his office or 
accommodation, or they might have a word with him during recreational activities. The 
chaplain was a listener, mediator, advisor, and counsellor in various matters. When it comes 
to teaching activities, it is mentioned in Poteri’s research that the chaplain organised lectures 
and small introductions on topics such as local church history, the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights, and ethical leadership. (Poteri 2018, 201–202, 218.) 
By 1977, during the first 20 years of the Finnish Military Chaplaincy’s involvement in 
the FDF’s international operations, 26 chaplains had served in Cyprus and 12 in the Middle 
East. In addition to that the Chaplaincy had started building connections to other Military 
Chaplaincies in Europe, the United States, and Canada in the 1970s. (Poteri 2018, 222–223.) 
In the following years the Chaplaincy’s involvement in the UN missions continued as usual. 
As in the previous years, the focus of the chaplain’s work was on preaching, teaching, and 
counselling among the troops. Some changes did take place though: Finnish military deacons 
were deployed abroad for the first time in 1978 and new areas of operation were introduced. 
The troops in Sinai were transferred to Golan (UNDOF) in 1979 and a battalion was deployed 
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to Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1982. Finnish chaplains and deacons naturally went where their 
troops did. (Poteri 2018, 230, 233, 240; Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 106.) 
Based on the research of Seppo Kangas it can be said that at the latest by 1988 the 
chaplains serving in UNDOF, in addition to other duties, were explicitly tasked to provide 
lectures on local religions. The challenge was, and not only regarding the knowledge of the 
local religious conditions, that no task-specific training was provided for the chaplains in the 
Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) before the operation. Only during the induction training in 
the AO, when the troops rotated, the UNDOF chaplains were briefed by their predecessors, 
but this period of one or two weeks was considered too short for gaining enough knowledge 
about the region, unless the new chaplain had previous knowledge of the history, religions, 
and cultures of the Middle East. Other peacekeepers whom Kangas interviewed in the autumn 
of 1993 felt they had had the same problem, for before the operation they had not received 
proper training on the local conditions either. (Kangas 1999, 144–145, 150–151.) Similar 
challenges have been brought up in research concerning more recent operations also (see e.g. 
Anttila 2012; Kivistö 2016). 
In UNDOF the chaplain’s lectures on local religions, cultures, and history, which were 
dependant on the chaplain’s activeness and voluntary for the personnel, were seen as having a 
very important role in shedding light to various phenomena which the troops faced daily. The 
UNDOF chaplains’ reports from the years of 1979–1993 reveal that during the 14 years the 
13 chaplains who served in the operation held 239 such lectures. Those who had previous 
experience from the region held more lectures than the rest. Unfortunately, there are no 
statistics on how many of the 5973 Finnish peacekeepers who served in the operation 
participated in the lectures. In the reports it is merely mentioned that the lectures were 
popular. In addition to the lectures, the relevant expertise of these chaplains was utilised in the 
planning of the so-called chaplain’s trips. Even though the main aspect of the trips might have 
been recreational, they had an educational aspect also, for they provided the peacekeepers 
possibilities to learn more about the local conditions and culture. As many of the places 
visited were familiar from the Bible, the chaplain was usually considered the most suitable 
person to organise them. During 1979–1993 the troops did 356 such trips with 6586 persons 
participating in them. (Kangas 1999, 118, 170–173, 279.) 
Chaplain Lauri Salminen who served in Satakunnan Tykistörykmentti (The Artillery 
Regiment of Satakunta – translation J.P) in Niinisalo in 1991–2001 was involved in the 
training activities of the United Nations Training Centre located in the same garrison. The 
centre was providing training for Finnish peacekeepers preparing for future operations, as 
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well as organising courses for international students sent in by different countries. Eventually 
Chaplain Salminen became responsible for organising training on religions, cultures, and 
traditions of areas of operation for Finnish troops. In addition to that he gave task-specific 
instructions for chaplains and deacons before their deployments. (Poteri 2018, 279–280.) 
Initially there seems to have been challenges, for even though according to official guidelines 
from the Defence Command the chaplain of Tykistörykmentti was responsible for the training 
related to the chaplain’s tasks in operations, in an interview with Kangas in 1994 Chaplain 
Salminen expressed that the training he had provided was not the result of demands from the 
UN Training Centre but his voluntary contribution. He had not been asked to provide any 
lectures for the troops and the instructions he gave for the chaplains had concerned ecclesial 
duties mainly. (Kangas 1999, 151.) 
By the year 2000 more than 100 Finnish military chaplains had served in international 
peacekeeping and crisis management operations (Niskanen & al. 2004, 187). In addition to 
organising ecclesial work, counselling, and leisure activities some of them had supported their 
troops with their religious expertise through lectures and chaplain’s trips at least, as well as 
established a proven track record in humanitarian and CIMIC duties (Helin 2008, 169, 174–
175). Since the year 2000, approximately 50 Finnish military chaplains have served in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Lebanon, Chad, and at the coast of Somalia.7 It seems 
that at the turn of the millennium two additional aspects of the Finnish chaplain’s work started 
to become increasingly notable. Some hints in different sources suggest that Finnish 
chaplains, similarly to their colleagues of other nationalities, have advised their commanders 
and personnel about religious and cultural issues and encountered local religious leaders and 
communities in various settings. (See e.g. Helin 2008; Riikonen 2008; Ala-Kärppä 2011; 
Puolustusvoimat 2012; Rytkönen 2015.) 
Despite the Finnish Military Chaplaincy’s involvement in international operations from 
very early on there has been limited official guidelines for the chaplains serving in them. This 
is evident in the newer documents also. For instance, only a small chapter on international 
operations was added to the updated Kirkollisen työn ohjesääntö (Guidelines for Ecclesial 
Duties – translation J.P) in 2003. Still, in spite of the brevity of the chapter, the expertise of 
the chaplain was noted in it. According to the document, chaplains and deacons are to 
participate in organising cultural and educational activities, as well as recreational trips – the 
so-called chaplain’s trips – in the AO. The idea of the trips was described to aim at supporting 
                                               
7 Information confirmed by Senior Chaplain Janne Aalto from the Finnish Defence Forces Defence Command 
per email on 13 March 2019. 
12 
 
the well-being of the troops and to familiarise them with local culture and circumstances. 
(Poteri 2018, 264–266.) The newer roles were noted too. Concerning activities outside the 
context of the chaplain’s own troops it was defined that ‘the chaplain keeps in touch with 
chaplains of the other countries participating in the crisis management operation, and, 
wherever possible, with local religious leaders. Similarly, ecclesial personnel contribute to 
humanitarian activities, if possible.’ (Poteri 2018, 266 – translation J.P.) 
Sotilaspapiston opas (Chaplaincy Guidelines – translation J.P) published in April 2017 
is, as its predecessor, quite limited concerning the chaplain’s duties in international 
operations. The first six paragraphs of the chapter named Kansainvälinen kriisinhallinta 
(International Crisis Management – translation J.P) – which contains less than two pages of 
text – rather deal with issues such as when a chaplain is deployed with the troops, how he is 
being recruited and trained, and what requirements he must fulfil, than the duties he ought to 
carry out. The last six paragraphs provide some guidance for his duties. (Sotilaspapiston opas 
2017, 13–14.) Concerning the engagement with local religious leaders, it is merely noted that 
the chaplain serving in international operations, among other duties, keeps in touch with local 
religious leaders. This is done in accordance with the commander’s intent and a NATO annex 
‘Chaplaincy Guidelines for Religious Ministry and Chaplains Co-operation in a Multinational 
Environment’. (Sotilaspapiston opas 2017, 14, 22–25.) It must be noted that this annex 
focuses solely on cooperation with other chaplains, not on engagement with local religious 
leaders, even if some of its basic principles may be applicable in that domain too. Advisement 
on religious matters in operations is not mentioned in the chapter. In another chapter named 
Puolustusvoimien henkilöstön toimintakyvyn tukeminen (The Support of the Capacity of the 
Defence Forces’ Personnel – translation J.P) it has been merely stated that: 
A military chaplain, by his educations, is an expert of religions. Individuals’ personal religious 
persuasions influence the troops’ course of action. This becomes especially apparent in the work of 
military chaplains serving in crisis management operations. (Sotilaspapiston opas 2017, 12 – translation 
J.P.) 
2.2 Finnish Peacekeeping in Lebanon 
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has had its presence in Lebanon 
since 1978. In the beginning of 2018, there were still some 11300 peacekeepers in the 
operation, as well as 325 field service personnel and 579 local workers. Throughout the years 
312 people have lost their lives while serving in the operation. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 
115.) 
 By the mid-1970s the situation in Lebanon had gotten out of control. The influx of 
Palestinian refugees, the attacks of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) against Israel 
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from the Lebanese soil, the civil war which erupted in 1975, and the Syrian intervention in 
1976 caused the country to fall into a chaos. Furthermore, as a response to the continuous 
PLO attacks the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) crossed the border in March 1978. Within a 
week the IDF had control over Southern Lebanon, except for the city of Tyre, all the way to 
the Litani river. A few days after the Israeli intrusion UNIFIL was established by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 426/1978. Its assignment was to monitor the 
IDF troops’ withdrawal from Lebanon, restore peace and security in Southern Lebanon, and 
assist the Lebanese government to regain its control over the area. Initially the operation was 
given a mandate of six months and its strength was defined between 4000 and 6000 
peacekeepers. The first UNIFIL peacekeepers arrived in Southern Lebanon already in the end 
of March 1978. Finland was involved in the operation from early on, as General Lieutenant 
Ensio Siilasvuo, then-Chief Coordinator of the UN peacekeeping activities in the Middle East, 
oversaw the negotiations between the conflicting parties. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 102–103.) 
 The IDF withdrew from Southern Lebanon by May 1978, but the situation in the 
region did not calm down. The subsequent four years witnessed fighting between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians, and between armed Lebanese factions, the PLO, and the UNIFIL troops. 
Some of the incidents were very dangerous. De Facto Force (DDF, later known as the South 
Lebanese Army, SLA) attacked the UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura in April 1980. In total 
86 shells of various kinds hit the camp. PLO rockets launched to Israel in July 1981 resulted 
an Israeli aerial bombardment in the AO of UNIFIL and an intense exchange of artillery fire 
for two weeks, but Israel refrained from greater land operations for the time being. A ceasefire 
demanded by the UN came into effect later in July 1981. As the ceasefire did not last the IDF 
launched the operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982 with about 90000 soldiers participating 
in the attack. The PLO fighters were pushed all the way to Beirut and forced to leave the 
country. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 103–105; Liesinen 2018a, 454–455.) 
 Finland deployed troops to Southern Lebanon for the first time in 1982. By 10 
December all the 460 peacekeepers had reached the country. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 106.) 
At that time Israel was still occupying areas as far as the outskirts of Beirut (Liesinen 2018a, 
455). After series of negotiations Israel gradually withdrew its troops from the Northern side 
of the Litani river until the withdrawal was complete on 29 April 1985 (Holma & Jalkanen 
2018, 107). In addition to more traditional soldiering the Finnish peacekeepers provided 
significant support for the Lebanese civilian population by organising medical services, 
protecting farmers, and distributing educational material. Moreover, the construction of local 
waste management infrastructure was launched with Finnish development aid. Partly this had 
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to do with the Force Protection of the troops, for it was understood that in order to fulfil the 
mission it was vital to build and maintain good relations and cooperation with the local 
population. (Holma 2018, 76.) 
 In the 80s and 90s Finnish peacekeepers experienced a lot of action in Lebanon. In 
1985 some SLA fighters took 25 Finns as hostages. The situation was resolved with the help 
of political pressure and without casualties. In 1987 Hezbollah fighters, after a failed attack 
against IDF and SLA positions, took some Finnish peacekeepers – serving in a near-by guard 
post – as hostages. They used the peacekeepers as human shields, took over the Finnish base 
9-36, and looted the base. After the incident, and further accusations and demands from 
Hezbollah, the Finnish Force Commander of UNIFIL Gustav Hägglund met with the 
Hezbollah leadership in Beirut – without the permission from the UN Headquarters in New 
York – and was able to calm the situation down. In July 1988 a Finnish PASI (Armoured 
Personnel Carrier) was hit by a mine, but there were no casualties. In November 1988 a small 
group of PLO fighters took over the pumping station 9-47A and again some Finns were taken 
as hostages. Eventually the peacekeepers managed to overpower the kidnappers, but a local 
worker got killed as a gun was accidentally fired amid the struggle. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 
107–111; Liesinen 2018a, 456–457.) 
In August 1993 the IDF launched an attack named Operation Accountability as a 
response for intensified activities of local resistance fighters. Artillery fire and aerial 
bombardments hit the surroundings of the Finnish bases several times during the next week. 
Over 20000 projectiles were fired into the AO of UNIFIL and about 200000 people left the 
region. The next major artillery campaign, called the Grapes of Wrath, took place in April 
1996. Again, the massive shelling caused considerable threats to the Finns also. The situation 
stayed volatile throughout the end of the 90s, but nonetheless the IDF withdrew from 
Lebanon in May 2000. Finland pulled out its peacekeepers in October 2001. During the 19 
years of peacekeeping in Lebanon more than 11400 Finns served in the country. Of them, 11 
lost their lives. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 107–112; Liesinen 2018a, 456–458.) 
 The positive developments in Southern Lebanon did not last for long. In July 2006 
Hezbollah launched rockets to Israel, captured two the IDF soldiers from the Israeli side of 
the Blue Line, and killed three others. Israel retaliated by deploying troops to Lebanon and 
bombarding the country. The 12th Finnish peacekeeper to die in the country was Captain Jarno 
Mäkinen who was serving there as a military observer. The UN base in Khiam where he was 
carrying out his duties was fully destroyed by an Israeli aerial bombardment. (Liesinen 2018a, 
458.) After a month of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel the UNSC passed on the 
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Resolution 1701/2006 which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. It was decided 
that the amount of UNIFIL troops will be increased from 2000 to 15000 soldiers, and that a 
sea component will be added to the operation. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 113.) In addition to 
that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was given the responsibility over Southern Lebanon 
(Liesinen 2018, 458). 
 As an aftermath of the July War Finland, among other countries, decided to deploy 
troops to Lebanon. A pioneer company with some staff officers reached Lebanon in the end of 
2006. This time the Finns served as a part of the Irish-Finnish Battalion (IRISHFINBATT) 
only until the end of 2007. In total 297 Finnish peacekeepers served in Lebanon during that 
period. While after the 2006 war Southern Lebanon has stayed relatively calm, the situation in 
Syria has influenced the region and made threat analysis more difficult. As it is well known, 
the Arab Spring inspired protests in Lebanon’s neighbouring country in 2011 soon turned into 
a full-scale civil war. It has been estimated that due to the Syrian Civil War the situation could 
have changed rapidly in Lebanon as well. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 114.) For instance, even 
though Hezbollah, the power player in Southern Lebanon, has been highly engaged in its 
attempts of aiding the Syrian regime, moving its focus away from Southern Lebanon and the 
border with Israel, its entanglement in the Civil War since 2011 has increased sectarian and 
political tensions within and without Lebanon (see e.g. Daher 2016, 179–197). 
 Finland returned to UNIFIL with 200 peacekeepers in May 2012. The main reasons 
behind the deployment might have been political as Finland was applying to become one of 
the UNSC Non-Permanent Members at the time. The Finns served again under the Irish 
command in IRISHFINBATT. The Irish lead lasted until November 2013 when Finland 
became the lead nation of the battalion. The number of Finnish peacekeepers was raised to 
350 and the battalion was renamed as the Finnish-Irish Battalion (FINIRISHBATT). (Holma 
& Jalkanen 2018, 114.) The lead was given back to Ireland again in November 2016, and the 
number of Finnish troops was decreased to 150 personnel. The number of troops was kept at 
that level only until March 2017 when Finland deployed a jaeger company to be a part of the 
French-led Force Commander’s Reserve battalion (FCR). This increased the number of troops 
to around 330 personnel. (Liesinen 2018a, 458.) In November 2018 Finland withdrew its 
troops from the IRISHFINBATT and has continued to contribute in UNIFIL with 
approximately 200 peacekeepers serving in FCR. In addition to monitoring and patrolling, the 
Finnish troops have participated in CIMIC activities and cooperated with the LAF in the form 
of joint operations and provision of training. (Army newsheet 2019.) 
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 Even if UNIFIL has been rather deadly for Finnish peacekeepers, it looks like in the 
recent years the levels of threat and hostility in this more traditional peacekeeping operation 
have been of fully different scale than in the crisis management efforts in Afghanistan – 
where the overall death toll of international troops during ISAF has been over ten times 
higher than that of UNIFIL. 
2.3 Finnish Crisis Management in Afghanistan 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was present in Afghanistan for a bit over 
13 years, starting in the end of 2001. More than 3500 soldiers died serving in ISAF. It has 
been estimated, that between 25000 and 40000 civilians died during the operation. Since the 
beginning of 2015 the international presence has continued in the country with the operation 
called Resolute Support (RS). (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 125, 129, 133.) The initial 
intervention developed into a longer-than-expected war (Byman 2018). 
 Soon after the events of 11 September 2001, the United States deployed troops to 
Afghanistan. The troops, which reached the country already on 7 October, had clear 
objectives: the destruction of the Taliban as an organisation and the capture of the leader of 
Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden – dead or alive. The operation was named Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and was based on the earlier UN Security Council Resolutions from the years of 1999 
and 2000. By mid-December 2001 the US and their allies had taken over Kabul. Later the 
same month the UNSC passed on the Resolution 1386 which mandated the international 
community to form ISAF. Initially the mandate covered Kabul and the surrounding areas, but 
already in October 2003 it was expanded to cover all Afghanistan. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 
25, 59–60, 125–126; Liesinen 2018a, 465–467.) 
 As the operation expanded so did the amount of troops. In 2006 there were 12400 
personnel in ISAF. By the summer of 2008 the number had increased gradually to 
approximately 52700. In 2011 there were already some 140000 personnel serving in 28 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) -areas. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 127.) It may be well 
argued that the increase in the number of US and other troops coupled with conqueror 
attitude, lack of understanding of the local context8, counterproductive policies, and poor 
choices of tactics on the ground, as well as the corrupt Afghan government’s inability to 
address issues, did not lead to any breakthroughs but rather ever increasingly deteriorated the 
security situation in the country. In addition to this both Al Qaeda and the Taliban were able 
                                               
8 For example, only at the turn of 2009–2010 did the US Central Command start paying attention to those 
religious leaders within and without Afghanistan who were influencing in the country’s religious dynamics (see 
West 2014, 120– 121). 
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to win the hearts and the minds of the local population more efficiently than the foreign 
coalition – which was causing a significant number of civilian casualties. The alienated tribes 
started perceiving the extremist organisations as more and more viable allies to whom to turn 
to. (See e.g. Atran 2010, 254–267; Hirvelä & Huhtinen 2013, 14; West 2014, 120.) As Scott 
Atran puts it somewhat provocatively: ‘almost no Afghans were closely associated with Al 
Qaeda until after 9/11, when America bombed them into togetherness’ (Atran 2010, 99). The 
campagn and the motives to participate in it have raised controversy in Finland also. For 
instance, the question if one can speak of crisis management anymore when one is involved in 
the war efforts of the US – especially if it was mainly for political reasons – is relevant. 
Besides, the limited provision of information concerning the Finnish troops participation in 
combat activities has been highly criticised. There are likely still many difficult questions to 
be sorted out. (Byman 2018.) 
In July 2011 the US announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and 
NATO handed over the responsibility for security to local security forces in June 2013 
(Liesinen 2018a, 468). By December 2014 the number of ISAF troops had been decreased to 
a bit over 13000 personnel (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 128). On 1 January 2015 the 
responsibility for supporting the government of Afghanistan was passed on to the next 
NATO-led operation called Resolute Support (RS). At that time the operation consisted of 
12000 soldiers. The aim of the operation is to support the government of Afghanistan, firstly, 
in creating and sustaining a secure environment which makes the reconstruction of the 
country and the strengthening of its democratic structures possible, and secondly, in spreading 
the influence of the central government to whole of Afghanistan. The troops serving in the RS 
are not supposed to take part in combat activities. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 128, 133.) 
 Finland chose to participate in ISAF straight from its beginning. The first section of 
Finnish troops who were deployed to Kabul consisted – by January 2002 – of 50 personnel 
specialised in Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities.9 (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 
125–126; cf. Liesinen 2018a, 465–466.) In 2004 it was decided that an additional group of 20-
30 peacekeepers would be deployed to the city of Maymana in Northern Afghanistan 
(Liesinen 2018a, 467). 
 The security situation in Afghanistan was challenging already in the early years of the 
operation. In February 2006 the FDF got involved into its heaviest armed struggle since the 
World War II as an enraged crowd from Maymana attacked a joint base with 10 Finns, 17 
                                               
9 For more on Finland’s first contributions in Afghanistan, see Koskela 2012 and Holma 2018. 
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Norwegians, 5 Swedes, and two Latvians. The caricatures of prophet Muhammed published 
in Jyllands Posten -newspaper earlier in September 2005 had their provocative effect in 
Afghanistan a few months later. Ten peacekeepers were wounded, but the troops suffered no 
losses. (Liesinen 2018a, 467; see also Lindholm 2012, 127–142; Muraja 2014, 32–36.) Even 
if the Finnish troops were able to avoid casualties for quite a long time, the worst-case 
scenario came to pass in the spring of 2007. The first Finnish peacekeeper to die in 
Afghanistan was Sergeant Petri Immonen. He was serving in Maymana and on the way to a 
local hospital with Norwegian medical staff as their group was attacked with a remote-
controlled hand grenade. (Liesinen 2018a, 467.) 
The caricatures did not rise tensions only in 2006. In his autobiography (2018) late 
Major Timo Liene, who served as a CIMIC officer in Afghanistan in early 2008, depicted an 
interesting course of events. It started as a big crowd had started to gather and demonstrate 
around the Blue Mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif due to the drawings. The Finns and Swedes 
stationed in a camp located a few kilometres from the mosque saw from a CNN news 
broadcast that the anti-Danish demonstration of thousands of people were led by a notable 
religious actor in Northern Afghanistan, the official for religious affairs in the region, called 
Qari Hayatullah. However, Liene had met the agitator before and had managed to build good 
relations with him. According to Liene the religious leader had apparently been pleased with 
his CIMIC activities and background in theological studies, and the two got along well.  Even 
without the approval from his superior, a Swedish colonel, Liene arranged a patrol to take him 
and an interpreter to meet with Hayatullah. Despite the big crowd and the obvious tensions, 
he was able to reach Hayatullah, who invited Liene into his office to talk. There Liene told 
him that the Danish troops had already been transferred to other parts of Afghanistan and that 
none of them were left in the Northern parts of the country. As a result of the meeting, 
Hayatullah promised that it would be announced in all the mosques of Northern Afghanistan 
that there are no Danish troops serving in the area anymore and that there is no need to harm 
ISAF soldiers due to the incident. According to Liene what Hayatullah said also happened 
and ISAF soldiers were not harmed because of the caricatures in the Northern parts of the 
country anymore. (Liene 2018, 14–16, 226–227.) 
By 2008 the amount of the Finnish troops had increased to 100 peacekeepers. At the 
same time, the dispersed troops were gradually centralised to Mazar-E-Sharif – CIMIC 
activities in Kabul and presence in Maymana were ended in 2007 – and attached to a PRT 
under Swedish command. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 127; Liesinen 2018a, 467.) In the 
beginning of 2010, most of the Finnish troops served in the PRT and MOTs (Mobile 
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Observation Teams). In addition to that there were officers serving in various headquarters as 
mentors and liaison officers. The number of the Finnish troops in Afghanistan reached its 
peak in the beginning of 2012 with 195 personnel. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 127–128.) 
Due to the increase in insurgency activities the situation in Northern Afghanistan was 
most volatile during the years of 2009–2012. The Finnish troops were not unaffected. For 
instance, an explosion of a roadside bomb caused serious injuries for two Finnish 
peacekeepers in October 2009. An attack with bazookas and grenades injured three Finns in 
November 2010. A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted against a Finnish-
Swedish patrol in the end of January 2011 was also a close call but caused no casualties. The 
second, and so-far the last, Finnish peacekeeper to die in Afghanistan was First Lieutenant 
Jukka Kansonen, who was killed by an explosion of a roadside bomb a couple of weeks later. 
(Liesinen 2018a, 468.) Based on the information provided by the Finnish Ministry of Defence 
the Finnish troops have been involved in 44 firefights and have been a target of 21 attacks 
with explosives between the years of 2008 and 2014. In addition to the two losses of life 15 
peacekeepers have been injured – some of them seriously. (Moilanen 2014.) 
 After the transition of responsibility to the local security forces in 2013 the nature of 
the operation changed for the Finns also. From thereon ISAF focused on support functions 
such as training of Afghan troops and assisting in the building of local society. The number of 
Finnish troops was dropped to 90 personnel by December 2014. (Holma & Jalkanen 2018, 
128; Liesinen 2018a, 468.) After ISAF the Finnish troops have continued contributing in 
Afghanistan in the operation RS. The peacekeepers have served in the multinational 
headquarters in Kabul and in the headquarters of the Northern Command in Mazar-e-Sharif. 
In addition to those who have been engaged in mentoring and training activities there has 
been personnel serving in medical duties, close protection, and in the National Support 
Element. Initially the number of Finnish troops consisted of 80 personnel (Holma 2018, 133; 
Liesinen 2018a, 468.) With respect to the situation in 2019, there has been approximately 60 
Finns deployed during each rotation. (Afganistan RS s.a.) 
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3. Theoretical Framework: Analysing and Addressing 
Religious Elements to Resolve Conflicts 
In what follows I present the previous research central to the study and outline the theoretical 
framework10 of my thesis by introducing the concepts of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL in detail, 
examining what advantages the utilisation of religious expertise may provide for conflict 
resolution organisations, and assessing the potential which local religious leaders may have as 
networking and peacebuilding partners. The theoretical framework has been built on select 
studies. In the context of this thesis they comprise of, first, the publications of Steve Moore 
(2013) and Eric Patterson (2014), both of which focus on the role of chaplains as religious 
experts in international military operations; second, studies of Kim Hansen (2012) and Anne 
Loveland (2014), which also provide some useful insights into the topic of the thesis; and 
third, literature which takes a broader look at the theme of religion and conflict resolution, 
including contributions from Appleby (2000), Coward and Smith (2004), Gopin (2002a, 
2002b), Johnston (2003), Little (2007), Smock (2010), and Sisk (2011). The research process 
will be discussed more in depth in the next chapter, yet a short summary is provided at this 
point: As a tool for research the theoretical framework supported me in creating a general 
understanding of the phenomenon, finding integral information from the primary data, and 
categorising and analysing this information. Furthermore, it was useful in the search for new 
information, i.e. the specific ‘Finnish features’ of the subject under study. 
3.1 Previous Research: Religion and Conflict Resolution 
Military chaplains are hybrids of religious leaders and government officials. When they 
provide advice on operational matters or engage in peacebuilding activities, they become 
conflict resolution actors as well. For these reasons this study is interdisciplinary in nature and 
draws on research conducted mainly in the fields of the Study of Religions, International 
Relations (IR), and Conflict Resolution (CR) – fields multidisciplinary in themselves. In this 
subchapter I examine the main developments in the intersection of Religion and Conflict 
Resolution by introducing relevant previous research related to the three abovementioned 
fields, helping the reader to situate this thesis into the broader academic context it belongs to. 
In the ‘West’ religion was for several years considered a disappearing phenomenon 
which, especially in the context of conflict, was seen manifesting mainly in a destructive 
                                               
10 The theoretical framework chapter of this study is partly a modification of my bachelor’s thesis called 
Engaging the Religious Element in Conflict Resolution: In the Light of Approaches Introduced by S. K. Moore 
from April 2015. 
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manner. Many social scientists were confidently waiting for the realisation of expectations 
expressed in the secularisation theory, according to which religion would lose its importance 
in the world due to increased levels of wealth and more wide-spread provision of education. 
However, contrary to the expectations, religion did not fade away – if it ever had – from the 
public domain. This started to become apparent in the ‘West’ also as religion began its 
comeback to the political arenas in the 1960s. Still, the negative attitudes persisted, not least 
due to some resurgence of religiously motivated violence in the 80s and 90s. (Marsden 2012, 
1; Philpott 2018, 275–277; cf. Norris & Inglehart 2012, 3–4, 215.) 
The aforementioned sentiments towards religion may, at least partly, explain why IR 
and its sub-fields of the Cold War era were full of theories which relied mainly on the so-
called rational factors. Other kinds of variables such as culture and religion were largely 
dismissed.11 Lee Marsden notes that even as the Cold War ended and new theories of IR were 
brought forth in the 90s, many of the famous theorists such as Charles Krauthammer, John 
Mearsheimer, and Francis Fukuyama still failed to address religion adequately. They either 
did not mention religion at all or dismissed it to a large extent. He remarks that only Samuel 
Huntington seemed to be an exception to the rule with his – contested – Clash of Civilizations 
-thesis (1993, 1996).12 At the latest the events of 11 September 2001 forced the specialists of 
the field to take religion seriously. (Marsden 2012, 2–3; see also Philpott 2018, 277.) 
Since the twin-tower attacks several prominent scholars have attempted to shed light on 
religion’s obvious but complex relationship with violence and conflict – often in the context 
of terrorism. In his famous book Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Terrorism (2003, [2001]) sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer argues the myth of cosmic struggle 
having potential to work as a catalyst for violent acts: It has provided various perpetrators 
rationalising and justifying frames of reference for their atrocities and given them the sense of 
clarity and meaning amid harsh experiences of life: poverty, social oppression, corruption, 
and the like. Seeing oneself as a warrior in a greater struggle rather than as just someone 
merely surviving everyday life can be empowering. (Juergensmeyer 2003, 248.) 
Furthermore, scholars such as Esposito (2003), McTernan (2003), Stern (2004), Kepel 
(2004), and Hoffman (2006) have taken looks at religion’s role as a legitimiser and driver for 
                                               
11 Religion and the Cold War (2012) by Philip Muehlenbeck provides a perspective on the role of religion in the 
international affairs of the time. 
12 In other fields of studies there are some notable scholars who engaged with the thematic in the 80s and 90s 
already. See e.g. Kepel 1984, 1991; Roy 1985, 1995; Marty & Appleby 1991, 1993, 1994, 1994; Esposito 1992; 
Johnston & Sampson 1994; Hoffman 1998; Palva & Pentikäinen 1999. 
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violence, although focusing on different aspects of the phenomenon.13 Contesting views exist. 
For example, social psychologists Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2011) argue 
that ideology alone is a weak driver for radicalisation and present universal mechanisms14 
which may contribute to the development of increased readiness to violent behaviour – 
justified with religious terms or not. While they do note that ideology may have an important 
role in the process of rationalising violence, they do not count it as a causal factor in 
radicalisation processes. (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011, 191, 220–221.) Besides, 
constructivists like William T. Cavanaugh (2009) criticise arguments like the ones of 
Juergensmeyer for Western secular biases and challenge the whole discourse on religion and 
violence arguing that supposedly secular ideologies may be just as violence promoting as so-
called religious ones. Still, even Cavanaugh notes that: 
There is plenty of important empirical and theoretical work to be done on the violence of certain groups 
of self-identified Christians, Hindus, Muslims, etc., and there are no grounds for exempting their beliefs 
and practices from the causal factors that produce violence. For example, there is no doubt that, under 
certain circumstances, particular construals of Islam or Christianity contribute to violence. (Cavanaugh 
2009, 54.) 
The more nuanced studies of religion and violence explore the relationship of 
ideological and other factors in more detail. Cognitive anthropologist Scott Atran (2010) 
acknowledges religion’s influence on human perception and motivation but does not consider 
its direct connections to violence only. Even if his main argument is that people fight 
primarily for the members of their in-groups – friends – and not for their ideologies or values, 
and maintains that ideological commitment alone is rarely enough for someone to turn to 
deadly violence, he recognises that religion, similarly to other ideologies, may contribute to 
group formation and group competition: both of these phenomena, when manifesting in their 
most unconstructive forms, intensify violence and deadly conflicts. Moreover, he asserts that 
ideological commitment is often a necessary component for sustaining long-term violent 
efforts. (Atran 2010, 295–317; see also Patterson 2012, 118–120.) Additional research on the 
relationship of religion and other factors which may contribute to radicalisation has further 
deepened the current understanding concerning religion’s potential to foster violence (see e.g. 
Dunbar 2013; Whitehouse 2013, Sinnott-Armstrong 2013, Philpott 2013; Hall 2013; Jones 
2013; Dawson & Bramadat 2014). 
                                               
13 Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu (2012) divide the analyses to micro (belief, identity), meso (elites, ideology), 
and macro (values, culture) levels. 
14 The twelve universal mechanisms of radicalisation identified by McCauley and Moskalenko (2011): Personal 
grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, thrill seeking, love, group polarisation, group competition, 
group isolation, jiujitsu politics, hatred, and martyrdom. 
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Apart from the emergence of vast amounts of literature focusing on religion, violence 
and conflict, changes in the character of modern conflicts have impacted the field of CR as 
well, both in terms of research and practice. Religious and cultural elements have been 
increasingly considered due to their growing role in armed confrontations since the end of the 
Cold War. (Kriesberg 2007, 34–35; Marsden 2012, 3–4; Patterson 2012, 115.) Moore 
acknowledges the book Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (1994) by Douglas 
Johnston and Cynthia Sampson as ‘the first scholarly endeavor to draw attention to the role of 
religious peacebuilding’ (Moore 2013, 81). Atalia Omer in turn credits R. Scott Appleby’s 
The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (2000) as an 
important turning point which set the quest for religious peacebuilding in motion, made space 
for theological and hermeneutical enquiry of peace-promoting features in religious traditions, 
and provided a more comprehensive and balanced picture of religion in general: 
While the “clash” thesis does take religion seriously on its own terms as a causal factor in international 
relations and global politics, it renders religion as an ahistorical, monolithic, and unchanging essence. 
This lens produces an overly simplistic, belligerent, skewed, and deterministic picture of religion and 
conflict in the post–Cold War era. This picture is an appealing one precisely because of its simplicity; it 
consequently functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy with both Islamists and xenophobic Western 
commentators rendering their objectives in terms of ineradicable and irreconcilable differences between 
civilizations. The “ambivalence of the sacred” thesis, on the other hand, is grounded in recognition of the 
internal pluralities of religious traditions, consequently articulating a non-essentialist and non-reductionist 
constructive and contextually sensitive framework. (Omer 2015, 3–4.) 
The earlier studies, like those of Gopin (2002a, 2002b), Helmick and Petersen (2001), 
Abu-Nimer (2003), Coward and Smith (2004), Busuttil and ter Haar (2005), Little (2007), and 
Sampson (2007) highlight religion’s positive potential in CR and point out that religious 
individuals operate at all levels of CR activities, whether it be peace negotiations at the 
highest political plane or local initiatives at the grassroots. In addition to that they reveal that 
several NGOs which engage in this field have been established on religious principles and 
values, as well as chart out future possibilities and courses for the field. These studies focus 
on presenting case studies, examining peace promoting resources in religious traditions, and 
studying other specific aspects – such as traditions, rituals, religious actors, and others – of the 
phenomenon (see also Sisk 2011; Matyók & al. 2014), but lack overall analyses. Only the 
articles Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict 
Resolution (2009) by Jacob Bercovitch and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Ethno-Religious 
Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution (2009) by S. Ayse Kadayifci-
Orellana provide the first systematic analyses of the distinctive features and strengths of 
religious actors and their methods in CR (see also Hertog 2010). 
Scholars of this tradition usually build their arguments on the findings that on one hand 
religious dynamics make the conflict more complex but on the other hand they might provide 
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creative opportunities for its resolution (e.g. Svensson 2012, 119, 133). Still, scholars like 
David R. Smock acknowledge that one should have modest expectations towards faith-based 
approaches to conflict resolution. Although they may bring about notable progress, only 
rarely they put an end to violence. Too narrow approaches do not usually work as the 
efficiency of conflict resolution depends on many cumulative factors. Political, ethnic, and 
economic realities usually contribute to outcomes of conflicts characterised by religious 
elements. Therefore, having the focus just on religion may not be assumed to be sufficient. 
According to Smock the use of diverse methods and comprehensive cooperation of both 
religious and secular actors is needed. (Smock 2010, 43–46; see also Gopin 2002a, 29; Funk 
& Woolner 2011, 328.) In addition to various practical challenges also the underlying 
presuppositions and normative attitudes of faith-based CR have gained increased attention in 
the latest publications of the field (see e.g. Marsden 2012; Appleby, Omer & Little 2015). 
Within the intersection of Religion and IR, scholars such as Johnston (2003), Hoover 
and Seiple (2004), and Thomas (2005) continued challenging secular mindsets by arguing for 
the relevance of religion in foreign affairs and promoting its constructive engagement in the 
early 2000s. Some scholars like Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (orig. 2004) maintain that 
secularisation is taking place even if the overall number of religious people is rising in the 
world. They suspect that the growing divide between religious and secular societies likely 
increases the importance of understanding cultural differences in international affairs. (Norris 
& Inglehart 2012, 6, 241.) The industry has since boomed, and one can find religion being 
taken into consideration as the main subject (Funk & Said 2008; Haynes 2009; Patterson 
2011; Hoover, Seiple & Otis 2012; Wellman & Lombardi 2012; Shah, Stepan & Toft 2012; 
Nordquist 2013; Bosco 2014; Hassner 2016; Marsden 2019) or at least a part (Snyder 2011; 
Choi 2016; Philpott 2018) of many of the newer publications. In Finland Heikki Pesonen, 
Tuula Sakaranaho, and Sini Paukkunen served recently as editors for a study which focuses 
on the role of religion in world politics (2019). 
A few critical comments must be brought forth at this point. Firstly, in the Study of 
Religions, the very concepts of religious and secular – and their clear distinctions – have been 
contested as a modern invention (see Beyer 2011; Smith 2012). This is not to say that the IR 
and CR scholars with a ‘realist’ approach to religion have failed to recognise the problematics 
that come with the concepts or the religious versus secular -dichotomy (see e.g. Thomas 2005, 
21–45). Contributions that focus on the overlaps have been made also: Philip S. Gorski and 
Gülay Türkmen-Dervişoğlu argue that ‘it is not really possible to draw a line between secular 
nationalism and religion: secular nationalisms are not free of religious elements and 
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sometimes even metamorphose into religious nationalisms’ (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 
2012, 143). James A. Gregor (2012) in turn claims that the totalitarian systems of the 20th 
century functioned as religions in many respects even if they were promoted as secular. 
Secondly, also within the field of IR a constructivist group of scholars has emerged to 
challenge the current discourses on religion in the foreign affairs circles (see Cavanaugh 
2009; Goldstone 2011; Fitzgerald 2011). Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2015) argues that policy-
making and initiatives focusing on religious dynamics may strengthen divisive discourses and 
thus foster the very conflicts they ought to resolve. Accordingly, she calls for more cautious 
courses of action to be taken. Thirdly, it must be noted that women are quite absent in the 
studies of Religion and Conflict Resolution. Only some scholars have explored their 
contributions to faith-based peacebuilding (see Kwok 2012; Sharify-Funk & Woolner 2012; 
Marshall & Hayward 2015; Hayward 2015). 
Among Finnish scholars Religion and Conflict Resolution has received limited 
attention. Although with different focuses in terms of context, the following two studies 
situate close to this thesis. The doctoral dissertation of Katri Kyllönen, Uskonnon rooli 
maahanmuuttajien konfliktien sovittelussa. Sovittelijoiden, maahanmuuttajien ja kirkon 
maahanmuuttajatyöntekijöiden näkökulma (The Role of Religion in the Mediation of 
Immigrants’ Conflicts. Mediators’, Immigrants’, and the Church Immigrant Workers’ 
Perspective, 2012), can be considered a pioneering work in the field. Kyllönen demonstrates 
the capacity religion and religious actors may have in creating connections to and between 
immigrant communities. A few years later Jari Portaankorva followed with his doctoral 
dissertation Uskontodiplomatia ja konfliktinratkaisu: muslimit ja kristityt sovinnon 
rakentajina (Faith-based Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Muslims and Christians 
Building Reconciliation, 2018). He displays how faith-based peacebuilding may support 
conflict resolution at local, national, and international levels, and argues that these efforts 
need to be integrated so that they may bring about sustainable developments.  
Needless to say, being inspired by the studies of Moore (2013) and Patterson (2014), 
which are presented in detail in the next subchapter, this thesis presents a new field of inquiry 
to the Finnish research of Religion and Conflict resolution. At the same time, due to its focus 
on the Finnish context, it provides a fresh angle to military chaplains’ conflict resolution 
endeavours, a phenomenon which has been examined previously from the North American 
viewpoint mainly. Following the ‘realist’ tradition of Religion and Conflict Resolution yet 
keeping the ‘critical’ perspectives of the Studies of Religion in mind, I trust that this thesis 
makes an ample and balanced contribution to the topic. 
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3.2 Military Chaplains as Religious Experts 
Military chaplains resolving conflicts is not a new phenomenon, yet it seems that chaplains 
engaging in activities of this kind have most likely been very rare exemptions to the rule. Yet, 
older historical documents reveal that some individual US military chaplains attempted to 
mitigate armed confrontations already in the 18th and 19th century, negotiating with their 
British, native American, and Spanish adversaries at least. By doing so they sometimes 
managed to save lives or even secure bloodless surrenders. (Klocek & Hassner 2014, 175; see 
also Hansen 2012, 23.) Obviously, some further research and critical evaluation of these 
events would be needed. While it might well be that these chaplains’ contributions have been 
advantageous for the US troops, neither their intentions nor the conditions of their 
adversaries’ surrender are being discussed in the reports. 
However, in the 20th century American chaplains assumed mediation roles when the 
rivalling armies negotiated about the evacuations of the wounded and the dead amid the 
World Wars (Klocek & Hassner 2014, 175), and when the US forces tried to win the hearts 
and minds of local populations later in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam (Hansen 2012, 23). 
Furthermore, US chaplains are known of having educated their troops about local religious 
and cultural issues to some extent already since the 1960s. Engagement with local religious 
leaders started to take place in those days also, but it became a more significant aspect of the 
chaplain’s work only when the US troops were deployed to the Balkans in the 90s, and to Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the next decade. (Loveland 2014, 133–137; Keller 2014, 61.) The 
increased operational focus of chaplains has caused controversy in the US from early on. 
Many have been concerned about the possible violations of his protected status that come 
with the entanglement in operational decision-making, information gathering, and other 
combat related tasks. Although in the US many of these issues have been addressed in the 
form of doctrine and guidelines by now (Loveland 2014, 138–145; Keller 2014, 65–66), it is 
possible that some obscurities and difficult ethical questions remain. 
As for the modern concepts, when military chaplains assume the roles of religious 
experts, approaches which Steve Moore calls Religious Area Analysis (RAA) and Religious 
Leader Engagement (RLE) become of central importance. Eric Patterson’s terms of choice, 
Religious Advicement (RA) and Religious Leader Engagement (or Religious Leader Liaison, 
RLL) are practically identical with Moore’s terms, and are treated so in this thesis. In their 
publications RAA/RA may be understood as a part of RLE/RLL, but in this study they are 
considered separately for the sake of conceptual clarity. Since the following description of the 
approaches helps one to comprehend the core structure of the phenomenon under study, it is 
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naturally the most important component supporting the analysis of the research material, as 
well as the evaluation of the research findings. 
Moore explains that the goal of RAA is to provide understanding how religion 
influences people’s behaviour in a given AO. This is done by collecting and analysing data 
concerning religious practices and traditions of local populations. The collection and analysis 
of information will begin before the deployment – if possible – and will continue in the given 
AO as encounters with local religious leaders and communities take place. (Moore 2013, 
104–105.) As to the role of military chaplains and the potential of the approach, he writes 
that: 
Coupled with advanced theological training, analysis of this nature positions chaplains to better 
interpret the nuances of religious belief that often escape detection – something that could be very 
costly to a mission. In grasping something of the meaning and reality of the faith perspective, chaplains 
are more apt to appreciate how the belief system of the grassroots person may color their response to 
given mission initiatives, plans of action, troop movement, etc. The nature of command often 
necessitates sending troops into the way of harm. As such, the availability of all information pertinent to 
the decision-making process is critical. Advising commanders of the possible pitfalls or backlashes of 
given courses of action with respect to religious communities is a crucial aspect of the role of chaplains. 
(Moore 2013, 104.) 
Patterson in turn describes RA to comprise all preparations and executions of accumulation 
and provision of information concerning religious and cultural elements within an AO, i.e. 
acting as a specialist of religion for one’s troops. He emphasises the importance of increasing 
the commander’s awareness of these matters so that he may be well informed about the 
specific features and effects of local religions and cultures and take them into account 
accordingly when operations are being planned and conducted. (Patterson 2014, 14–15; 19.) 
He argues that ‘it has been a matter of life or death for the past decade’ (Patterson 2014, 19). 
A rather successful real-life example of RAA (or RA) activities is provided in Moore’s 
book. Military Chaplain Michael Hoyt conveyed a case from the time when he was serving in 
the US Army in Iraq. It had to do with a situation when the US troops had imposed 
restrictions of movement in a certain neighbourhood in order to prevent insurgency activities 
in the area. As an unintentional side-effect the troops blocked the access to the source of water 
nearest to the local Mosque. Thus, the observation of ablution practices and ritual purity 
before the daily prayers became more challenging for the local Muslim population and 
increased antagonism towards the US troops started to develop. However, due to his networks 
Chaplain Hoyt was able to learn about the issue and consult his leadership about it. As a 
result, the US troops adjusted their activities accordingly and the risk of unnecessary 
confrontation decreased. (Moore 2013, 104–105.) 
With reference to RLE, Moore situates it in the context of peacebuilding activities and 
asserts that chaplains’ work as bridgebuilders between different actors is of strategic 
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importance. First of all, chaplains may support mission members – both military and civilian 
– in building trust and good relations with local religious leaders. He writes that chaplains’ 
status as religious leaders themselves provides them common ground with local religious 
leaders, for both are recognised as trusted individuals and public representatives of spiritual 
values within their own communities. In addition to that their status as religious individuals 
may provide chaplains additional rapport in places where ‘the Westerners’ are generally 
thought of being secularists and thus a possible threat to traditional ways of life. Second of all, 
chaplains may mediate and support reconciliation between locals. Usually they can consult 
conflicting parties one by one, and sometimes they may even be able to get them around the 
same table to negotiate. Moore argues, that when chaplains are bringing together conflicting 
parties, and especially their religious leaders, they might be able, depending on the situation 
and their skills, to work as catalysts for beneficial interaction. Chaplains may provide local 
populations new platforms for communication, encourage them to launch reconciliation 
processes, or even support them in finding ways to cooperate. At best this may contribute 
substantially to the stabilisation of areas of operation. (Moore 2013, 97, 103–108.) Like 
Moore, Patterson describes RLE (or Religious Leader Liaison, RLL) as chaplains’ 
peacebuilding efforts. According to him the idea of the approach is that military chaplains 
meet with local religious leaders – as well as other representatives of local populations – with 
the intention and aim of fostering peace and mutual understanding. (Patterson 2014, 14, 19.) 
One of the first studied contemporary RLE/RLL efforts took place in 1993–1994 as 
Canadian chaplains – including Steve Moore himself – serving in Bosnia tried to build trust 
between leaders of the different ethno-religious groups found in the country: Bosnian Muslim, 
Croat Roman Catholic, and Serbian Orthodox. Chaplains Moore and Eugenio, who were 
deployed to the outskirts of Sarajevo with the Canadian Contingent of the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the winter of 1993, were soon approached by Imam Asim 
Azdahič, a regionally influential religious leader, and invited to discuss about peace and 
reconciliation with some of the religious leaders of the local Muslim community. During their 
rotation Chaplains Moore and Eugenio were able to build good relationships with the Bosnian 
Muslim and Croat Roman Catholic communities, which became open for the idea of dialogue. 
Their successors, Chaplains Guay and Pichette managed to further include Serbian Orthodox 
leaders in the process. Although the collaboration with the three faith communities eventually 
resulted in a joint interreligious celebration, with the regional leadership of each faith group 
participating in it, it failed to create long lasting effects. (Moore 2013, 133–139, 144.) 
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The reports from the 21st century include experiences of – in addition to American and 
Canadian – French, Norwegian, and New Zealander chaplains. Case studies reveal chaplains 
advising commanders and engaging local religious leaders and communities in Afghanistan, 
Kosovo, Iraq, and various countries of East Africa (Moore 2013; Cutler 2014). In addition to 
operational roles some chaplains have been utilised at strategic levels also: they have 
contributed to the planning and coordination of religious conflict analysis and conflict 
resolution activities of entire countries (Hoyt 2014; Cutler 2014; West 2014).  
Another case study presented in Moore’s book describes the impact of RLE/RLL 
activities of Michel de Peyret, a Roman Catholic priest who served twice in the French 
contingent of Kosovo Force (KFOR). During his second tour in the NATO-led mission in 
April-August 2005 he managed – due to his previous experience in peacebuilding and his 
commander’s support – to bring together the top religious leaders of all three faith 
communities of their AO: the Albanian Muslim, the Albanian Roman Catholic, and the 
Serbian Orthodox. In the beginning de Peyret created relations with the religious communities 
separately, being able to build trust and reduce tensions between the local population and the 
French troops. After learning that the local religious leaders had never met each other, the 
French troops decided to invite them to a shared meal with de Peyret’s help. They accepted 
the invitation and the encounter was a success. The religious leaders offered apologies to each 
other and organised consecutive meetings. Eventually they even joined forces in a public 
statement appealing for dialogue and condemning violence. (Moore 2013, 169, 175–179.) 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL are just one approach in the vast field of conflict resolution. 
Still, when one wants to address problems more comprehensively in places where religion 
matters, it is arguably a useful tool to be included into the repertoire of conflict resolution 
strategies. However, like conflict resolution in general, using these applications is not hasty 
business. Trust building, networking, and finding domains of cooperation requires a lot of 
patience and work (Moore 2013, 106–108; Appleby 2000, 279). What is noteworthy is the 
flexibility of the concepts. They were developed in military context but could be useful for 
civilian organisations as well. (Moore 2013, 258.) To mention a few possible examples, 
similar approaches could be used in civilian crisis management operations or in NGO 
activities, many of which take place in regions where religious elements play a big role in 
conflicts. The approaches could prove to be similarly important to local officials, for instance 
police forces and other security actors: in regions devastated by conflict, the relations between 
local officials and religious communities may be considerably weakened, if not severed, and 
tools are needed for addressing the problem. Therefore, should RAA/RA and RLE/RLL be 
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considered in the framework of CCM in the future, it seems likely that they would provide 
conflict resolution organisations an area of cooperation with a wide range of possibilities. 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL do not come without challenges. As it has been stated very 
clearly in the earlier studies, the chaplain’s qualities and training play a decisive role, making 
them a central area of investigation in this study too. Sometimes simply the orientation or lack 
of relevant skills may render a chaplain unsuitable for the role of religious expert. For 
instance, not all theological inclinations are useful in peacebuilding endeavours with local 
religious leaders. Moreover, recognising suitable partners – ‘tolerant voices’ – from among 
local populations requires certain interpersonal skills and sound judgement. (Moore 2013, 
110, 246–247; Appleby 2000, 287.) The background and experience of chaplains are of 
importance in this. For example, Klocek and Hassner write that among the US chaplains – 
who work in a rather multicultural and multireligious environment already – the engagement 
of leaders of various faith traditions was not considered as challenging as the provision of 
religious advice. Even if it may be presumed that chaplains have subject expertise on world 
religions, this is not necessarily the case – in the US context it is rarely the case. Certainly, 
inadequate training may be addressed but based on the US experiences it is not always clear 
how it can be done efficiently with respect to RAA/RA and RLE/RLL. (Klocek & Hassner 
2014, 179–181; see also Nix 2014, 57–58.) 
Another factor which may undermine chaplains’ potential as religious experts is the 
obscurity of their expert role. Without a clear role definition and guidelines within the 
military organisation chaplains may end up dealing with ambiguous tasks that are not 
integrated into the operational objectives of missions. Also, should the issue be left 
inadequately addressed, chaplains’ chances with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL could be hampered 
by leaders who are not aware of the broader possibilities which come with the approaches. 
Chaplains usually have significant resources at their disposal, especially in comparison to 
those of local religious leaders and communities, yet without the permission and support from 
their organisation they might not be able to make use of these resources and act properly, or at 
all, in this domain. Moreover, without standardised procedures RLE/RLL attempts run into 
the risk of becoming a discontinuous endeavour due to the short rotations and their chancing 
focuses. (Moore 2013, 161, 251; Klocek & Hassner 2014, 177, 180; see also Hoyt 2014, 78; 
Cutler 2014, 109.) Somewhat surprisingly the role of leaderships’ awareness and 
understanding is almost fully neglected in the previous research, and therefore special 
attention is paid to it in the analysis of this study. Also, other individual and structural issues 
which may affect RAA/RA and RLE/RLL are attempted to be specified. 
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Furthermore, Moore argues that issues like chaplains’ relationship with influence 
activities and information gathering for intelligence purposes need to be addressed. 
Unsurprisingly, the utilisation of chaplains for tasks like military deception or targeting would 
compromise their authenticity and credibility as trustworthy religious leaders who try to 
transcend hostilities. Notwithstanding, it must be noted that even if the intent and goals of 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL were in order, and no misuse of the chaplains took place, it is 
possible that locals became suspicious and associated these activities with propaganda, 
espionage, deception, or the like. (Moore 2013, 240–241.) Likewise, proselytization or 
promotion of ideas like religious freedom could potentially have similar effects. As Klocek 
and Hassner argue, further inquiry is needed to determine under which conditions the 
presence and actions of chaplains would rather produce negative than positive outcomes. 
(Klocek & Hassner 2014, 184.) Finally, military operations obviously often include an 
increased risk of facing kinetic threats. Hostile actors do not necessarily respect chaplains’ 
status as non-combatants and, as implied earlier, they may even consider RLE/RLL as an 
activity which needs to be opposed by force. Both chaplains and collaborating local religious 
leaders may thus turn into high value targets for opposition forces. (Moore 2013, 240.) 
Militaries do have means to address such issues, but it is reasonable to suppose that in some 
cases risks outbalance possible gains. The way that the above-mentioned issues have been 
taken into account in the FDF tell about the state of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL within the 
organisation and are therefore relevant for this thesis also. 
3.3 Added Value of Religious Expertise 
Religious experts – military chaplains included – are the first group of key actors in faith-
based conflict resolution. Due to their training and experiences they have developed a 
comprehensive understanding concerning religious elements and their dynamics in conflicts. 
Because of their status as credible religious actors they have a good basis to establish rapport 
with local religious leaders and communities. In this subchapter I summarise how their 
contributions differ from those of other conflict resolution actors, having the focus especially 
on the added value their expertise may provide for conflict resolution organisations they are 
working for. The added value is examined under four categories: 1) knowledge and 
information, 2) trust, 3) dialogue, and 4) religious tradition. The ultimate purpose of the 
following paragraphs is to aid the analysis of the research material in relation to the 
interviewees’ conceptions concerning the significance of the chaplain and his RAA/RA and 
RLE/RLL contributions in operations. 
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‘The starting point for resolving conflict is understanding it’ (Burnett 1994, 287). 
Firstly, information and knowledge about religion provides relevant understanding, for 
religion has an impact on how people think and act (Gopin 2002a, 13–14). 
Indeed, literally billions of people structure their daily routines around the spiritual practices enjoined 
by a religious tradition, and they often do so quite “publicly”. Dress, eating habits, gender relations, 
negotiations of time, space, and social calendar – all unfold beneath a sacred canopy. Around much of 
the world, politics and civil society are suffused with religion. In regions of the Middle East, Africa, and 
South Asia, for example, it is not uncommon for political leaders and government officials to 
demonstrate (and sometimes exaggerate) the depth of their formal religious commitment. That tests of 
moral character can be conducted apart from religious norms, however they are construed, is a highly 
contested notion in Islamic societies. (Appleby 2000, 3.)  
Thus, religion is one of the key elements that guide the social behaviour and inner life of vast 
amounts of people. Many of these people are active participants in violent conflicts this very 
moment. The challenge is that religion and its effects are not always easy to detect. Religion 
is prone to be absorbed into culture, it gets easily mixed into politics, and it adds extra layers 
into already complex structures of societies. Similarly, religious actors are not free from the 
influence of surrounding political, cultural, social, or economic realities, and therefore rarely 
– if ever – act ‘purely’ religiously. Nevertheless, Appleby argues that religiously motivated 
behaviour may and should be discerned, for the failure to do so results in erroneous analysis 
of the actors and their acts. (Appleby 2000, 55–56.) 
Secondly, religious texts and traditions are rich with material that has to do with 
reconciliation and conflict, along with stories about inner struggles of human beings amidst 
both war and peace. In-depth understanding of the relationship of the two, religious people 
and their religious traditions, helps one to understand these people and discover culturally 
relevant ways to resolve conflicts. (Gopin 2002a, 13–14.) Moreover, religious traditions and 
communities can provide religious experts with valuable information regarding the ways of 
life and behaviour of religious individuals and groups: 
From centuries of service, reflection, and prayer, religious communities possess a profound 
understanding of the psychological and social, as well as the spiritual needs of the human persons and 
human communities (Appleby 2003, 237). 
Having knowledge and information about religion serves interaction also. Appleby 
brings up an important observation about the significance of cultural sensitivity with concepts 
and words: the understandings of terms such as ‘peace’, ‘justice’, or ‘forgiveness’ differ from 
a religious tradition to another. In order to have meaningful conversations or mediate 
effectively, it is necessary to be familiar with the colloquial language of each religious 
community. (Appleby 2003, 251.) Furthermore, Marc Gopin notes that religious people tend 
to depict their circumstances with religious language and symbolism, even if religion was not 
among the underlying causes of the conflict in which they are involved. This opens another 
possibility for the utilisation of religious experts: they understand religious discourse and 
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action, their nuances included, and are accustomed to situations where the deepest feelings are 
expressed in religious terms. (Gopin 2002a, 14.) 
As for the possible advantages which come with a religious identity, Little’s remark is 
in line with those of Moore: ‘In some circumstances, prominent religious identity provides a 
badge of trustworthiness and impartiality that can be of great benefit in either formal or 
informal negotiations’ (Little 2007, 440; see also Moore 2013, 103). Judy Carter and Gordon 
S. Smith (2004, 296) state that sometimes religious leaders and actors have more freedom to 
move and act than their secular counterparts, as a credible religious status may add to one’s 
political immunity and trust within and without one’s own religious community. It is often 
associated with honesty, impartial, integrity and, high morals. Also, as Moore points out, for 
religious experts their religious identity works as a common ground with local religious 
leaders, giving the experts a better access to them and their communities (Moore 2013, 105). 
The high level of trust which religious experts often enjoy may at times translate into 
special opportunities in conflict resolution. They may be able to build trust between third – 
i.e. intervening – parties and local actors and mediate between conflicting parties themselves. 
Assuming a mediation role may be possible even if they were representing one of the 
conflicting parties, for ‘they are seen to transcend narrow partisanships, even though they 
have their own loyalties and commitments, which – in some cases – are well known.’ (Little 
2007, 441; see also Moore 2013, 103.) Based on the observations of Frode Lagset, a 
Norwegian military chaplain, it seems that chaplains’ attempts of trust-building among locals 
are not necessarily hindered even by the fact that they are serving in foreign armed forces. 
According to him at least in Afghanistan the local population is used to the close association 
of religious, political, and military actors: ‘In his estimation, affiliation with those in the 
uniform was not as much of a problem for the local community as some would contend.’ 
(Moore 2013, 219.)  
If religious experts find themselves in mediation roles, in an ideal case they may build 
bridges between the conflicting parties by encouraging dialogue and denouncing violence in 
collaboration with local religious leaders. Depending on the organisation they are working 
with and the situation at hand, they might even have the chance to provide disputants with 
safe spaces to meet and discuss. Thanks to the distinctive religious characteristics of the 
encounters, they might be able to provide spiritual guidance and counsel, for instance remind 
people of religious values and help them to handle grief and losses. (Carter & Smith 2004, 
296–298.) Concerning the possible challenges, Gopin asserts that building trust in highly 
religious environments faces the same risk as conflict resolution activities in general: if the 
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focus is on the results, the people involved become instrumentalised. In order to avoid this, 
the work of religious experts should be evaluated comprehensively, not only narrowly based 
on short-term outcomes. (Gopin 2002a, 154–158.) 
Like it has been indicated in the previous paragraphs already, understanding, trust, and 
dialogue complement each other’s in conflict resolution. As demonstrated, the faith-based 
approach may open new possibilities for dialogue, both between intervening parties and 
conflicting parties and between conflicting parties themselves. For conflict resolution 
organisations these additional channels of communication are most valuable, as without 
encounters and interaction between conflicting parties the actual resolution of their conflicts 
will not be possible. Once the process has started, religious experts may further support it by 
promoting and facilitating constructive dialogue (Little 2007, 440–441, see also Appleby 
2003, 255). Context specific understanding will enable them to discuss ideas and arguments 
in a culturally relevant way (Appleby 2003, 239; see also Gopin 2002a, 14). 
Religious and cultural understanding may prove to be an asset also when one attempts 
to understand non-verbal communication. As Marc Gopin notes, dialogue is not the 
equivalent of peace-making or conflict resolution. Depending on the culture and community, 
people value gestures, symbols, and acts, not to mention emotions and rationality, differently. 
(Gopin 2002b, 144–145.) What can be very challenging is that these non-verbal signals can be 
understood in various ways. For instance, there are great differences in what communities 
consider as appropriate or desirable gestures when it comes to themes such as reconciliation. 
Gopin clarifies his point in the following way: 
Let us take an example. In repeated interviews and social engagements between Arabs and Jews, some at 
very high levels of government, I have noticed a single pattern. Arabs tend to offer honor and expect 
honor as a conciliatory gesture in initial meetings, and Jews see the same honoring as far less important, 
or something that would be part of the culmination of the relationship instead. (Gopin 2002b, 147.) 
Then there are also times when dialogue may simply not be possible due to the strong 
emotions involved. The capacity for honest verbal expressions of feelings to the perceived 
enemy is simply lacking. In these cases, other forms of communication need to precede 
dialogue. (Gopin 2002b, 144–146.) Smock brings up an important point regarding dialogical 
peace-making: one should be careful not to bring disputants together too early. It is often 
more productive to first work separately with each party to make sure that everyone is 
sufficiently prepared for the encounter before it takes place. (Smock 2010, 46; see also Moore 
2013, 103.) 
One more aspect of religious experts and dialogue is worthy of attention. As Appleby 
(2000, 290–291; see also Little 2007, 440–441) demonstrates, religious mediators can be very 
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efficient in establishing dialogue between secular actors too. Regarding the work of an 
international Catholic lay community of Sant’Egidio in Kosovo, he writes: 
In 1995, at a point when Sant’Egidio representatives sensed an opening, they offered to moderate a 
structured dialogue. Having rejected several other offers of international mediation, “the Serbs concluded 
that St. Egidio could facilitate dialogue on a private, humanitarian and unofficial basis”, writes Roberto 
Morozzo della Rocca. “For their part the Albanians accepted St. Egidio as being fully independent of the 
Serbian state. […] a channel for ongoing dialogue and negotiations was established in the process. 
Despite deteriorating relations between the two million Albanians and the 200,000 Serbs resident in 
Kosovo, Sant’Egidio sustained this inchoate dialogue and provided medical assistance and other forms of 
humanitarian aid to both sides. (Appleby 2000, 290.) 
Sant’Egidio’s work had a similar effect amid the Algerian civil war as their connections 
opened new possibilities for dialogue in the 1990s. They managed to bring together prominent 
secular and religious leaders and offer them a safe platform for negotiations. (Appleby 2000, 
291–292.) 
The possible advantages gained with religious expertise are not limited to the increased 
levels of understanding, trust, and communication. With active theological enquiry and 
discussion, one might be able to harness some of the transformative power of religious 
traditions in favour of conflict resolution: 
Familiarity with classical sources might make it possible to distinguish where and when a leader is 
expressing real traditions and when he is using the religion to gain political power through the use of 
violence. Even if he is expressing an authentic violent source, exploration is required to see if there is 
theological deliberation, a new look at the sources, or alternative sources that might countermand the 
desire for violence or conflict that is implied in the tradition. Religious traditions are dynamic, and can 
change profoundly through discussion and the influence of leadership. (Gopin 2002a, 19.) 
There are not only violence-prompting resources within religious traditions: ‘On the 
constructive side, religions have a keen awareness on of injustice and the subtle workings of 
prejudice and evil’ (Appleby 2003, 237). Therefore, sacred texts can function as an inspirator 
for both individual and communal transformation, and the religious values incorporated in 
various traditions can turn out to be useful in conflict resolution. (Gopin 2002a, 19–20; see 
also Carter & Smith 2004, 279–281.) 
Moreover, religious traditions do not include texts and ideas only, but there is a ritual 
aspect as well. Concerning reconciliation, Gopin argues that for most people, ceremonies and 
rituals are of great importance in the times of crisis. He sees that the majority of people cannot 
actually cope with verbal reconciliation, but fortunately ‘[t]here are many ways that people 
say “I am sorry” with their deeds and symbols without uttering a word.’ (Gopin 2002b, 196.) 
Thus, he argues against solely verbal approaches to religious peace-making and suggests that 
when conflicting parties are prepared enough, they could invite the other party to join them in 
their rituals, agree to participate in the rituals of the opposing party or possibly even take turns 
in such occasions. (Gopin 2002b, 195–196.) Moore maintains that religious experts are 
suitable to engage local religious leaders through rituals. Regardless of the intensity of their 
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religious dimension – whether the rituals are simply shared meals or joint prayers – they 
provide religious leaders with chances to encounter each other and, hopefully, to alter their 
relations for the better. (Moore 2013, 56.) 
3.4 Potential of Local Religious Leaders as Partners 
Local religious leaders are the second group of central actors in faith-based conflict 
resolution. In many societies they are key individuals on whose willingness to cooperate the 
success of conflict resolution attempts can be highly dependent (Moore 2013, 106). Smock 
states that ‘without credible local partners, no international actor has a chance of making 
much of a contribution to conflict resolution’ (Smock 2010, 43). Appleby considers religious 
leaders who view nonviolent peace-making as a religious duty particularly potential 
candidates as such partners (Appleby 2003, 251). In this subchapter I examine the added 
value that can be gained if conflict resolution organisations send religious experts to network 
and build peace with local religious leaders in accordance with the RLE/RLL principles. The 
added value is presented below under four categories: 1) mobilisation of people, 2) 
connections and networks, 3) political influence, and 4) resources. This part of the theoretical 
framework supports the evaluation of the interviewed chaplains’ and commanders claims and 
observations concerning Finnish troops’ collaboration with local religious leaders. It provides 
an overall theoretical idea concerning the range of potential outcomes of such collaboration 
which may be then later compared to the interviewees’ experiences. 
Religious leaders are usually influential individuals, particularly within their own 
communities, and their religious authority gives them special leverage to mobilise people. 
Therefore, with their words and deeds, they can directly contribute to the development of 
conflicts, for good or ill. (Appleby 2000, 283.) When it comes to the possible positive 
contributions, there are many ways how religious leaders can support conflict resolution by 
addressing issues among their own followers. They may remind people of the importance of 
virtues and values such as tolerance and peace. They may promote human rights and justice 
and condemn violence and incitement to it. They may set an inspiring example by displaying 
will to forgive and reconcile. (Carter & Smith 2004, 294–295.) Appleby provides an example 
of contributions of this sort from Kosovo: 
During the aftermath of the war and continuing through the war in Kosovo, Serbian Orthodox as well as 
Croatian Catholic bishops, priests and lay leaders tempered their ultranationalist rhetoric, condemned 
atrocities and attitudes within their own communities, sponsored or participated in a series of local 
reconciliation seminars, and entered more readily and frequently into ecumenical collaboration, 
including participation in the promising Interreligious Councils established in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
(Appleby 2003, 246–247.) 
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 As for the ritual aspect of faith-based conflict resolution, religious leaders may do 
their share by leading local communities through times of sorrow and mourning in culturally 
appropriate ways. In some cases, they might even manage to bring conflicting parties together 
for joint rituals. There they may have possibilities to urge people to acknowledge and 
apologise for the sufferings of the opposing party. (Carter & Smith 2004, 296.) Religious 
experts can support these sorts of events as catalysts or assistants (Appleby 2003, 247; see 
also Moore 2013, 252). In some situations, joint pursuits for conflict resolution which have 
cut across religious boundaries have been most successful. Interreligious endeavours initiated 
by prominent religious actors have mobilised a great number of people for peace. A good 
example of this is the case of Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammad Ashafa from 
Nigeria. The impact of their joint project, the Interfaith Mediation Centre, has been arguably 
vast: 
By now the Interfaith Mediation Centre has worked with nearly seven thousand youths, has a membership 
of ten thousand people, and has located at least two youth leaders trained in conflict resolution in every 
one of Nigeria’s thirty six states (Little 2007, 432). 
Religious leaders’ significance in conflict resolution is often based on their good 
connections and networks: in general, they are well-connected through the religious 
institutions they oversee. These institutions do not only bring people together efficiently at the 
grassroots level, improving networking among local populations, but they also connect local 
communities to larger religious organisations and networks (Appleby 2003, 253; Moore 2013, 
125). Some religious leaders – as well as lay members of religious communities – may even 
have friends behind the enemy lines (Gopin 2002b, 212; see also Moore 2013, 100). Also, 
some of them engage in intercultural or interreligious initiatives already (Appleby 2003, 254). 
Thus, approaching religious leaders may enable conflict resolution actors to gain the widest 
possible access to alienated communities. 
 Such efforts of track two diplomacy, which differ from traditional diplomacy practiced 
by government officials and politicians, can provide creative opportunities for conflict 
resolution. Especially in those regions of the world where there are no clear boundaries 
between religion, culture, and politics, faith-based actors and approaches can prove to be most 
valuable in opening such opportunities. (Philpott & Cox 2010, 2–3.) Daniel Philpott and Brian 
Cox illustrate this potential by conveying a report of a Hindu bandit from Kashmir who went 
through a noticeable transformation during an interfaith event. Even though the bandit was 
strongly insulting his opponents in the beginning of the seminar, a noticeable change took 
place in him over its course: 
At the end of the three day seminar, our attention was naturally piqued when the same man stood up again 
before the participants, but with a different message. He apologized to the Muslims for his insensitivity to 
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their suffering in the conflict, and forgave them for their violence against the Hindus. What had elicited 
the change? The man had experienced the telling of his story to Muslims for the first time. The seminar 
allowed him to understand the complexity of social justice, and to come in terms with the historical 
wounds of his community, ultimately moving him to embrace apology and forgiveness. All this was 
accomplished in an atmosphere of religious ritual and reflection. (Philpott & Cox 2010, 1.) 
In respect to religious leaders and political influence, two aspects must be observed: on 
one hand, religious leaders are often formidable political actors at local and regional levels – 
whether they pursue it or not – and sometimes they even reach national and international 
prominence (Appleby 2000, 284–285; Smock 2010, 44–45). If religion plays a big role in a 
certain society, religious actors might be capable, or even needed, to provide the necessary 
legitimacy for political processes (Smock 2010, 45; see also Little 2010, 441–442; Johnston 
& Cox 2003, 14). At best, when joining conflict resolution efforts, religious leaders may be 
able to convince political leaders to change their attitudes, follow their lead, and even join 
them in the faith-based pursuit for peace, for there are many prominent politicians who are 
religious themselves (Johnston & Cox 2003, 22–23; Appleby 2003, 241). On the other hand, 
faith-based peace-making efforts of religious leaders may complement political processes, not 
by directly interfering in political matters, but by focusing on other aspects of conflicts. 
Smock argues that ‘sometimes it is more productive for religious leaders to consider 
emotionally divisive issues than for them to be debated in secular/political context’ (Smock 
2010, 46). Carter and Smith, too, remind that there might be issues which are impossible to be 
settled within traditional political settings or are simply better to be addressed by religious 
means: 
From disputants’ point of view, on the other hand, interfaith initiatives offer an opportunity to get beyond 
political posturing and the pieces of paper on which peace agreements are written. They give disputants, 
especially at the grassroots level, a chance to move from the intellectual and political realm to the 
emotional and more practical realms of peacebuilding. (Carter & Smith 2004, 291.) 
In addition to authority, connections, and political power, religious leaders often have 
various resources at their disposal. Should they be willing to cooperate with conflict 
resolution actors, these resources may become available for the service of peace. In some 
cases, depending on their status and connectedness, the resources available to local religious 
leaders are not necessarily restricted to local level only, but might surpass regional or even 
national borders: 
They may be associated with large and well-funded international organizations, which they can call up for 
assistance. This can allow religious leaders to act and direct resources faster than either governmental or 
non-governmental actors. (Carter & Smith 2004, 296.) 
The information provided by religious leaders may prove to be an important resource 
for those who wish to better understand and resolve conflicts. Due to their networks and 
connections within their own societies, religious leaders possess first-hand knowledge about 
local issues. They speak local languages and likely know the different actors personally. 
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Because of their background and education, they usually have extensive cultural know-how 
and are well predisposed to assess the conflicts affecting their communities. (Moore 2013, 
79.) Regarding human resources, if local religious leaders receive proper training, they may 
become important actors in conflict resolution themselves (Appleby 2003, 252–253). 
Furthermore, as religious leaders usually double as educators within their communities, they 
could pass this training on to the local populace too (Carter & Smith 295). According to 
Appleby, in each religious community there is a group of key people whose involvement in 
conflict resolution would be of great importance: 
While levels of religious literacy vary, in most religious communities a core group of disciplined and 
dedicated believers keeps the tradition alive by performing works of mercy, providing catechetical or 
other religious instruction, and leading or participating worship. These adherents naturally form the heart 
of any systematic effort to build local cultures of peace from the conceptual and symbolic resources of the 
religious tradition. (Appleby 2000, 286.) 
With respect to material resources of religious communities, they may consist of social 
places and other already-existing infrastructure (Appleby 2003, 252–253), along with material 
suitable for humanitarian aid. In situations where the weakening or even collapse of local or 
state authority entails that they lack the capacity to take care of the basic needs of local 
populations, the work of local religious institutions might become crucial. Due to their 
structures and knowledge, they are often able to provide and restore services and 
infrastructure. These institutions are also usually considered as trustworthy by local 
populations, making them natural actors to whom people turn in times of crisis. (Moore 2013, 
214.) 
Although the focus of this subchapter has been in the possible advantages which may be 
gained when conflict resolution actors collaborate with local religious leaders, there has been 
no intention to neglect the challenges which may come along. At times, local religious leaders 
might be rather of hindrance than assistance. Some do not possess relevant resources, skills, 
or understanding to mitigate conflict, others may purposefully incite their followers to 
violence and hatred. In some situations, religious leaders may simply not have enough 
influence to be of assistance. Moreover, like other human beings, they are not immune to the 
realities surrounding them. (Sisk 2011, 1–6.) Still, also these reasons speak for the need to 
take religious leaders into consideration – as potential spoilers at least. 
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4. Semi-Structured Interviews and Qualitative Content 
Analysis 
A qualitative research method has been utilised in this thesis. Qualitative research, unlike 
quantitative research, does not seek statistical generalisability of findings but rather aims at 
describing, understanding, or theorising a specific phenomenon (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 87; 
Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 46), even if the findings might at times shed light on other similar 
phenomena or contexts also (Alasuutari 2011, 32, 37–38; Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 49–50). I 
chose to utilise a qualitative approach due to its suitability for exploring and describing the 
subject of the study in detail. A systematic literature review was conducted in order to form 
the introduction, background, and theoretical framework chapters. The primary data of this 
study was collected with semi-structured interviews. The data was then analysed with a 
method called qualitative content analysis. In the following subchapters I present the starting 
points and preconditions of the study, outline the data collection process, describe the analysis 
of the data, and discuss questions concerning the reliability, validity, and generalisability of 
this study. 
4.1 Starting Points and Preconditions 
The primary data of this study consists of 10 semi-structured interviews. The conduction of 
the interviews required a research permit from the FDF. Since my study has to do with the 
international operations of the FDF and touches aspects of CCM, I decided to direct my initial 
enquiries to the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT). I approached 
FINCENT for the first time by e-mails and phone calls in February 2018 and eventually had a 
meeting with its then-chief in the beginning of June 2018. He provided me guidelines how to 
proceed with the application for the research permit. I drafted my application – including a 
research plan – for the research permit during the summer of 2018. I submitted the final 
version of the application to the Finnish Defence Forces Defence Command in the end of 
August 2018 and the permit was granted in the end of September 2018.15 The interview 
questions (see Appendix III) were formed based on the initial theoretical framework – 
included in the research plan – by the end of September 2018. The interviews were conducted 
in various locations in Southern Finland during October and November 2018. The 
transcription of the interviews was finished in the end of December 2018. The whole writing 
process of the thesis was completed in the end of October 2019. 
                                               
15 FDF research permit AO17058, 21.9.2018. 
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In accordance with the research permit the research participants, who contributed to the 
study on voluntary basis, included ten persons with relevant experience: six former military 
chaplains and four former commanders of Finnish contingents in Lebanon and Afghanistan. 
At the time of their interviews half of the chaplains were regular staff of the FDF, the other 
half of them being reservists who were serving in various Parishes, whereas all the former 
commanders were on active duty, serving with ranks of colonels and colonel lieutenants in the 
FDF. There was not much diversity among the interviewees them all being rather established 
Finnish males. Three of the military chaplains and two of the commanders were chosen to be 
interviewed due to their tours of duty in Lebanon, and the rest of them, three military 
chaplains and two commanders, were chosen due to their tours of duty in Afghanistan, 
although it must be noted that most of them had experience from more than one operation. 
The other deployments might have naturally given additional perspectives and depth to the 
reflections and answers of those concerned but, keeping the limits of the research permit in 
mind, any direct references to experiences which did not have to do with the focus countries 
and the studied time period of this study were left outside the analysis. In total, the research 
participants had approximately seven and half years of operational experience from the two 
countries since the year 2010. 
The participants were chosen from among candidates with experience of serving as 
military chaplains and commanders for I assessed that they would possess the most relevant 
information concerning the topic but might provide different perspectives on it, which is 
useful when one wishes to draw a more accurate picture of the studied phenomenon (see e.g. 
Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 87–88). In operations, the Finnish chaplain has a direct access to his 
commander, and he engages local religious leaders in accordance with his commander’s intent 
(Sotilaspapiston opas 2017, 14). The logic behind the decision not to focus on one operational 
environment only was similar: I estimated that comparisons between experiences from the 
two countries would reveal different aspects of the subject under study, providing richer 
material for the analysis (see e.g. Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 49–50). As dictated in the research 
permit, this thesis has been put in writing in a manner which ensures that the identities of the 
research participants will not be revealed. Each participant has been given a serially numbered 
code, where the abbreviation CO stands for commander, CH for chaplain, L for Lebanon, and 
A for Afghanistan. 
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4.2 Data Collection 
The former chief of FINCENT supported me in finding some suitable candidates for the 
interviews and obtaining their contact information, except for the reservists whom I found 
through internet searches and personal enquiries. Finding Finnish chaplains with experience 
from operations was not too difficult, for some of them have given interviews of their 
experiences, others have written blog posts or short articles from their operations, some have 
given out this information about their work history in their resumes or introductions in their 
Parish websites, and so forth. Commanders of Finnish peacekeeping and crisis management 
forces are likewise rather public figures and maybe even easier to be found, thanks to news 
agencies such as YLE and Helsingin Sanomat. 
Initially I approached the suitable candidates with e-mails and phone calls. Most of the 
candidates whom I found and reached (15) considered the topic interesting and would have 
liked to participate in the study, and I ended up in a situation where I could have had more 
participants (14) than the research permit allowed (10). I chose the participants from among 
the suitable candidates based on the Lebanon and Afghanistan quotas mentioned above, the 
order of their positive responses, and their availability in October and November 2018. Before 
the interviews I sent the interview questions to the participants in advance by e-mail. The 
interviews, which were recorded with the interviewees’ consent, took place face to face in 
various military facilities, church premises, and at my home. The interviews lasted from 40 to 
90 minutes depending on the schedule and amount of contribution of each participant. The 
duration of the interviews was almost 11 hours in total. When transcribed, they became to 
consist of approximately 130 pages of text. The language of the interviews was Finnish, and 
the translations of the interview quotations used in the thesis are mine. I find that the 
interviews were easy to arrange and that the atmosphere during the interviews was relaxed 
and open every time. 
There are many issues which may raise when one gathers data with interviews. In this 
case the process of obtaining the research permit took several months. Finding suitable 
participants and organising meetings with them took weeks. Half of the interviews required a 
full day of travel to be conducted. Also, interviewing itself – like transcribing – is a time-
consuming endeavour. (See Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2000, 35, 140; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76.)  
In addition to that one must consider the limits of human memory, the changes taking place in 
human beings, motives of the participants, levels of honesty of the participants, different ways 
the research questions may be understood, challenges in communication, effects of interaction 
between the participants and the researcher, limits of a perspective of an individual human 
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being, and so forth. (See Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2000, 16–18, 23, 34–36, 41–43, 48–53, 186–189; 
Alasuutari 2011, 69–75, 111–117). 
Still, despite all the challenges it can be stated that there are certain advantages when 
interviewing is used for research purposes. As a method it is flexible, for it provides 
possibilities to repeat questions, ask for specifications, or clarify what is being meant, 
meaning that there are many ways to maximise the amount of relevant information which is 
being collected. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 75.) The semi-structured – or thematic – interview 
method is considered particularly useful when the phenomenon at hand has not been studied 
extensively before, but it is known that the research participants are familiar with – or even 
experts of – the phenomenon. In such a situation, as it was in the case of this study also, the 
researcher may take an initial look into the presumably significant aspects of the phenomenon 
in advance and, based on this analysis, create a theoretical idea – or an actual theoretical 
framework – of it. After that the researcher may form the interview protocol around the 
relevant themes based on the theoretical idea. In the final phase he may start conducting the 
interviews, which are focused on the relevant themes. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2000, 35, 47.) 
Both the actual and spontaneous interview questions focused on the practical aspects of 
the utilisation of religious expertise of Finnish military chaplains. I purposefully neither 
defined the concepts of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL for the interviewees nor shared my ideas 
concerning the topic before or during the interviews. I also did not single out any of the 
particular features of the approaches – presented in the theoretical framework – and avoided 
asking specific questions concerning the possible advantages, challenges, and ideas for the 
development of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL (such as ‘do you think that the chaplain’s presence 
may work as a signal of trustworthiness to local populations?’ or ‘do you see any problems 
which may raise in regard to the chaplain and intelligence gathering?’). This was done in 
order to provide the interviewees more room to focus on the aspects they considered pertinent 
to the topic and not to direct the interviews too much with my preliminary understanding. 
This proved to be important, as it eventually highlighted the emphases and understandings of 
the interviewees as well as the possible gaps in their awareness concerning the approaches. 
4.3 Analysis Process 
The collected data has been analysed with a method called qualitative content analysis. The 
goal of content analysis is to create a clear, coherent, and compact picture of the phenomenon 
which is being studied, without losing any relevant information present in the collected data. 
Hence, the data is being reorganised in a way that it would be possible to draw plausible 
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conclusions about the phenomenon. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 110.) In this study the analysis 
was loosely bound on theory, i.e. abductive in its nature: The theoretical framework provided 
a versatile tool for the research process as it enabled the search for material which suits to the 
already known themes and issues, but it did not restrict new themes or information emerging 
from the collected data. Therefore, it was also possible to take into account the differences 
between the previous research and the primary data. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 98–99.) 
In practice the research data has been processed with the help of a qualitative data 
analysis software called ATLAS.ti. The transcribed data was reduced into smaller segments of 
text which were categorised, producing 99 codes as they are called in the software, under nine 
themes, or code groups. The themes/code groups included the already existing six interview 
themes and three new themes which emerged during the interviews. For example, under the 
theme/code group called ‘the role of the military chaplain’ categories/codes such as ‘ecclesial 
work’, ‘spiritual and psychosocial support’, ‘crisis support’, and so forth, were formed. In 
many cases individual segments of text suited under multiple categories/codes and were 
therefore used in this manner. With the software, each category of segmented data, i.e. all the 
individual pieces of text in each category/code, were compiled into lists and further analysed. 
In the process some of the categories/codes clearly merged and were therefore treated as units, 
the contents of others were summarised as such.  
As I worked on with the material, I decided to focus on two aspects of the phenomenon 
in my analysis: first, the broader conceptions and ideas the interviewees brought up 
concerning religious factors in international operations, and second, the concrete experiences 
they told about having with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL. The subchapters of the analysis became 
largely based on the interview themes: Only one of the interview themes – nr. 6 concerning 
the future potential of the topic – merged fully into other parts of the analysis. As to the new 
themes, two of them – which deal with the less discussed issues – were combined and 
emerged as the independent subchapter 5.3, and one – which focused on the perceived 
advantages that come with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL – became covered in the other 
subchapters and was thus left out as a separate entity. 
The description provided above is obviously not an exhaustive account but rather a 
general synopsis of that what I did with the research material. Qualitative analysis is often a 
complex process taking place simultaneously at multiple levels. The researcher makes 
interpretations of the research data while examining it and these interpretations guide the 
further examination of the research data. As the research data needs to be understood in its 
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entirety, it might need to be re-examined, reorganised, and reinterpreted several times during 
the research project. (See Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 109–110.) 
Throughout the research process the information the participants made available was 
treated as evidence, so it was assumed that the answers they gave were to a great extent 
honest, objective, and accurate descriptions of the things they had experienced (Alasuutari 
2011, 72). This does not mean that the things which were not said would not have been 
considered, but there were no reasons to presume that the research participants had distorted 
or hidden any information. My assumption about their honesty is based on their status as 
public officeholders serving in trusted institutions, the considerable responsibilities they have, 
the similarity of their answers concerning the phenomenon under study, and the amount of 
healthy criticism they demonstrated during the interviews. Due to the conditions of the 
research permit they were not allowed to give me any classified information, but it seemed 
that there were only a few moments when this influenced the interviews. In such cases the 
interviewees also usually politely expressed, if they were not able to go into further details. In 
retrospect, the research participants provided me with an extensive and most useful set of data 
to be analysed. 
4.4 Reliability, Validity, and Generalisability 
Concerning the reliability and validity of this study a couple of things must be noted. On one 
hand the reader should be aware that the study is based on the following positivistic premises: 
it is assumed, firstly, that there is one objective reality, and secondly, that the phenomenon 
which is being studied exists. On the other hand, the fact that the possibility to reach objective 
knowledge or truth may and should be questioned has been taken into consideration. (Tuomi 
& Sarajärvi 2002, 133–134.) The participants make interpretations of the studied phenomenon 
and the researcher interprets the participants’ interpretations (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 102). 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the reality is being observed from a given perspective, as 
if through certain kinds of lenses (e.g. Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 153).  
As for my lenses, they may be coloured by my positive attitudes towards Finnish 
peacekeepers and faith-based approaches to conflict resolution, but as can be seen on the 
pages of this thesis, my ‘faith’ for them is neither uncritical nor without reservation. 
Throughout the research process I have kept in mind that my attitudes and opinions influence 
my reasoning. Therefore, I have consciously attempted to reduce their effects. For instance, I 
did my best not to neglect any aspects or parts of the research material while processing it, 
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compared it constantly with the previous research, and strove to provide well-reasoned 
arguments when assessing opposing views found in it. 
Since in the case of qualitative research the phenomenon under study is usually limited 
to a specific context and time, and the research data may be interpreted and analysed in 
various ways, the researcher becomes a central tool in the research process himself. It is 
possible that other researchers would end up having different study findings no matter how 
faithfully they followed my research design. Therefore, many researchers argue that the 
transparency of the study and the recognition of the researcher’s subjectivity become central 
factors in the assessment of the reliability and validity of the study. The reader must have 
enough information concerning the whole research process (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2000, 186–
189; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 20, 138; see also Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 152–153; Alasuutari 
2011, 63). 
For this reason, in order to increase the reliability and validity of the study, I have 
defined the premises, subject, and purpose of the study in detail, provided information about 
the study timetables, told about the research participants within the limits of the research 
permit, described the data collection process, and introduced the analysis of the data. I have 
also explained my choices concerning the focus of the study. In addition to the high level of 
transparency the study contains some limited data triangulation, for two different types of 
groups (military chaplains and commanders) of research participants with experiences from 
two different types of operational environments (Lebanon and Afghanistan) were interviewed 
in order to compare their perspectives on the topic (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 142). The lack 
of other forms of data triangulation may obviously be considered a challenge to the evaluation 
of the reliability and validity of the study. For example, I did not gain access to confidential 
mission reports, which could have provided additional data about Finnish chaplains’ RAA/RA 
and RLE/RLL activities. Moreover, when one is studying a phenomenon such as the 
utilisation of religious expertise, Johnston’s blunt remark, ‘[b]y its very nature, any spiritual 
contribution to conflict resolution will be impossible to isolate and measure’ (Johnston 1994, 
265), should be remembered. Therefore, I suggest that the results of this study should be 
approached with healthy criticism, although I am convinced that due to the reasons mentioned 
above, some conclusions can be drawn. 
In addition to reliability and validity the question of generalisability should be 
addressed. It may be said that in a way all qualitative studies are case studies, and thus 
generalisation of the findings is not the ultimate goal of the research. Still, based on the 
argumentation of Jari Eskola and Juha Suoranta I would say that some generalisations may be 
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made in this case. According to them the proper collection of data is of importance: If the 
research participants have similar enough experiences of the phenomenon which is being 
studied, relevant expertise concerning the research questions, and interest in the study itself, 
the level of generalisability is likely to be better. In addition to that comparisons within the 
research and between the previous research and the research results improve the 
generalisability of the research results. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 49–50.) These conditions 
were met in this study. 
Furthermore, Pertti Alasuutari writes that generalisability is not a problem, if the subject 
under study is an already known or a common phenomenon, even if it has not been studied 
extensively before. Rather than needing to reveal or prove its existence explaining and 
describing it becomes central. (Alasuutari 2011, 183.) The utilisation of military chaplains’ 
religious expertise is certainly not an uncommon phenomenon, although little studied. Based 
on the versatility of the case studies presented in his book Moore argues that the principles of 
the phenomenon are generalisable to various contexts. (Moore 2013, 97–98, 240, 295.) 
The role of chaplains engaging the leaders of religious communities is not a new phenomenon in 
operational environments. Encounters of this nature have occurred over the decades wherever chaplains 
have deployed with troops, regardless of nationality. In a form or another, RLE has been a successful 
aspect of civic engagement in active conflict zones, in peace support operations, with its emphasis on 
reconstruction and stabilization, and in post-conflict environments where brokered ceasefires led to 
mission mandates enforcing fledging peace agreements between former belligerents. (Moore 2013, 97.) 
The common nature of the phenomenon was noticed with the Finns as well, for the research 
participants seemed to be quite familiar with the concepts of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL even if 
some of them had little or no first-hand experience of the approaches. For these reasons, it 
may be concluded that the applicability of the information produced in this study is not 
limited to Finnish chaplains or the utilisation of religious expertise in Lebanon and 
Afghanistan only, but likely proves to be useful in different national contexts and other areas 
of operation as well. Besides, as noted already earlier, these approaches could prove to be 
useful outside the military realm (see e.g. Moore 2013, 258), likely serving NGO activities 
and civilian crisis management operations too. 
Nonetheless, despite the good quality and possible wider applicability of the findings I 
wish to emphasise that it is not within the scope of this study to provide an all-encompassing 
picture of such a complex phenomenon as the utilisation of Finnish military chaplains as 
religious experts in Finnish Defence Forces’ international operations in Lebanon and 
Afghanistan even throughout the studied time period. I rather aim to gather and present some 
insights into such an interesting topic and hope that they might serve as an inspiration for 
further research, discussion, and ideas. 
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5. Conceptions about Religious Factors in International 
Operations 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the broader context of the interviewees’ conceptions 
concerning the subject of this study, hopefully helping the reader to see where they are 
coming from and to better evaluate their experiences discussed in the next chapter. The first 
subchapter presents what the study participants thought about the chaplain in international 
operations in general. The chaplain’s role as a religious expert is situated among his other 
duties, and it is assessed how the chaplain’s skills, competence, and orientation, as well as the 
personnel’s attitudes towards him affect how the chaplain is and may be utilised. The second 
subchapter examines the interviewees’ views about the significance of religious expertise and 
the chaplain’s possibilities to contribute in this domain during the deployments. Dynamics of 
religion and conflict, Finnish troops’ preparedness to deal with religion and culture, the ways 
in which religious expertise may prove to be useful, the usual challenges which one may face 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL, and ideas how to improve the utilisation of the chaplain in this 
regard are addressed. The third subchapter highlights areas which gained less attention during 
the interviews but could prove to be important to be considered when the chaplain is utilised 
in this expert role. The questions of the chaplain’s peacebuilding endeavours, relationship 
with intelligence gathering, attitude towards missionary work, religious status, gender, and 
effect on local power relations and identity issues are examined. 
5.1 On the Roles of the Chaplain: ‘What Is He?’i 
For the interviewees the ecclesial role of the chaplain was obvious, but their conceptions 
about its significance in international operations varied. He may be viewed primarily as a 
priest, or the ecclesial duties can be simply considered as one aspect of his work. (CO 1 L; 
CO 2 A; CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A.) Still, it may be asked 
that does not the chaplain’s religious identity and theological perspective in a way permeate 
everything he does (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 5 A). In respect of working hours, it is not church 
services and devotions but counselling, or providing spiritual and psychosocial support, which 
takes most of the chaplain’s time in operations. Such ministry of presence and support of 
personnel’s capacity was deemed central by the interviewed chaplains and most valuable by 
the interviewed commanders. The chaplain is out there with the troops, for the troops. (CO 1 
L; CO 2 A; CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A; CO 4 A.) The 
chaplain’s role as a welfare officer, a person designated to organise leisure activities for the 
troops, gained less attention during the interviews (CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 5 A; CH 6 A), but 
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this could be as it can be seen as a part of the capacity support functions (CH 3 A), and is at 
times intertwined with the ecclesial duties (CO 2 A; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). 
As for educational activities there were clear differences among the interviewed 
chaplaincy’s experiences. Some had not given a single lecture or presentation about the 
religions, culture, or history of the AO during their deployments (CH 1 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). 
It was estimated that at times this might have been because of the lack of interest among the 
troops (CH 1 L), sometimes simply due to the nature of the operation (CH 6 A): 
[W]hen I was there, more than half of the troops were of the regular staff, and there were many who had 
served in multiple operations, so they did not need the chaplain’s lectures that much. I held one lecture 
with the doctor, […] about defusing […] and they liked it, even if they were first like that what these 
doctor and chaplain are supposed to know. So, they were maybe even surprised, that wow, they do have 
some expertise which we do not have […].ii (CH 6 A.) 
For other chaplains giving such lectures had been a more or less regular activity (CH 2 L; CH 
3 A; CH 4 L), even if at times it might have been more out of the chaplain’s initiative, than of 
the organisation’s demand (CH 3 A). Still, despite the differences in their experiences, the 
chaplain’s role as an educator for the troops – which was often treated as an aspect of the 
advisory role – was considered being well within the realm of possibilities of the chaplain by 
all the interviewed chaplains, provided that the chaplain possessed relevant expertise on the 
subject matters. Still, critical remarks were also presented. For example, it is possible that 
there are other personnel or local partners with more expertise available (CO 2 A; CO 3 L; 
CH 6 A). In those cases, however, it might still be possible to use the chaplain as a facilitator 
for the educational events (CH 5 A). 
In addition to the more traditional roles of deployed Finnish chaplains which have to do 
with ecclesial duties, spiritual and psychosocial support, welfare duties, and educational 
activities most of the interviewees highlighted the chaplains’ role in more severe crisis 
support and debriefing functions (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CH 1 L, CO 3 L, CH 2 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 
A; CO 4 A), although it was acknowledged that the need for it manifests quite rarely (CH 1 L, 
CH 6 A). 
[W]hen there are few young reservists, and nothing happens, the Crisis Support Group is not really 
needed as such. But it could have been needed, and if one thinks of it from the perspective of the 
commanders, of those who were in SKJA [Finland’s International Crisis Management Contingent in 
Afghanistan] at that time, I felt that they did not need a chaplain for anything else than a) Christmas and 
b) the case that someone dies. Luckily during my time no-one got killed.iii (CH 6 A.) 
Especially the interviewed commanders saw the chaplain as an important asset in supporting 
personnel in cases of serious accidents or events both in areas of operation and back home. A 
road traffic accident, an incident of artillery fire hitting near one’s base, or a sudden death of a 
fellow peacekeeper or a relative were named as examples of situations which might launch 
deeper personal crises. Having a professional listener among the troops at those times was 
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considered most useful. (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L, CO 4 A.) Again, the chaplain’s focus on 
the well-being of the own troops was highlighted: 
Well, I think that the main task is the spiritual counselling and mental support of the own troops, and 
would I say that… The chaplain, with other actors, is central in this debriefing and these things. It is the 
number one thing.iv (CO 4 A.) 
The symbolical value of the chaplain was also discussed during the interviews (CO 1 L, 
CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). One of the chaplains stated that simply the presence of 
the chaplain, although he was not sure how and why, seems to be meaningful for some of the 
own troops. They find it somehow encouraging. He further continued that at least in the 
Lebanese context, where priesthood is held in high regard in the society, the presence of the 
chaplain is a significant signal to the locals also. (CH 1 L.) A commander who had also 
served in Lebanon made a similar remark. Having a chaplain with shows that the Finnish 
troops value similar things as the locals do (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; Moore 2013, 103). As theorised 
by one of the chaplains who had served in Afghanistan: 
And for the locals the presence of a chaplain in this case meant that these people are in a sense decent, for 
they take care of the spiritual needs of the people also. So, in that way the presence of the chaplain may 
have significance for the troops, in the eyes of the local population, which we do not anticipate. So, in 
that sense, our role, until something serious hits us, is quite much about presence, and that is our role as 
priests in any case. With our presence we remind the people about the sacred, and the locals notice that 
too. […] So, I think like that yes, we have church services or devotions or small prayers during the 
parades, and it may in a way build trust, that hey, these people do take these things into consideration…v 
(CH 5 A.) 
Another commander with experience from Lebanon noted that even a different religious 
affiliation does not necessarily impact negatively on the status and amount of respect the 
chaplain receives from the locals as a religious leader. The chaplain is usually treated 
differently than the regular peacekeepers by the Lebanese population. (CO 3 L; Moore 2013, 
220.) Moreover, he noted that the presence of the chaplain may also signal the other Western 
or Christian troops about the commonalities concerning the troops’ religious heritage. This 
might be useful, for religion has its significance among them also. (CO 3 L; Nix 2014, 44.) 
If we think now that we had a battalion out there and there is no chaplain with them, then the locals will 
consider it weird, the Christians, and other troops like the Italians and the Irish, who are supposedly 
more religious […] so yes, if we tell that we have no chaplain here, then certainly someone will frown 
upon it, thinking that what group of barbarians is this, coming from the North.vi (CO 3 L.) 
Though measuring qualities of this kind is impossible, these perceptions resonate with many 
scholars’ remarks on the special status and added trust which a prominent religious identity 
may provide (see e.g. Little 2007, 440; Moore 2013, 103; Carter & Smith 2004, 296). 
Whether it was due to the chaplain’s possible symbolical value or not, liaising with 
chaplains of other contingents was seen as a natural part of his work. Chaplains do not only 
organise ecumenical church services or welfare events together, but might have possibilities 
to exchange information, plan joint activities, and support the cooperation between 
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contingents more broadly. (CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L, CH 5 A; CH 6 A.) 
For example, sometimes the chaplain’s knowhow may become handy when one needs to 
understand troops of other nationalities better (CH 4 L). 
 The chaplain’s role as a religious – and cultural – expert brought forth a variety of 
opinions. All the interviewed chaplains considered it a possible role for the chaplain. It was 
regarded as a function, the importance of which is dependent on the situation and context in 
the operation concerned. Most saw advisement and religious leader engagement as tasks 
among other chaplain’s tasks, the primacy being in the support of personnel’s capacity (CH 1 
L; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A; see e.g. Moore 2013, 102), but there were also views that in 
some operations they could or should constitute the primary role of the chaplain (CH 2 L; CH 
3 A; see e.g. Moore 2013, 219). Moreover, it was noted that the internal and external 
ministries do not need to be considered mutually exclusive (CH 2 L; CH 4L). 
The topic is contested. One of the interviewed commanders who had served in 
Afghanistan was especially sceptical of there being Finnish chaplains with enough relevant 
expertise (CO 2 A). In light of previous research from other contexts, it is a very relevant 
question (Moore 2013, 295; Nix 2014, 58–60; Cutler 2014, 107; Klocek & Hassner 2014, 
179–181; Loveland 2014, 144). He saw that in the current situation the chaplain should have 
quite a deep understanding of Islam, for that is the religion Finnish troops have been mainly 
dealing with in places like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and he wondered how 
well Finnish chaplains are educated in Islam and Islamic culture. He maintained that the 
required in-depth expertise and the status of an expert are not something which may be gained 
with a week or two of induction training, arguing that likewise those who are deployed to 
operations as military experts have developed their skills and knowledge for years. (CO 2 A.) 
On the contrary, the other commander who had served in Afghanistan had a lot more 
confidence in Finnish chaplains in this respect. He saw this function as the second most 
important role for the chaplain and argued that the proper usage of the chaplain’s expertise 
adds to the Force Protection of the troops (CO 4 A), which is actually a common argument 
among those who are favourable of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL (Loveland 2014, 139). 
[O]f course it depends on the person too, and on the chaplain’s own expertise, but I see him also as an 
extremely important consultant in regard to the local religious community, […] and let’s put it this way, 
that the so-called role of a consultant becomes more important in operations, where religion has such a 
significant role, like in Afghanistan, for example.vii (CO 4 A.) 
This difference in opinion might have to do with the fact that the commander with the 
more sceptical view had served in Afghanistan in a later phase when the Finnish troops had 
already reduced their contact ‘outside the wire’ and focused on training and advising the 
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Afghan National Army (ANA) (CO 2 A), whereas the other had served in the country earlier 
when the Finnish troops saw more action and engaged with the local population, religious 
leaders included (CO 4 A). Both commanders who had served in Lebanon had utilised their 
chaplains’ expertise in this manner and considered the expert role suitable, or even self-
evident, for the chaplain – provided that he has the required expertise (CO 1 L; CO 3 L). 
 Besides the question of required skills and competences of the chaplain the discussion 
concerning the expert role inspired reflections about his personality, self-understanding, and 
orientation, as well as the leadership’s attitudes towards the chaplain and religion. First, the 
chaplain, who usually has relatively much freedom to decide how he does his work (CH 1 L; 
CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 6 A), might not be well suited or interested in to meet with religious 
leaders of other faiths (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 4 L; CH 6 A; CO 4 A; Moore 2013, 
110; Cutler 2014, 107). Second, the commander and other key personnel, depending on their 
conceptions and experience, might not recognise the need for and understand to use the 
religious expertise of the chaplain (CH 1 L; CO 3 L, CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 
A; CO 4 A; Nix 2014 56–67; Cutler 2014, 109). 
And as a professional I am annoyed that the knowhow which I have due to my training and profession 
is way too often confined [by the perception] that what sort of a person I am or am not, which is based 
on God knows what... each officer’s, well usually officer’s, personal experiences on other chaplains or 
general perceptions, that a chaplain must be like this or that. It is extremely frustrating, when one thinks 
of expertise, that one cannot relate [to the chaplain] with the same ordinariness as to a logistics expert or 
a medical doctor as a medical expert, or a lawyer as a legal expert... I think that it is sometimes a bit 
difficult for us to differentiate preaching from advisement.viii (CH 5 A.) 
Hopes were expressed by some of the interviewed chaplains that the principles and guidelines 
regarding RAA/RA and RLE/RLL would be discussed and clarified both among the 
chaplaincy itself, as well as more broadly in the FDF (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 5 A). 
One of the commanders in turn found it problematic that there is no framework which would 
help one to assess the chaplain’s competence in the questions of religion and culture (CO 3 
L). These concerns seem to be common to different militaries: without clear roles, doctrines, 
and guidance problems rise and more things tend to go wrong (Moore 2013, 106, 162; Keller 
2014, 64–66; Klocek & Hassner 2014, 180). 
Like in other countries’ contexts also (see e.g. Klocek & Hassner 2014, 176), in 
addition to the roles discussed above there seems to be many other tasks the Finnish chaplain 
may get to handle in international operations, for he enjoys certain flexibility in the 
organisation. The chaplain may participate in patrols and other regular peacekeeping duties 
(CH 1 L; CO 3 L), plan logistics issues (CH 6 A), contribute to the troops’ communications 
(CH 1 L; CH 6 A), run the troops’ library (CH 6 A), participate in humanitarian activities (CO 
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2 A), and so forth. There have also been cases, in small operations, when the chaplain has 
been officially appointed a second role within the organisation (CH 1 L).  
Finally, it could be concluded that, as seen with the expert role also, the way how the 
chaplain is perceived seems to have a clear effect on how his skills are used in general. This 
aspect is highlighted much more in the research data than in the previous research. Although 
all the interviewed commanders had positive attitudes towards chaplains and appreciated the 
contributions which they had witnessed from the ones they had served with abroad, not all the 
interviewed chaplains had had only positive experiences with their commanders and troops. 
Thus, the relationship of the commanders’ and other personnel’s attitudes and the chaplain’s 
possibilities to contribute were brought up (CH 1 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A). As one of the 
commanders summarised it: ‘[S]ome know how to utilise the chaplain, some consider him as 
a burden’ix (CO 4 A). 
[T]he chaplain himself sees his role and duties in one way, but the people around him see him in another 
way. It is of course dependant on their experiences and views, […]. So, someone sees that here comes the 
Mr. Minister of the Word and someone else sees something else like that here comes the Angel of Death. 
To each their perceptions. One encounters this, if not daily, at least weekly. It is one of the challenges of 
this job, like, ‘what is that?’x (CH 1 L.) 
5.2 Religion, Religious Expertise, and Conflicts: ‘It Is Not Quite an 
Easy Field to Play in’xi 
All the interviewees saw that religion needs to be taken into account in international 
operations. Both among those who had served in Lebanon and in Afghanistan there were 
reflections on how the circumstances and other factors interplay with religious elements in 
conflicts. As it was stated by one commander: When things are well, a person ‘goes to church 
and spins the prayer beads […] but when things get worse, then it gets a greater meaning and 
the prayer beads spin more intensely.’xii (CO 3 L.) Another speculated that depending on the 
conflict the role of religion may range from being anything between a side factor to even 
among the main drivers of a conflict (CO 4 A).  
One of the chaplains asserted that in some cases the religious aspect of identity is so 
important for the people involved in a conflict that it may not be ignored if one wants to 
resolve the conflict, even if other factors like ethnicity or nationality were the primary identity 
markers of the communities involved. (CH 2 L.) Also, even if in many cases religion does set 
the boundaries of communities (CO 3 L; CH 4 L), defines – at least partly – the distribution of 
power and resources (CO 1 L), and may be used as a tool to further exacerbate the conflict 
(CH 3 A; CH 4 L), it does not mean that the conflicts are mainly religious as such (CH 2 L). 
Religious and cultural sensitivities just need to be considered as a part of a bigger puzzle: 
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I don’t see either, at least in most international operations, that the conflicts were essentially religious, but 
that where religion is a more dominant factor in ordinary people’s daily lives than it is in the secularised 
Western countries on average, then, of course, it may be very important to get along with local religious 
leaders, for example. And of course, religious – as well as other – festivals just need to be taken into 
consideration, for out of ignorance and foolishness one may cause much damage for one’s operation and 
its goals, if one does not understand to respect people’s culture. So… I have often compared it to… if we 
had had bases of the British Army in Finland for the last ten years, and even if they were siding our 
government in principal, i.e. in theory most of the people were politically on the same side as they are, 
still we would not like that there were bases of the British Army. It would be wise for them also to keep a 
low profile towards the civilians, particularly during festivals. Should they show up, even if it was only 
for training purposes, with an armoured unit when we have the commemoration of the Independence Day 
or something else going on, it would be remembered. So, if one does not understand to be sensitive with 
such matters, one fails quite drastically.xiii (CH 6 A.) 
Two chaplains who had served in Afghanistan gave thoughts about the conflict in the 
country. The other saw that actors such as the Taliban and the Islamic State have clear 
religious motives and attempt to define who are true Muslims and not, but that most of the 
problems in the country are resulted due to the power games of local warlords who try to gain 
dominance over drug trade and other criminal activities. Geopolitics has also had its effect, as 
well as foreign funding. (CH 5 A.) The other made similar remarks about the situation and 
brought up how religious elements of the conflict might have a different significance in 
different parts of the country (CH 6 A). Concerning Lebanon, one commander said that 
religion is one of the main sources of authority and control in the region. Things happen 
according to the logic of religious boundaries and norms, not as defined by the state. (CO 1 
L.) Furthermore, the other stated that the presence of conflicting religious groups makes the 
challenges of the country more complex to be solved (CO 3 L). 
All the interviewed commanders maintained that religion is taken well into 
consideration in the international operations of the FDF and that the troops are prepared 
enough when deployed (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CO 4 A). During the Pre-Deployment 
Training (PDT) the troops gain a general understanding concerning different actors and their 
religious affiliations in the given AO (CO 1 L; CO 3 L). They also receive specific 
instructions how to behave in a culturally relevant (CO 2 A; CO 3 L) and respectful (CO 4 A) 
way with locals. Expertise of people who have lived in the AO is utilised as they are at times 
invited to provide lectures both in the PDT phase in Finland (CO 2 A), as well as during the 
operation abroad (CO 3 L). Information that has to do with religion is gained from various 
sources throughout the operation (CO 1 L) and religious sensitivities are considered when 
activities in the AO are planned and conducted (CO 3 L). Still, it was noted that there is also 
room for improvement when it comes to the utilisation of the chaplain’s expertise in this 
domain (CO 1 L; CO 3 L; CO 4 A). 
[W]e have a good amount of information, but we might have the chance to use it more efficiently in this 
regard. Especially when we have chaplains of the Defence Forces [i.e. regular staff], or why not reservists 
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also, serving as chaplains [in international operations] […] by directing them a bit more, as it depends on 
that what sort of things are brought up in the training, how well you are instructed to operate there. So, 
there might be even need for improvement. It is, after all, a matter of managing a big system and anyone 
who understands anything about it is welcome to provide some additional understanding to it.xiv (CO 1 L.) 
The interviewed chaplains were less unanimous about this topic. The troops’ ability to 
deal with religious elements and the basic training about culture and religion provided was 
both thanked and criticised. On one hand, some acknowledged that the civilian expertise 
within the Finnish troops is usually considerable, even if the level of knowhow of chaplains 
and other deployed personnel varies (CH 2 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). On the other hand, some 
considered the quality of cultural and religious expertise among the troops (CH 3 A) and the 
level of basic training on these issues (CH 3 A; CH 4 L) rather superficial. According to those 
with the more critical views, during independent rotations the troops can become quite 
dependent on the chaplain’s contribution in this domain (CH 3 A; CH 4 L). This may be 
questioned: should the responsibility over religious and cultural expertise rest mainly on the 
shoulders of the chaplain? (CH 1 L.) Likewise, the experiences concerning the commanders’ 
and leaderships’ awareness about and attitudes towards religion and religious expertise varied 
considerably among the interviewed chaplains. It was felt by some that the personnel’s ability 
to deal with the topic is sometimes influenced by their biased views on religion, which easily 
turn the discourse about it unbalanced. (CH 1 L; CH 5 A.) 
In practice gaining a general understanding of the cultures and religions of the given 
AO was not considered problematic, but it was noted that religious expertise becomes more 
helpful and needed when one must investigate the specific cultural and religious dynamics of 
a certain area or village (CO 1 L; CO 3 L). It may be unlikely that the chaplain possesses this 
sort of information in advance (CH 1 L), but it was reminded that he might be well suited to 
be used in acquiring this sort of data through encounters with the local religious leaders and 
communities (CO 1 L; CO 3 L) – although not all the research participants would agree with 
this (CO 2 A). Especially in new operations learning about the conditions and creating good 
connections in the AO as quickly as possible was regarded as vital by couple of the research 
participants (CH 1 L; CO 3 L). However, simply local religious leaders’ or communities lack 
of willingness to meet with the troops (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L; Moore 2013, 248; 
Loveland 2014, 144), a bad security situation (CH 3 A; CH 5 A; CH 6 A; Keller 2014, 68–
69), or a restricted nature or mandate of an operation (CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A; 
Keller 2014, 66–67) could hinder or obstruct RAA/RA and RLE/RLL attempts. Thus, if 
decided to be used, the situational factors determine, how religious expertise can be best 
utilised. 
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Well, I would say that it depends on the operation. So, the expertise, it may be either a supporting element 
in the background when the operation is being planned and conducted, providing information into that, or, 
indeed depending on the operation and the area of operation where we are, it may be even a part of the 
structure of the operation. So, for example, if we know that there is a village leader in the village, but that 
in reality the village is run by the religious leader, then this certainly has to be taken into consideration. 
Of course, we must show respect to the village leader, but maybe we need to also think that should we try 
to solve the issue by approaching the religious leader.xv (CO 4 A; see also Smock 2010, 45.) 
As for the ideas how the chaplain can contribute as an advisor on religious and cultural 
matters and builder of trust between their troops and locals, most of those presented were in 
line with the findings of the previous research, although there was variation in the focuses of 
the research participants. Some of the interviewed chaplains also brought up the potential they 
saw in the chaplain facilitating dialogue between local religious leaders (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 
4 L), but this aspect of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL is highlighted much more in Moore’s and 
Patterson’s studies than in the research data of this study. Bearing in mind the centrality of the 
peacebuilding aspect in their work, the lack of reflection of it might indicate that most of the 
research participants have not become familiar with or properly considered this feature of the 
approaches. This has clear implications for future research and training, especially should 
religious approaches be intentionally used to augment CCM (see e.g. Moore 2013, 1–10). 
However, as indicated already earlier, chaplains were not the only sources of religious 
expertise who were mentioned in the interviews. Especially the contribution of interpreters, 
both Finnish nationals and locals, were brought up frequently (CH 1 L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CH 
3 A; CH 4 L). Beyond the fact that having an interpreter with might be a necessary 
requirement for any meaningful exchange with locals to take place (CH 1 L), he can also be 
an important source of information in questions of local culture and religion (CO 2 A; CO 3 
L; CH 4 L), advise personnel on conduct with locals (CO 2 A; CH 3 A), and support the 
commander – and other personnel – when visiting local religious leaders and occasions (CO 2 
A; CO 3 L; CO 4 A). There have even been cases when interpreters have been able to solve 
problems with locals because they have known to whom to turn to – sometimes those being 
local religious leaders (CH 3 A). 
Based on the interviews it may be summarised that religious expertise was conceived as 
an important tool in the toolbox of the troops, but there is no consensus on how much the 
chaplain could contribute in this respect. As far as the impact is concerned, some of the 
interviewees remarked that when religious elements are significant in the conflict, naturally 
the religious expertise of the chaplain becomes more valuable (CH 1 L; CH 4 L; CH 6 A; CO 
4 A), but it was reminded that as the number of deployed chaplains is small, so is the overall 
effect too, even if their contributions could prove to be valuable or even crucial in individual 
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cases (CO 3 L; CH 6 A), let’s say, if some vital religious aspects were otherwise ignored 
(Moore 2013, 104): 
It is difficult to see, that this field would become a game changer in the future either, […] but the critical 
factor by which we lose, that it may become. Because if you cross someone in that field in international 
operations, whether it has to do with the activities of your own troops or the outsiders, the consequences 
can be catastrophic.xvi (CO 3 L.) 
Still, the question if a good interpreter – or other experienced personnel – may be more 
useful than the chaplain in this regard (CO 2 A) remains open. Moreover, the utilisation of the 
chaplains’ religious expertise appears to be conceived being somewhat of an irregular and 
unorganised activity by some of the interviewees (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; 
CH 5 A). The ambiguity and lack of systematic training and planning in regard to the 
chaplain’s expert role was thought to potentially hinder its full potential from being harvested 
(CO 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 5 A). The possible discontinuity of activities which 
comes with the short rotations and different focuses and interests of different commanders 
and chaplains was seen to cause challenges especially to trust building and long-term 
cooperation with locals (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; Klocek & Hassner 2014, 177). 
Unsurprisingly, when the interviewees were asked about the future potential of the utilisation 
of chaplains’ religious expertise, the answers were quite diverse and resembled their current 
stances on the matter – if someone had a positive understanding of the efforts, he was positive 
about its future potential. 
However, ideas how to increase the efficiency of chaplains in this field were expressed 
by almost everyone during their interviews. Before deployments chaplains could be provided 
additional training (CO 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 5 A; CO 4 A), and their training 
could be better integrated to the training of commanders and other leadership of operations 
(CO 1 L; CH 2 L). Moreover, their expertise could be utilised already when operations are 
being prepared (CO 1 L; CH 2 L). There might also be room for improvement when it comes 
to the training of commanders (CO 1 L), as they might not be aware how to utilise chaplains 
in this sense (CO 1 L; CO 4 A). In general, awareness concerning the topic would support the 
FDF to estimate, when this expertise would be truly needed and when not (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; 
CH 5 A). With respect to how chaplains are used during operations, they could be deployed 
with smaller contingents or military observer teams also (CH 3 A), and at times they could 
function primarily as religious experts (CH 3 A; CH 2 L) or even peacebuilders among local 
religious leaders (CH 2 L). Appointing chaplains to serve as CIMIC officers was considered 
an option also (CH 3 A).  
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As for the bigger picture, it was seen that the chaplains’ expert activities should be 
better integrated to the FDF organisation (CH 5 A) and the broader strategy of international 
operations (CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L), as well as coordinated operations wide (CO 3 L). 
Creating a framework where chaplains could consult other experts of religion – similarly as 
medical doctors do with their colleagues – was also proposed (CO 3 L). In some operations, 
as has been the case in KFOR in Kosovo, a chief chaplain could be added to the peacekeeping 
or crisis management organisation to serve as an advisor to the Force Commander, the officer 
who is in charge of the whole operation. While this would increase awareness about religious 
elements among the top leadership of the given operation, it might prove to be important from 
the point of view of coordinating possible peacebuilding activities also (CH 2 L; CH 4 L): 
Anything that increases the understanding and acceptance among the local people, all of that has potential 
and is needed, and I could even think that this activity could have even more possibilities […] if it was 
known how to utilise it better. But that depends on those in charge, mainly on the battalion commander, 
and personally I think that there should be a chief chaplain in UNIFIL who would coordinate this activity, 
for it may be understood as an operational matter also [...]xvii (CH 4 L.) 
5.3 Possible Grey Areas: ‘Maybe Walking Around There with a 
Cross Could Cause a Bit of Mistrust’xviii 
As pointed out in the previous subchapter, the chaplains who were interviewed due to their 
experience from Lebanon estimated there being great potential in dialogue facilitation among 
estranged religious communities, if the situation is ripe for it. All of them referred to how the 
Finnish troops had succeeded in this earlier in KFOR in Kosovo (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L.) 
A couple of challenges were brought up. First, such potential never actualises, if it is not 
recognised and understood to be used (CH 1 L). Second, these activities are demanding and 
sensitive. They, like other RLE/RLL activities, contain risks. Should the chaplain attempt to 
mediate and facilitate dialogue between local religious leaders efficiently, it requires, in 
addition to the willingness of locals, a broader vision in the organisation, training, time, and 
resources. (CH 2 L.) 
I wanted to think that it needs to be expressly planned and coordinated, so that is not like that it is nice 
for the Chaplaincy to meet with the religious leaders, but the input should come from somewhere else. 
Or at least on my opinion it would be nice, if it was a part of some greater wholexix. (CH 1 L.) 
One of the interviewed chaplains maintained that the broader vision of the organisation 
defines if there will be the required long-term commitment and continuity for peacebuilding – 
for example so that armed forces launch the process of dialogue between local religious 
leaders and the responsibility to support it is later given to civilian organisations (CH 2 L; 
Moore 2013, 256). He was the only one of the interviewees who considered the chaplain’s 
peacebuilding potential to this extent, which adds to the plausibility of the claims of there 
being room for broadening the vision in terms of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL within the FDF.  
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Pertaining to other caveats of concern, when the chaplain studies local religious 
dynamics and interacts with local population, he acquires information (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CO 3 
L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L; CO 4 A) which may turn relevant from the point of view of intelligence 
actors also (CH 2 L; CH 3 A). This aspect was problematised by two of the interviewed 
chaplains, who opposed the idea of using the chaplain for any intelligence gathering activities. 
Like Moore – and many others – they saw that it would be in contradiction with the status of 
the chaplain and work against any efforts of building trust and mutual understanding between 
foreign troops and locals. The meetings with local religious leaders should be used to produce 
something good between the actors. (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; Moore 2013, 240–245.) Further 
resembling Moore’s ideas, one of them maintained that such peace-oriented and faith-based 
activities are in the core of any operation and should not be compromised. When the chaplain 
can gain the trust among different parties of a conflict and promote values like peace and 
human dignity, working openly and honestly, it is the way he supports the goals of his 
operation most efficiently. This capacity will be lost, if the locals become suspicious of the 
chaplain. He regarded the provision of general information, even to the intelligence actors, 
less problematic, although much depends on how the information is being used. (CH 2 L; 
Moore 2013, 240–245.) 
One of the commanders who had served in Afghanistan maintained that in the Finnish 
context the attempts to gain understanding of religious elements, among other factors, has 
firstly and foremostly to do with the ability to convey respect. He saw that the Finnish troops 
have been particularly good in this and hoped that they could promote this approach in 
international operations in the future also, even if Finland is a small actor in the field. Finnish 
troops have been able to show local populations that they are not forcing their own agendas 
when it comes to the ways of life in their countries. (CO 4 A.) He opposed the idea of 
forcefully pushing the Western models of democracy and civilisation on non-Western nations, 
seeing it as counterproductive for the operations and their goals: 
[A]nd that is, on my opinion, all in all a big challenge in crisis management and peacekeeping, that we, 
representatives of the Western countries, go into a fully different culture, and we go and… we basically 
dis the whole country’s history, traditions, and cultures, and go and kind of force our own [...]xx (CO 4 A.) 
If his views truly represent the Finnish approach accurately, it might, at least partly, explain 
why the issues of influence activities and intelligence gathering were not such a big deal 
among the interviewees like it seems to have been in the North American context (see e.g. 
Moore 2013, 240–245; Keller 2014, 65–66). 
One must be careful with religious agendas as well. Although it is possible that the topic 
could raise some questions about the state of religious freedom within the armed forces and 
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the society, which is an important concern in the US (Klocek & Hassner 2014, 183), among 
the research participants the idea of the chaplain engaging in any proselytization activities 
among local populations was opposed – if the topic surfaced. Although the chaplain is always 
a representative of his own faith community, missionary work among locals was seen as not 
being a part of his job description in international operations. (CH 2 L; CH 4 L.) The 
chaplain’s possible inability to distinguish between the different roles of his may cause at 
least two sorts of problems. First, biased attitudes towards locals would hinder him from 
working efficiently as an advisor (CO 3 L; CH 4 L), and second, attempts of converting them 
could raise opposition obstructive to the mission objectives (CH 2 L). 
One of the interviewed chaplains maintained that there needs to be enough training for 
the deployed chaplains that they understand their role as religious experts and known how to 
bypass divisive religious issues politely and respectfully, should they raise. There must be 
room for discussion and disagreement, but one must realise that going into certain theological 
questions can bring about difficult feelings. (CH 2 L.) 
[S]o that you for example know that if some sheikh asks you then [...] ‘is Jesus also God’s son’, that it 
may be a wise answer that ‘as Christians we think like this, but I do not want to go into it, I won’t start 
justifying it’ […]. It is actually interesting how do you answer to that. ‘These are those religious 
questions, that Christians do think like this but […] I know that from your perspective it can be shocking’. 
[…] But the idea about it, that on one hand people are allowed to ask anything, but then because of one’s 
role one has to know that this question is something we do not need to start dealing with. One respects it, 
gives a general answer, stays sincere: ‘Yes, we are Christians. You certainly know what we think of these 
sorts of things, but I came to meet you because I wish to show you respect, give you the space as religious 
and societal actors, and maybe it is not good to get into this…’xxi (CH 2 L.) 
He emphasised, similarly to some American chaplains (Cutler 2014, 106; Loveland 2014, 
143), that this does not mean that one needs to compromise his religious identity in order to 
be a suitable person to work with indigenous populations. He speculated that doing so could 
even cause some loss of credibility in the eyes of conservative religious people, although it is 
still most likely less risky than, for instance, attempting to convert anyone. In his opinion one 
should just politely express, where his own religious boundaries are, and explain that he 
respects others’ right to do the same. He asserted that it is possible to get along and respect 
each other even if there is a strong disagreement about spiritual matters. (CH 2 L.) 
However, the matter is not straightforward. Even if the chaplain knew very well what he 
was doing, working professionally and respectfully, it is possible that in some cases, for 
example in some Muslim majority countries, his presence could still be considered a negative 
thing by locals. It would raise doubts or ill will. (CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L; Klocek & 
Hassner 2014, 184; Hansen 2012, 26–27.) As will be seen with the case of Finnish 
experiences in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign chaplains, Finnish ones included, may 
also be used against peacekeepers in the form of rumours about the Western troops 
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proselytising the locals (CH 5 A; CH 6 A). Thus, assessing when it is the right time for the 
chaplain to try to get in touch with local religious leaders can be challenging (CH 2 L). As for 
how to get rid of the possible tensions which come with Finnish military chaplains’ Christian 
status, it was speculated by one commander that in the future it might be possible to have 
Finnish imams, who focused on working with locals, serving with Finnish troops. Especially 
if they knew local languages and cultures relevant to the operations, they might have better 
chances to build trust between Finnish peacekeepers and locals than Christian chaplains. (CO 
2 A; Hansen 2012, 25.) However, as noted by one of the interviewed chaplains, some of the 
troops’ atheist or agnostic orientations might cause challenges as well, if promoted openly in 
places like Lebanon or Afghanistan (CH 1 L), so it may be argued that the issue does not 
concern the chaplain only. 
The question of female chaplains was also brought up, as two of the commanders 
pondered how the dynamics that come with them would work out in religiously conservative 
environments. One of them stated that having a female chaplain with could be a positive 
signal for local women, as they would see a woman in such a role, but he was not sure if her 
presence was helpful in any of the negotiations with local men (CO 3 L). The other saw that 
as men might not want to discuss with her at all – which might be the case with other women 
serving in operations too – one might need to reconsider how the chaplain’s expertise is 
utilised in this sort of situations: 
[H]ere is, in my opinion, maybe the biggest challenge in this. I think that the chaplain must be used, and it 
has to be in the way that if I, as a battalion commander, go to meet with a religious leader, I do not go 
there alone, but I have the chaplain with me. But as said, then we have this question that how you do kind 
of break the ice, if you go there with a female chaplain. So is it better that I encounter the religious leader 
[alone], as the female chaplain has briefed me well enough for this, as well as provided support and 
background information, and, after I have had the meeting, we will sit down, and she will kind of analyse 
it, and will provide me the results of the analysis for to be used in the next meeting.xxii (CO 4 A.) 
In any case, even if it was not problematised during the interviews, addressing the dominance 
of older males in this field is needed for a better inclusion of women and youth into such 
faith-based initiatives (Klocek & Hassner 2014, 183). 
What was left with very little attention also, was religion’s relationship with power. As 
Klocek and Hassner rightly note, it should be considered carefully that on which basis the 
troops interact and with which religious communities. In addition to the questions of 
inclusivity it has to do with the possibility of unintentionally strengthening structural 
conditions which foster enmity. Also, it should be asked if RLE/RLL may reify religious 
identities (Klocek & Hassner 2014, 183), and potentially make conflicts more difficult to be 
solved. Only one of the interviewed chaplains touched this aspect of identity issues. He noted 
that people tend to start to make generalisations about others during conflicts, perceiving them 
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as essentially bad in nature, and maintained that it is challenging to overcome this 
phenomenon as it requires readiness for self-criticism and possible opposition from one’s own 
community by those who are involved in the process. Still, he saw that religious leaders have 
a lot of potential to counter these effects due to their authority and capacity to rehumanise 
others. (CH 2 L.)   
As implied by some of the interviewees, all these questions contain risks which require 
attention. Still, most of the interviewees did not discuss and assess the chaplain’s possible 
peacebuilding activities among local religious leaders and communities, the relationship of 
the chaplain and intelligence gathering, or the significance of his attitude towards missionary 
work. Only one chaplain considered these aspects more thoroughly during his interview (CH 
2 L). The possible challenges which may come with the chaplain’s religious status or gender 
were also left with little scrutiny. This was also the case with the risks that come with when 
one is dealing with identity issues. However, based on the research data it is impossible to say 
whether these questions have been sufficiently addressed before Finnish chaplains have been 
utilised as religious experts. Maybe the interviewees would have had well-informed opinions 
about these issues, had they been addressed with more specific questions. For example, 
avoiding giving an impression that peacekeepers are gathering intelligence – or doing 
anything else which may be considered disrespectful – is a general concern for the troops (CO 
3 L) and therefore possibly too obvious to be thought of in this context. Although the 
limitations of the Chaplaincy Guidelines, as well as some interviewees’ notions about the 
unclarity concerning the chaplain’s expert role, little training in regard to the topic, and 
irregularity of the chaplains’ expert activities may further imply that the attention to these 
questions has been limited, additional research would be needed to determine, what the 
situation has been. 
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6. Experiences of Religious Expertise from the Field 
This chapter focuses on the interviewees’ experiences of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL activities in 
Lebanon and Afghanistan. The first subchapter addresses their training and preparations 
before the deployments. It was found that there have not been any specific courses which 
would have prepared the interviewed chaplains to advise personnel on religious and cultural 
matters or to encounter local religious leaders, yet there have been some elements in different 
educational settings which were considered useful in this respect. In addition to these 
elements some challenges, the training of commanders, and suggestions for improvement are 
examined. The second subchapter presents findings on advisement on religion and culture in 
the two countries. It seems that the perceptions concerning the need for information about 
religion and culture have defined if each chaplain’s expertise has been utilised or not. How 
these perceptions are formed and how RAA/RA activities have looked like are the central 
questions throughout the subchapter. The third subchapter analyses the experiences of 
RLE/RLL activities during the deployments. Based on the research data the level of 
willingness of the locals, the current security situation, and the nature of each operation have 
largely defined the chaplain’s possibilities to encounter local religious leaders and 
communities, but personal qualities have had a role in it too. What was possible to be done 
and what not is being discussed along the way.  
6.1 Before the Deployments: ‘As for Training, It Has Been a Matter 
of the Chaplain’s Own Activeness – To Understand the Role 
and Familiarise Oneself with It’xxiii 
The interviewed chaplains considered that theological studies provide the basis for the Finnish 
chaplain’s expertise (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). During his time as 
a university student one does not necessarily specialise in topics that are useful in 
international operations, but the studies should give the chaplain at least a good general 
understanding of religions and their dynamics (CH 1 L; CH 5 A; CH 6 A), build in him kind 
of ‘religious literacy’ (CH 1 L). As for advantageous subjects and specialisations, the Study of 
Religions was mentioned as an example by most of the chaplains (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; 
CH 5 A; CH 6 A). Otherwise it was noted that further training of the church or mission 
organisations can become helpful in multicultural environments (CH 6 A), and one may 
acquire relevant knowledge and skills through work also (CH 1 L; CH 4 L). One of the 
chaplains speculated that due to the nature of their work chaplains and priests might be better 
than average prepared to encounter people of various backgrounds (CH 1 L). In the military 
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training of the interviewed commanders, religion, culture, religious expertise, or the 
chaplain’s expert role in international operations have been little or not at all addressed (CO 1 
L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CO 4 A). Most of them brought up the role of Finnish general education 
and acknowledged its importance in building their understanding of religion (CO 2 A; CO 3 
L; CO 4 A). 
Local religious and cultural issues are on the agenda of some of the courses in which 
chaplains may get to participate prior to their deployments. All the interviewed chaplains who 
were deployed to Afghanistan were provided a possibility to participate in the International 
Support Staff Officer’s Course (INTSUPSOC), which has been organised in the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework in Norway. One of them could not 
participate in the course before his tour (CH 3 A), the others did. The course was aimed for 
personnel who work in the medical, legal, staff, and ecclesial fields. The course included joint 
training for all but also specified lectures for each of the four groups. As a part of their 
specific training chaplains were provided some insights into RLE/RLL activities. (CH 5 A; 
CH 6 A.) Beyond INTSUPSOC some had had possibilities to participate in other international 
(CH 1 L; CH 4 L) and national (CH 4 L; CH 5 A) courses which have touched relevant topics. 
For example, the NATO and Partner Chaplain Operations Course organised in the NATO 
School Oberammergau, located in Germany, has addressed the chaplain’s operational roles 
(CH 4 L). None of the commanders brought up any courses they saw having been useful for 
themselves in the view of religion and culture (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CO 4 A). 
Referring to the specialised courses, one of the interviewed chaplains found that 
debriefing and crisis counselling trainings are also relevant for RLE/RLL as both support 
one’s ability to deal with people in a constructive manner. He saw that providing chaplains 
further training on dialogue and interaction skills would be useful. In civilian context relevant 
courses would comprise of those which have to do with themes such as reconciliation or 
psychotherapy. As for military training, he maintained that CIMIC training would give 
chaplains tools to work with local populations. (CH 2 L.) According to Moore, the latter has 
been done in the context of New Zealand’s PRT contribution in Afghanistan, where chaplains 
had been integrated – with a clear mandate, proper training, and long-term planning – into 
humanitarian and development tasks among the local population (Moore 2013, 214–216.) 
Another chaplain proposed organising additional training for chaplains in cooperation with 
universities. The training could cover topics like interreligious dialogue and relevant 
languages. (CH 3 A.) These kinds of ideas have been implemented in the US, where some 
chaplains have been educated in interreligious and intercultural issues, as well as conflict 
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resolution (Loveland 2014; 145). The third one stated that chaplains should be provided 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) training (CH 4 L). However, based on the research data and 
the studies of Moore and Patterson it can be speculated that this proposal could raise some 
controversy or at least require some discussion how the skills provided in this training would 
be utilised during the deployments (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; Moore 244–245; Klocek & Hassner 
2014, 176). 
For Finnish troops the PDT, which is provided as a specific training for each operation, 
contains some instructions on religion and culture. The experience of the interviewed 
chaplains was that for them this training did not provide much when it comes to the aspect of 
religious expertise and its utilisation in operations (CH 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 5 
A; CH 6 A), except maybe for the context specific information about local villages and tribes 
and their religious and cultural affiliations (CH 5 A). ‘I was there teaching rather than 
learning, what comes to this engagement with religion and culture’xxiv (CH 3 A). In general, 
they seem not to have received much of task-specific instructions during their PDT phases, 
apart from spending a few moments with the chaplain of Pori Brigade (CH 1 L; CH 4 L; CH 6 
A). It was acknowledged that otherwise the PDT can be very useful for chaplains, especially 
for those reservists who have not served in a military environment for a while (CH 4 L; CH 6 
A). 
Regarding the challenges of RAA/RA activities that may come due to lack of training, 
two of the chaplains reminded that it has an effect on how useful pieces of advice the chaplain 
may provide (CH 2 L; CH 5 A). Without being properly informed it is harder for him to grasp 
how religious elements interplay with other factors in any given conflict (CH 5 A): 
It is necessary for a theologian or a chaplain as well, if you ought to give advices, it is necessary that you 
have time to get familiarised and you receive information about local conditions and in this way you get 
into it, your understanding grows, so… […] It is actually quite an important thing to be taken into 
consideration, when one speaks about the chaplain’s preparations or the chaplain’s training for the task, 
for maybe we do it a bit superficially, like that ‘you are a chaplain, you do know this’.xxv (CH 5 A.) 
To name an example of the shortages related to RLE/RLL, not all the interviewed chaplains 
had received training for Key Leader Engagement during their PDT phase. There are two 
reasons for this. First, according to the knowledge of one of the interviewees it used not to be 
a part of the planned training of the chaplain earlier. Second, at times the chaplain, like other 
personnel, might need to be recruited to the operation with a short notice when someone drops 
out, and there is simply no time for him to go through the full PDT. (CH 1 L; CH 2 L.) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the amount of interaction training for chaplains has increased 
over the years, it may yet be questioned if such a still relatively modest input makes a 
difference, especially should the individual chaplain’s strengths and interests lie elsewhere. 
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‘[I]f his background education in these things is weak, it is difficult to mould it into a different 
shape during the Pre-Deployment Training.’xxvi (CH 1 L.) 
For the interviewed commanders the PDT had been more useful. They saw that it had 
helped them to comprehend the role and significance of religion and culture in the areas of 
operation, as well as to understand better how to deal with it. (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CO 3 L; CO 4 
A.) Still, it was noted by one of them that the chaplain’s religious expertise and its utilisation 
is not necessarily addressed too well during the PDT. On his opinion highlighting his role and 
integrating his training more into the training of the commander could foster the utilisation of 
the chaplain’s expertise. (CO 1 L) 
[T]hen the area in which, it may be said now afterwards, this aspect should be slightly boosted is this 
prior operation-specific training in Finland. His [the chaplain’s] role and familiarity with it could be 
brought up more clearly. Then it could have been, I emphasise it could have been, that we would have 
figured out something more [during the operation]. Difficult to say, but […] he could have been more 
present there where I was trained, that he sees and hears all those things… Sure, he was present in some 
[parts of the training], but not all.xxvii (CO 1 L.) 
The proposed arrangements are not fully unusual. In the US Army and Marine Corps 
chaplains take part in the preparation and planning of operations (Nix 2014, 52–53, 55–56). 
Generally, the different groups of interviewees seemed not to be too aware of how and 
how much RAA/RA and RLE/RLL issues are considered in the educations and trainings of 
the other group, which might explain some of the experiences of poor cooperation. As one of 
the chaplains expressed it, it must be made sure that the chaplain and other personnel ‘speak 
the same language’xxviii (CH 5 A). As for similar concerns, some of the interviewees 
speculated if the chaplains of the FDF’s regular staff had a better basis to serve in 
international operations (CO 1 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L), some others simply noted that different 
backgrounds may cause some variation but pointed out that the outcomes still depend a lot on 
the person (CH 1 L), like is the case with other personnel groups also (CO 4 A; Nix 2014, 56). 
[T]his very moment we have chaplains serving as regular staff, military chaplains, I do not mean these 
chaplains, who are deployed to crisis management operation from the reserve, but [I mean] these 
chaplains of the FDF […] We have plenty of good chaplains, but then we have few chaplains that I know 
that if someone of these few chaplains was deployed somewhere, let’s say, that I was a battalion 
commander in some operation, in Afghanistan for instance, having a chaplain like that with me would be 
the last thing I would like to do.xxix (CO 4 A.) 
Also, although currently it might be that the chaplains of the FDF’s regular staff have a better 
access to relevant military courses and trainings than the reservists, this issue could be 
addressed by simply providing the reservists more of such possibilities (CH 4 L). 
In order to further increase their readiness to work in religiously and culturally different 
conditions some of the interviewees mentioned reading relevant literature (CO 2 A; CH 2 L; 
CH 3 A; CH 4 L; CH 6 A; CO 4 A) and contacting people with previous experience from 
operations (CH 3 A; CH 4 L) out of their own interests. One also receives a lot of practical 
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hints, including remarks on local religion and culture, during the hand-over-take-over phase, 
when the predecessor instructs the successor for a week or two in the AO before saying 
goodbyes to the operation from his part (CO 1 L; CO 2 A; CH 1 L; CH 4 L; CH 5 A). Still, it 
is a short time and there are many other things to be learned too (CH 1 L). 
The interviewees’ reports on their experiences concerning the task-specific instructions 
and training – or rather the lack of them – support their notions and arguments about the to a 
certain degree irregular and unorganised state of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL activities within the 
context of the FDF’s international operations. Arguably, without proper guidelines and 
training these endeavours become more dependent on the personal interests and inclinations 
of the people involved, increasing the chance of there being more variation in how things are 
done in the field. The Finnish experiences thus resemble the earlier state of affairs in North 
America in this regard. (Moore 2013, 161–162; Cutler 2014, 115; Klocek & Hassner 2014, 
179–181, Loveland 2014, 140–141). 
6.2 Advising Personnel – Ready When Needed, if Perceived to Be 
Needed 
In Lebanon providing advice on religion seems to have been quite a regular endeavour for 
Finnish chaplains. Even if one of the interviewed chaplains who had served in Lebanon stated 
that he was asked very little advice concerning local religions, he acknowledged providing 
some support for the personnel before their meetings with the priests of the local Christian 
communities, as well as answering some individual questions his troops might have had. He 
saw that as UNIFIL has been present in the country for such a long time, there were not many 
surprising elements in the operation anymore. Standard procedures on how to deal with 
various issues, such as local religious festivities, had already evolved, and therefore he had 
felt that there was not much demand for the chaplain’s advice. He described advisement as a 
resource which had been available, should there have been a need for it, and should it have 
been decided to be used. (CH 1 L.)  
The other two interviewed chaplains had more versatile experiences, as religion was on 
the agenda both in formal and informal settings during their deployments. Both told having 
regularly discussed about the local religious dynamics with their commanders and other 
personnel. A lot of effort was seen especially for finding new ways how to reach the local 
Shia religious leaders, as showing impartiality towards the locals was considered central to 
the operation and as both chaplains saw potential in increased dialogue with and between the 
local religious communities. Moreover, both mentioned having organised chaplain’s trips 
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with educational content for their troops, so their knowledge was used in this fashion also. 
(CH 2 L; CH 4 L.) 
[W]hen I organised my chaplain’s trips, we visited, for example, […] a monastery in order to get 
familiarised into it, and we had a communion there […] so they are, also in the religious sense, 
educational events for the peacekeeper.xxx (CH 4 L.) 
Both interviewed commanders who had served in Lebanon had had their chaplains to 
study the religious dynamics of the AO and advise them before visiting the locals and their 
events (CO 1 L; CO 3 L). After the meetings the chaplains could further help the commanders 
to analyse what was being discussed and plan future actions based on the analysis (CO 3 L). 
In addition to providing advice for them, their chaplains also supported other personnel in a 
similar manner (CO 1 L; CO 3 L). It was acknowledged that, beyond the chaplain, the 
interpreter can have a role in this too (CO 3 L). 
None of the interviewed chaplains who had served in Afghanistan had experiences of 
advising the commander or other personnel on religion or culture during their deployments in 
the country, apart from one of the chaplains providing small lectures for the troops (CH 3 A). 
They saw that this was partly due to the nature of the operation, partly due to the lack of 
interest among the troops. All of them served at a time when the operation had already calmed 
down as ISAF had passed on the responsibility over security to the local security forces. (CH 
3 A; CH 5 A; CH 6 A.) During their rotations few informal discussions and exchanges about 
religion had taken place with the troops (CH 5 A; CH 6 A), but the chaplains’ contributions 
can be called minimal. Overall the provision of information about religion and culture for the 
troops seems to have been vague: 
In Afghanistan, there was nothing for the troops, and the soldiers were not even interested in some… 
practically in anything. The little handbook, ‘Welcome to ISAF Operation’ or what was it called, in it 
there was less than a page of information about Islam and the political situation of Afghanistan, and that 
was really the only thing that was generally distributed for the soldiers.xxxi (CH 3 A.) 
Still, out of their own interests at least two of the chaplains had tried to gain a deeper 
understanding of the conditions they were serving in. One mentioned that he had learned a lot 
about the local culture due to the plentiful discussions he had had with a local trader who was 
doing business next to the Finn’s base (CH 6 A), another told that he had invited three experts 
to provide lectures for the Finnish troops (CH 5 A):  
So, in that situation I organised three small lectures to be held alongside the weekly briefings […] I was 
dealing with the Swedish and the Germans there, and others as well, there were the Dutch and all others 
[…]. The Germans had one of these, what do you call him, a cultural officer, or something like this, and 
he was well informed what was happening in that region in general, and I asked him to hold a lecture 
about the things he could share for the troops. Then I asked one policeman, there was the EU police 
operation there, so I asked the policeman there to tell what they do in cooperation with the local police. 
Then I asked one who works in the UN relief activities to tell what they do, so that I could give the troops 
perspectives to the world outside the gates. This was the idea behind it, why I organised such lectures. In 
a way I used the connections, which I was able to build, I tried to use them for the benefit of the 
troops.xxxii (CH 5 A.) 
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Also, the same chaplain told about having had a chance to meet with two Muslim imams and 
one Religious and Cultural Affairs officer of the ANA and gotten an idea of their work. This 
department seems to be the ANA’s embodiment of religious expertise: 
[T]his Office for Religious and Cultural Affairs, it goes to the villages and talks about what ISAF troops 
are doing, with the emphasis that the ISAF troops are not here to proselytise, they are here to support the 
Nation of Afghanistan, and yes, Islam is taught to our [Afghan National Army] soldiers, yes, they go to 
pray to the mosques on Fridays. And in this way, they also want to counter these rumours spread by the 
Taliban, [like] that soldiers who cooperate with Westerners are not real Muslims, and that they have gone 
astray from the true faith, and that ISAF is here to conduct a crusade.xxxiii (CH 5 A.) 
While one of the interviewed chaplains was serving in Afghanistan when the Finnish 
troops were still stationed in various locations outside the main base and he considered having 
had the potential of advising the personnel on religious and cultural matters, he saw there was 
no need for it at the time. The decreasing level of contact with the locals meant that there was 
less demand for advice on how to deal with these issues. Moreover, many of the Finns serving 
in the country had experience of multiple operations and were thus already familiar with local 
religious and cultural sensitivities. The only way he had to consider these matters himself was 
by making sure that none of his church leaflets, which were sometimes printed in English and 
contained passages of the Bible, would not end up into the garbage bins. It was assessed that 
this could have offended the locals, who hold also the Christian scriptures in high regard. In 
general terms, his main concern during the operation was how to reach his own troops. He 
said having spent a considerable number of hours just for organising transportations and 
travelling between the different outposts so that he could provide the troops possibilities for 
church services, counselling, and some leisure activities. Also, as the number of Finnish 
troops was decreasing, it meant that everyone was given additional miscellaneous tasks along 
the way. Outposts were closed and equipment packed. (CH 6 A.) One of his stories about a 
visit to an outpost which was soon to be abandoned illustrates the at times less glamorous 
nature of the chaplain’s work: 
[W]hen you needed to participate in the upkeep of the camp, and we were closing it and packing and 
doing other stuff, it was a common source for laughter that the chaplain is burning books. […] I had that 
kind of old gigantic oil barrel in which I burned books, because it was pointless to take any unnecessary 
weight with, and maps, because they had to be disposed for operational reasons. It happened to be a 
suitable job for the chaplain when everyone was packing and tearing down something. So, this [title of a] 
religious advisor sounds very impressive, considering what I was doing there, burning books and baking 
waffles.xxxiv (CH 6 A.) 
The two other chaplains had more stationary experiences in Afghanistan, as at the time 
of their deployments all the Finnish troops stayed at the same base as they did (CH 3 A; CH 5 
A). One of them said that he might have been able to contribute by providing some 
perspectives on religious issues had he had the chance to participate at least in the briefings of 
units like FHTs (Field Human Teams) or MOTs (Mobile Observation Teams) (CH 5 A). Like 
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his colleague, also the other chaplain felt that he had been side-lined in the crisis management 
organisation (CH 3 A). 
The commander who had served in Afghanistan during the earlier and more active 
phase told having good experiences of advisement by the chaplains he had served with. They 
had been able to provide him relevant information about the local religious leaders and 
dynamics, prepare him for the meetings with the religious leadership, and support him during 
the meetings. (CO 4 A.) 
[B]ecause those chaplains, with whom I was working, they had the information and understanding of 
Islam, so they were able to brief me in a way that I knew, for example, how to behave. And on the other 
hand, during those moments they could, so to say, translate for me those things this religious leader spoke 
about, what do these things mean. As if, translating religious dialect into an understandable language.xxxv 
(CO 4 A.) 
He further added that, had he understood it at the time, he should have used his chaplains for 
providing his troops some additional training during the deployment. In his opinion having 
some basic training about religion and culture in the PDT phase only is not enough, but there 
needs to be regular revision throughout the operation. Reminding the troops about right 
conduct has a pre-emptive effect. (CO 4 A.) The other commander who had served in 
Afghanistan later had not asked advice on religion or culture from his chaplain. He told that 
his local Afghan interpreter was able to provide him the necessary information about the 
religious and cultural matters, as well as to help him to greet the imams stationed in the ANA 
base where the Finnish troops trained and mentored the local troops. For him the chaplain was 
an advisor only in matters concerning the wellbeing of the Finnish troops. (CH 2 A.) 
The perceptions about the current need for information about religion and culture 
among the personnel seem to have defined whether the chaplain’s advices on religion and 
culture have been sought after in either country. These perceptions have been likely formed of 
several factors like the skills and orientation of the chaplain, the prevailing security situation, 
the nature of the operation, the personnel’s awareness concerning the topic, individuals’ 
attitudes, interpersonal issues, and the availability of other sources of knowledge, such as 
interpreters or other experienced personnel. Still, even if there is neither unanimity about the 
topic among the interviewees nor standard practices which may be identified within the scope 
of this study, some of the experiences speak for the potential of using Finnish chaplains as 
advisors on religious and cultural issues.  
The chaplain does not need to be perceived as an advisor to the commander only in 
regard to the local population, but also to the own troops (CO 1 L). Especially when the 
chaplains have been able to join the regular patrols and other routine duties of the troops, like 
the case has been at least in Lebanon, they have had chances to observe both how the locals 
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and the own troops are doing. When the chaplain is active in participating in what the troops 
do, it helps him to do his work as a counsellor better. (CO 3 L.) 
[A]s I said earlier, I think that the participation in peacekeeper’s basic patrolling, guard duties, then one is 
at the fifty [the name of the outpost], he [the chaplain] might have been even a week at the outpost 
observing… it makes a difference, not only because he got the personal contact with the local population 
and their events, but also because he was a part of the peacekeeping troops, so when some guy comes to 
talk about the boredom of patrolling […] so the guy knows, that the chaplain has been five times in the 
same patrol with him, so he [the chaplain] knows what he [the guy] is talking about. And that is an 
important element. […] that you may talk about it, and listen, and give advice and tips during counselling 
[…] it requires that you know, what the work is about, and that is very important in it.xxxvi (CO 3 L.) 
Dichotomic understandings can be challenged elsewhere also. For instance, ethical 
advisement, which did not gain much attention in this study, may touch both aspects, the 
chaplain’s internal and external ministries (CH 2 L; CH 4 L). It is certainly valuable for the 
well-being of the troops, but encouragement and guidance to ethical conduct will likely 
indirectly support any interaction with local populations, which again might help 
peacekeepers to fulfil their mission objectives more efficiently. In stressful conditions the risk 
of soldiers building xenophobic attitudes or mistreating locals increases (see Wester 2014, 
132–133). Chaplains are known – or at least usually expected – to address these issues by 
calls for moderation and respect for human dignity (see Loveland 2014, 131–132). 
6.3 Engaging Religious Leaders and Communities – A Sum of Many 
Factors 
Finnish chaplains’ interaction with local Christian priests and communities has been recurrent 
in Lebanon. They have met with the priests in various settings like in official meetings with 
the representatives of local municipalities (CO 1 L; CO 3 L), church services (CO 1 L; CH 1 
L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L), other community events and festivities (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CH 2 
L), and at the homes of the priests (CH 2 L). In addition to visiting the local priests with their 
commanders and regular patrols some chaplains have accompanied CIMIC teams and 
encountered the local priests in that context (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CO 3 L). One of the 
commanders noted that the local churches are often involved in CIMIC projects, and therefore 
having the chaplain to participate in CIMIC activities works well (CO 1 L). In order to further 
increase interaction invitations have been extended to the local priests by the troops also, and 
they have payed visits to the Finnish base for parades and meetings with the commanders (CH 
2 L). When it comes to the interaction with Shia sheiks, the situation has been the complete 
opposite. They seem to have been very reluctant to meet with the Finnish chaplains who have 
served in the country. (CO 1 L; CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 2 L; CH 4 L.) 
One of the chaplains described the encounters with the Lebanese priests as one of the 
most interesting and rewarding experiences during his deployment and saw it as a good 
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possibility to contribute to the relations between the peacekeeping forces and the local 
population. Likewise, he enjoyed encountering other locals too. Sometimes possibilities for 
interaction rose rather spontaneously when he and other peacekeepers were invited to visit 
local homes after church services or other events in the villages. While participating in regular 
patrols and organising chaplain’s trips there were possibilities for him to interact with the 
Muslim population also, and he recalled that once he got invited for a breakfast to a local 
village by one of the Muslim workers of the Finnish base. Although he did not manage to 
meet with the local Shia sheiks – despite multiple efforts and his commander’s support – he 
assessed that otherwise the Finnish troops’ interaction with the local communities of different 
religious backgrounds was balanced. On a broader scale the situation looks different also, as 
during his time the Force Commander of UNIFIL had met with the religious leaders of all 
different communities in a round table discussion. He did not think that the reason for the 
sheiks’ reluctance to meet with him was likely due to any religious problems, but rather 
pressures from their own local communities, such as the possible loss of credibility among 
one’s own people, if one was too closely involved with the UN troops. Even if he saw that 
‘the doors started to already open slightly’xxxvii towards the Shia sheiks, and his commander 
had promoted the idea of such a meeting to a local mayor, it did not come to pass. He felt that 
had he had a bit more of time and resources, the situation might have been different. (CH 2 
L.) 
I claim that the resources… as a chaplain I did not have the resources, with the interpreters, to search 
more diligently for a potential Shia leader and explain it well, encounter, maybe contact the UNIFIL 
Headquarters [and ask] how they have reached the leaders.xxxviii (CH 2 L.) 
Another chaplain estimated that he had attended a Maronite mass in a near-by village 
approximately once a month, as well as met with the municipality leadership and priests of 
the Christian communities in the AO regularly. During the masses he was usually invited to 
join the altar service. He was also asked to preach in the church once but had to cancel the 
event as he had gotten sick. Like his other colleague, he also actively tried to meet with the 
Shia sheiks, but his attempts did not avail due to what he perceived as the lack of willingness 
of the Shia communities. During his deployment it was even planned that the Finnish troops 
would host a meeting for the local religious leaders, Christians and Muslims alike, but it never 
took place. He had learned that in some of his commander’s meetings with the local 
leadership there had been sheiks present, but he had not participated in those meetings 
himself. (CH 4 L.) 
The third chaplain who served in Lebanon had a similar experience and understanding 
of the Shia religious leaders and their lack of willingness to meet. He did not have any 
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encounters with them and speculated that maybe they have determined along the years that 
these meetings are not of use for them. They don’t necessarily perceive to gain anything out 
of these meetings. Foreign chaplains come and go, they stay. His experiences with the local 
priests and communities were mainly positive, but he also brought up that one could end up in 
more challenging discussions with the local Christians because of the differences how 
Christianity manifests in Finland and in Lebanon. (CH 1 L.) He recalled an encounter when 
someone had challenged him with difficult questions: 
[H]ow would I say this… at least in our terms it [Christianity] is rather conservative [in Lebanon], and 
therefore you are often watching your words. For I have been in a situation, when there has been a person 
who has known things about what’s going on in the North, so then you are there, watching your words 
and trying to answer questions about same sex marriages and female priests and the like. So, you must 
know your own culture and you have to understand… […] one has to be able to really talk about it, there 
they get more tough on you than back in the home country when you start to talk about religion, that’s my 
experience. […], but even from that situation we left after shaking hands and smiling…xxxix (CH 1 L.) 
The commanders’ experiences from Lebanon are in line with that what the chaplains 
told. Both said having active chaplains serving with them, and the interaction with the 
Christian priests and communities was frequent. Their chaplains had visited church services 
and other events, and at times they had joined in these visits. The commanders recalled 
having limited encounters with some Shia sheiks themselves, for they were sometimes present 
during the meetings with the local municipality representatives. However, like the 
interviewed chaplains, also their chaplains did not manage to network with the Shia sheiks. 
(CO 1 L; CO 3 L.) 
One of the interviewed commanders had made some inquiries about the possibility of 
his chaplain meeting with the Shia sheiks during his own meetings with the local community 
leaders. He saw that the current political situation in the region explains the Shia population’s 
reserved stance towards the UNIFIL troops, and this was seen in all the interaction between 
the peacekeeping personnel and the Shia population, not only between the chaplain and the 
sheiks. (CO 1 L.) He noted that as his chaplain did not manage to reach the local religious 
leaders of the Shia communities, it obviously limited their ability to gain additional 
perspectives to the local Shia villages. An official representative may have a very different 
understanding of the situation in his village than the other notable actors of the community. 
(CO 1 L.)  
The other commander in turn did not see his chaplain’s limited contact with the Shia 
religious leaders as a problem, for he thought that there was enough interaction with the local 
Shia communities through other peacekeepers. He did not oppose the idea of the chaplain 
increasing his involvement with the Shia community as such but estimated that in this case 
the additional attempts of creating relations could have been counterproductive, for there was 
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the risk that this kind of endeavour would have been perceived as intelligence gathering or 
some other negative activity by the locals. (CO 3 L.) 
[I]n an operation like the one in Lebanon the big problem is that there are so damn many actors in the 
region. If you think it from the perspective of the village chief, the village is visited by the UNIFIL 
Headquarters’ personnel, then it is visited by the UNIFIL CIMIC personnel, then by the Italian Brigade’s, 
Multinational Brigade’s, Headquarters’ personnel and their CIMIC sections. Then the same village is 
visited by the battalion which is responsible for the area, its jaegar platoons, its company commander […] 
and then it is visited by other UN aid agencies, and then by local aid agencies. So, there might be five 
groups visiting the local chief’s office in one day. Just drinking coffee and asking the same questions, that 
have they seen anything, has it been raining recently, and other things. They will surely get frustrated.xl 
(CO 3 L.) 
Nevertheless, this risk assessment may be questioned, and it may be asked that, after such a 
long presence of the operation in Lebanon, was it not the time to try building and fostering 
dialogue between the local religious leaders and communities already (CH 2 L). 
The situation of Finnish chaplains engaging local religious leaders during the studied 
time period looks very different in Afghanistan. As indicated earlier, none of the interviewed 
chaplains who had served in Afghanistan had encountered local religious leaders, unless one 
counts the exception of one of them meeting with the two imams of the Afghan National 
Army a couple of times. Even the theoretical chance to network with local religious leaders 
seem to have been thin, for during their deployments any unnecessary movement outside the 
base was considered too high of a security risk (CH 3 A; CH 5 A; CH 6 A). The chaplains 
could not leave the base and move as freely as, for instance, their colleagues in Lebanon were 
able to do. ‘I think that [it was] partly because of the commander, partly because of the 
current situation in the operation. […] ISAF was being shut down.’xli (CH 3 A.) Moreover, 
earlier there had been times when ISAF chaplains’ – both Finnish ones’ and others’ – 
encounters with local religious leaders had caused misunderstandings and unrest (CH 5 A; 
CH 6 A), as well as provided the Taliban possibilities to spread rumours about ISAF engaging 
in missionary work among locals (CH 5 A; see also Moore 2014, 21). This had caused wider 
restrictions on RLE/RLL activities, which affected the interviewed chaplain also (CH 5 A; 
CH 6 A), even if it is possible that chaplains of some other contingents were able to continue 
pursuing contact with local imams and mullahs (CH 3 A). Generally, religious sensitivities 
were considered to some extent during their deployments. For example, movement and 
activities of the troops were reduced during festivities like Nowruz, the Persian New Year, or 
Eid al-Fitr, the festival which ends the fast of Ramadan, and so forth. (CH 6 A.) 
Only one of the interviewed commanders told that his chaplains had visited local 
religious leaders in Afghanistan, sometimes with him, sometimes without. He did not recall 
there being any restrictions on such visits during that time but noted that incidents which 
could have potentially caused additional unrest due to religious feelings being hurt were 
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considered. He described these visits as courtesy calls, saying that after meeting with any of 
the locals in person it had been easier to deal with them later with e-mails or phone calls. This 
had been the case with the religious leaders also, who might have initially frowned upon the 
‘infidels’, but eventually got along with the Finns. He told that also his colleagues had 
perceived that the gestures had a real effect: even if developing friendships was unlikely, at 
least the interaction became smoother than what it could have been without the visits. (CO 4 
A.) Although Chaplain Frode Lagset’s description about the Norwegians’ encounters with the 
local religious leaders in Maymana earlier in 2007 has a slightly more positive tone, he also 
emphasised the importance of establishing good relationships above other things (Moore 
2014, 216–219). The chaplain of the other commander had not engaged local religious leaders 
in Afghanistan, except for one courtesy call in an ANA base. The commander saw that the 
potential of any such visits had been very limited due to the nature of the operation at the 
time. (CO 2 A.) 
What seems to have been common to the operations in both countries is that the level of 
willingness of the locals, the current security situation, and the nature of each operation have 
defined Finnish chaplain’s possibilities to interact with the local religious leaders and 
communities to a great extent. The impact of individual qualities can also be detected: some 
of the interviewed chaplains and commanders tried to find new ways how to be of use in this 
field, the others were less active. Despite the possible challenges which may come with the 
approaches the interviewees’ perceptions about the outcomes of any interaction which had 
taken place with the locals were mainly positive, and none of the interviewees brought up any 
examples of things going wrong. Yet, in addition to enhanced networking, cooperation, and 
trust building with the local populations (Moore 2013, 103, 125), as well as some extra pieces 
of information the local religious leaders provided (Moore 2013, 79), based on the research 
data it is difficult to identify any other benefits which may have resulted due to RLE/RLL 
activities the interviewees told about. 
Concerning the troops’ interaction with the locals at a more general level, there is 
another commonality between the operations which surfaced during the interviews and has 
not been mentioned earlier. The Finn’s attempts to be mindful of local customs might have at 
times seemed silly or funny to the locals. For example, both in Lebanon and Afghanistan the 
troops have been told not to drink or eat publicly during Ramadan in order to show respect. 
This has led into situations where they have politely declined drinks and food offered by the 
locals in the period of fasting, which does not necessarily make sense to the locals, who do 
realise that the Finnish troops consist mainly of non-Muslims. (CO 3 L; CH 5 A.) When a 
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peacekeeping or crisis management contingent is stationed somewhere for longer periods of 
time, the locals will also get used to them and their habits (CH 1 L; CH 5 A.) 
It must be understood also, that those people who have been dealing with the Westerners, ISAF has been 
there for 15 to 16 years, they have surely gotten used to [the Westerners], they do know who are on the 
other side, and that also increases tolerance to it, that these Westerners just do not necessarily 
understand.xlii (CH 5 A.) 
In operations ’cultural sensitivity’ easily translates into dos and don’ts, even if more reflective 
approaches might be required of the personnel (CH 1 L; CO 3 L; CH 5 A).  
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7. Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to introduce and analyse, first, how Finnish military chaplains and 
commanders perceive the utilisation of Finnish military chaplains 1) as advisors for the 
command and other personnel in regard to religious elements and their effects in areas of 
operation and 2) as liaison personnel between Finnish contingents and local religious leaders 
and communities; and second, what sort of experiences do they have of such endeavours from 
the Finnish Defence Forces’ international operations in Lebanon and Afghanistan since the 
year of 2010. Simultaneously the study intended to contribute to the broader discussion on 
religious approaches and actors in conflict resolution, especially in the framework of 
comprehensive crisis management (CCM). This was done through ten semi-structured 
interviews with peacekeepers of relevant expertise, including six former military chaplains 
and four former commanders of Finnish contingents. 
It was found that Finnish chaplains’ RAA/RA and RLE/RLL endeavours in Lebanon 
and Afghanistan from 2010 to 2018 have been similar to those of their international 
counterparts’ contributions in various contexts, with the exception of there being no known 
successes of mediation, facilitation, or reconciliation between estranged religious actors or 
communities in either of the countries during the studied time period – only some attempts in 
Lebanon. Although in the interviewees’ case it seems that the most significant challenges 
have had to do with external conditions such as the level of willingness of locals, the security 
situation at hand, and the mandate and nature of each operation, the effect of individual and 
organisational issues has been evident: to some extent, lack of full awareness and vision 
concerning the approaches, insufficient policy and doctrine, limited training and instructions, 
inadequate planning and preparations, non-existent organisational frameworks, short 
rotations, and biased attitudes of personnel have all influenced Finnish chaplains’ possibilities 
to serve their contingents in regard to local religious conditions and actors. In other words, 
these activities have not been conducted in a fully organised manner. 
The irregular state of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL in the Finnish Defence Forces has 
implications to the comprehensiveness of the organisation’s conflict resolution efforts: if 
relevant expertise is not systematically used, opportunities will likely be missed and 
unnecessary mistakes made. Moreover, in light of theoretical understanding it may be stated 
that without a broader vision, longer-term planning, and increased commitment with respect 
to the approaches it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to connect the FDF’s operations 
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to any peacebuilding initiatives through local religious and traditional leaders – a strategy 
which has proven to be highly useful for Finnish peace mediation efforts. 
In the first part of the analysis I focused on the interviewees’ perceptions about the topic 
of the study. This served as a good background for the second part, which had to do with their 
concrete experiences with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL, for two reasons: First, considering the 
centrality of chaplains and commanders in RAA/RA and RLE/RLL activities, their attitudes, 
orientations, and understandings are of importance. These factors, the way they see religious 
factors in international operations, influence how chaplains perform in this field – or if they 
will perform at all. Second, due to their practical experiences from operations the interviewees 
were able to give well-grounded arguments on how things should look like in their opinion, 
explicating their understandings of the approaches and the possible areas of advancement on a 
broader scale. 
The findings underline the centrality of the image of the chaplain being a peacekeeper 
who is, mainly and foremostly, concerned of the wellbeing of his own troops. In places like 
Afghanistan he might join risky convoys to outposts simply to make sure that the troops get 
their encouragement and waffles. Except for liaison with chaplains of other contingents, the 
duties outside his own troops, i.e. RAA/RA and RLE/RLL, brought forth a wider range of 
opinions – although his internal and external tasks need not to be considered mutually 
exclusive. The question whether Finnish chaplains have the required skills and competences 
as well as suitable attitudes and orientations for these tasks raised some concerns, both among 
the interviewed chaplains and commanders. Moreover, even if the chaplain’s presence may 
have some positive symbolical significance for one’s own troops, allies, and local 
populations, and despite the relative freedom he enjoys in the organisation, some interviewees 
noted that personnel’s attitudes towards the chaplain – or religion – may restrain him from 
working efficiently, both as a religious expert and in general. Also, it is possible that due to 
lack of awareness he is sometimes simply not understood to be used in RAA/RA and 
RLE/RLL roles. Considering the previous research, these findings are not surprising and 
speak for the need for further discussion and clarification about this aspect of the chaplain’s 
duties in international operations both within the Finnish Military Chaplaincy and the FDF. 
The research observations indicate that the research participants take religion seriously 
as a factor in conflicts, even if it was not possible to determine the interviewees’ or Finnish 
troops’ level of understanding of or ability to deal with it in international operations. The 
topic brought forth mixed opinions, and there was no consensus on the chaplain’s role in all 
of this either. Still, the majority of the interviewees’ ideas how to use him in this domain, as 
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well as the presented conceptions concerning the possible advantages and challenges that 
come with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL, were in line with the previous research, demonstrating 
the interviewees’ familiarity with the topic. However, the chaplain’s peacebuilding capacity 
between local actors received much less attention in comparison to the studies of Moore and 
Patterson, which might indicate that most of the research participants were not fully aware of 
the potential of the approaches. This observation is of importance, should CCM be 
intentionally augmented with religious approaches in the future. On the other hand, the use of 
interpreters and other personnel in RAA/RA and RLE/RLL was discussed more than in the 
previous studies, which in turn might be due to the often-thanked high quality of Finnish 
peacekeepers. It is not only the chaplain who may have religious expertise. 
Most of the interviewees saw that there would be room for improvement when it comes 
to the utilisation of the chaplain’s religious expertise. Their remarks about irregularities and 
plentiful ideas for improvement speak for these perceptions also. Partly the suggestions for 
advancement had to do with developing the training of chaplains and commanders, including 
some arguments for the increased integration of their trainings. Yet, mostly the ideas 
concerned organisational issues, i.e. creating procedures and frameworks for the utilisation of 
religious expertise within the FDF and its international missions, making it a more systematic 
activity. Again, the views of the interviewees resembled the descriptions presented in the 
previous research. There have been similar challenges in other contexts as well. 
Particularly interesting is the relatively limited attention which some aspects of 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL received, especially because of the risks involved. The challenges 
related to the chaplain’s peacebuilding activities among local religious leaders and 
communities, his relationship with influence activities and intelligence operations, and his 
attitude towards missionary work were not much discussed. The chaplain’s religious status or 
gender were also left with little scrutiny. Likewise, this was the case with the topic of harmful 
reinforcement of power relations or reification of identities which may come with religious 
approaches. Unfortunately, based on this study it is impossible to say if these questions have 
received enough attention before Finnish chaplains’ RAA/RA and RLE/RLL endeavours, 
making the FDF’s preparedness in this field an even more urgent area of further investigation. 
In the second part of the analysis I focused on the tangible experiences the interviewees 
told about having with RAA/RA and RLE/RLL. By doing so I was able to further clarify the 
picture of the realities they faced personally during their training and deployments. Moreover, 
I had the chance to highlight the factors which defined their possibilities to deal with religious 
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elements and actors in the two countries, and thus reveal the specific circumstances and 
challenges in the different operational environments. 
As for training and preparations, the situation has not been flattering. Based on the 
research data it may be stated that the Finnish chaplains who have served in Lebanon and 
Afghanistan between 2010 and 2018 have either received very limited task-specific 
instructions and training for RAA/RA and RLE/RLL prior to their deployments, or they have 
not received them at all. Likewise, it looks like their commanders have not been given much 
guidance how to utilise the chaplains in this domain. When it comes to dealing with religious 
and cultural issues in operations the interviewed chaplains emphasised the significance of 
their university studies and some specific military courses they had attended, for the 
commanders the PDT was of greatest importance. Furthermore, the hand-over-take-over 
phase had provided some useful insights to the topics, although may be deemed short. Many 
also relied on their own research and activeness for gaining further understanding. 
It was found that with RAA/RA it has been the perceptions concerning the need for the 
chaplain’s advices, not standard procedures, which have defined whether they have been 
sought after in either of the countries. These perceptions have likely been comprised of 
factors such as the skills and orientation of the chaplain, the prevailing security situation, the 
nature of the operation, the personnel’s awareness concerning the topic, individuals’ attitudes, 
interpersonal issues, and the availability of other knowledgeable individuals, such as 
interpreters or experienced peacekeepers. In Lebanon the Finnish troops have been able to 
interact frequently with the local population, as well as organise chaplain’s trips within the 
AO, which likely increases the need and interest for insights about religious and cultural 
issues among the personnel. In Afghanistan there has been more interaction with the locals 
earlier, but during the later phase the contact had been reduced to the minimum, which might 
explain the lack of interest towards the chaplain’s ideas concerning the local ways of life. 
Moreover, the Finnish peacekeepers who have been deployed to Afghanistan have usually 
been quite experienced and therefore more familiar with local religious and cultural issues 
already. Although interpersonal issues or biased attitudes towards the chaplain or religion 
were not overly highlighted among the experiences of the participants of the study, some parts 
of their stories, especially from Afghanistan, speak for the possibility of RAA/RA being 
affected by these factors in the Finnish context as well. In any case, individual qualities have 
played a role in RAA/RA activities in both countries, for some chaplains have been keener to 
share their views than others – like some commanders have been more interested in hearing 
them than others. 
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 According to the research data Finnish chaplains’ RLE/RLL activities have been 
mainly affected by the situational factors which were well identified by the research 
participants. Primarily the level of willingness of the locals, the prevailing security situation, 
and the nature and mandate of each operation have defined their chances to interact with the 
locals. In Lebanon the Christian priests and communities have been very receptive of Finnish 
chaplains, whereas the Shia sheiks have not shown interest in meeting with them. In 
Afghanistan, earlier the security situation and later the focus of the mission seem to have 
restricted Finnish chaplains the most. Still, as with RAA/RA, it is possible to notice the 
variation caused by individual qualities and organisational issues: some of the interviewed 
chaplains and commanders have been more active and interested in trying to reach the local 
religious leaders and communities, others have paid less attention to it. As speculated by some 
of the research participants, at least in Lebanon it might have been possible to gain additional 
benefits with the approaches, had they been more systematically utilised. 
The study was not designed to determine or measure how Finnish chaplains’ RAA/RA 
and RLE/RLL endeavours have succeeded in either of the countries – that is a task for more 
extensive research. It may be only concluded that none of the interviewees brought up any 
examples of great achievements or grave mistakes from the time of their deployments or 
recent years – i.e. since 2010 – and that those who had first-hand experiences of the 
approaches were either positive or very positive about them. Many of the interviewees 
conveyed stories about earlier successes and challenges they had heard from others, some 
assessing that even if the approaches would not bring about considerable breakthroughs, 
negligence in this domain could cause missed opportunities and even serious challenges for 
the troops – considering the events of Maymana presented in the second chapter this 
estimation seems reasonable. Despite its limitations this study points out that, even if there are 
issues which need to be addressed should RAA/RA and RLE/RLL wished to be used more 
efficiently, Finnish chaplains’ contributions to the relationship of their troops and the local 
populations have not been insignificant. After all, throughout the years both in Lebanon and 
Afghanistan a variety of peacekeepers ranging from commanders to regular troops have 
received their chaplains’ support when dealing with local religious and cultural issues. 
In terms of future research, there are two obvious paths to be taken. First, a more 
thorough investigation of Finnish military chaplains’ – and other Finnish peacekeepers’ – 
RAA/RA and RLE/RLL endeavours in international operations would complement the picture 
of the utilisation of religious expertise within the FDF, help to evaluate how useful these 
efforts have been, and point into new directions how to develop the approaches at national 
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level. Internationally the research potential of the field is vast, for one can find indications of 
chaplains of various nationalities having assumed RAA/RA and RLE/RLL roles during their 
deployments. The hints include at least Australian (Saunders 2014; Moore 2014, 336), Danish 
(Vejrup 2018), French (Mielcarek 2014), German (Boczek 2008), South African (Moore 
2014, 336), and Swedish (Afghanistanstyrkan s.a.) cases. 
Second, one could study other relevant organisations. In Finland NGOs like Finn 
Church Aid and the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission already systematically consider 
religious conditions and actors in their peacebuilding activities, and the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs has strengthened its capacity in this regard during the last few years. Organisations 
such as Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) or Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC) in 
turn could benefit from paying more attention to this theme, if they already have not. Case 
studies and further examinations would illuminate these organisations’ usage of religious 
expertise, could reveal areas of development, and might even help them to incorporate new 
approaches into their strategies. Moreover, keeping the principles of CCM in mind, all these 
research efforts might help improving the interoperability of Finnish government and non-
governmental actors in conflict resolution, and especially in its religious domain. 
Moreover, finding ways how to provide better training for interreligious and 
intercultural encounters would prove to be valuable. Like indicated both in some parts of the 
previous research and the research data itself, increasing peacekeeping and crisis management 
personnel’s capacity to understand and deal with religious and cultural issues both in terms of 
conflict analysis and interaction has proven to be a challenging task. Previous training 
programs have not necessarily succeeded in this. Still, it is arguably a vital component of 
good quality communication and cooperation with local populations, which in turn define, 
often to a large extent, whether missions will be successful or not (see e.g. Autesserre 2014, 
115–157). Therefore, the evaluation of previous training programs and development of more 
efficient ones is needed. Like Heinonen argues: ‘The questions in intercultural, inter-
religious-community communication may be unexpected and deeply challenging. They 
demand deep personal commitment to open-mindedness and flexibility.’ (2017, 53.) As for 
how to foster such qualities in peacekeepers and crisis management personnel, there seems to 
be shortages in both research and practice. 
Finally, I would assess that adopting practical measures for advancing the utilisation of 
religious expertise within the framework of CCM would not prove to be overly difficult, if 
this option was decided to be explored. Rather, the biggest challenge in all of this might lie in 
the attitudes and awareness of those responsible for conflict resolution activities. This has its 
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implications also for the scholars of RAA/RA and RLE/RLL, who have until now focused on 
chaplains and their qualities, even if the predispositions and understandings of military 
officers and other government officials, those who prepare, plan, and lead international 
operations, are of similar – or even of more – importance. At the end of the day, they are the 
ones who set the organisational parameters for the utilisation of religious expertise and 
peacebuilding capabilities within peacekeeping and crisis management forces.16 Similar 
challenges likely apply to civilian crisis management and other organisations as well.  
Certainly, organisational change can be painfully slow and met with internal resistance 
(see e.g. Autesserre 2014, 254–257). However, Finland has already experience in pioneering 
within the religious domain of peace mediation, proving that such transformations are 
possible. Furthermore, if the goal truly is to reach higher levels of comprehensiveness, these 
changes are most necessary. As Ari Kerkkänen argues: ‘[T]here is no room for the successful 
operationalisation of comprehensiveness unless political-strategic decisions are also made, 
and mandates drafted, that take into account the root causes and complexities of a given 
conflict situation.’ (Kerkkänen 2015, 45.) Thus, despite also bringing up some practical ideas 
how to develop the utilisation of religious expertise within the FDF and other conflict 
resolution actors, this study hopes to serve mainly as an extender of vision and provoker for 
thought. Although analysing and addressing religious elements of conflicts is far from 
unproblematic, I am convinced that it is better to try than not to engage them at all. 
                                               
16 The organisational obstacles for development presented here are not of new or peculiar kind. As for the 
advancement of the FDF’s linguistic support, which can be argued having been relatively slow considering the 
operational environments where Finnish peacekeepers have served, Pekka Snellman poses the following 
questions: ‘How can military decision-makers’ language awareness be improved? What is the understanding and 
role of language in the FDF?’ (Snellman 2018, 130.) 
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Appendixes 
Appendix I: Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ANA   Afghan National Army 
AO    Area of Operation 
CA    Comprehensive Approach 
CIMIC   Civilian-Military Cooperation 
CCM   Comprehensive Crisis Management 
CH    Chaplain 
CMC   Crisis Management Centre Finland 
CMI   Crisis Management Initiative 
CO    Commanding Officer / Commander 
CR    Conflict Resolution (Field of Study) 
DDF   De Facto Force    
EU    European Union 
FCA   Finn Church Aid 
FCR   Force Commander’s Reserve 
FHT   Field Human Team 
FINCENT  Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
FINIRISHBATT Finnish-Irish Battalion 
FDF   Finnish Defence Forces (In Finnish: Puolustusvoimat) 
Felm   Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission 
HUMINT  Human Intelligence 
IDF    Israel Defence Forces 
INTSUPSOC  International Support Staff Officer’s Course 
IR    International Relations (Field of Study) 
IRISHFINBATT  Irish-Finnish Battalion 
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
KLE   Key Leader Engagement 
LAF   Lebanese Armed Forces 
MFA   Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
MOT   Mobile Observation Team 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation 
NORDEFCO  Nordic Defence Cooperation 
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PDT   Pre-Deployment Training (In Finnish: rotaatiokoulutus) 
PLO   Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PRT   Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RA    Religious Advicement 
RAA   Religious Area Analysis 
RLE   Religious Leader Engagement 
RLL   Religious Leader Liaison 
RS    (Operation) Resolute Support 
SLA   South Lebanese Army 
UN    United Nations 
UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Observation Force 
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UNEF I  First United Nations Emergency Force 
UNFICYP  United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
WISE   Wider Security Network 
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Appendix II: Definition of Terms 
Finnish military chaplains who have served in international peacekeeping and crisis 
management operations of the Finnish Defence Forces have been – at least predominantly – 
ordained priests of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland – although priests of the 
Orthodox Church of Finland are also eligible for the role – and have consisted of both regular 
staff and reservists. 
 
Religion, which escapes exhaustive definitions like culture, is not bound to any single 
definition or theory of the concept, but is understood, broadly speaking, as the dominant 
ideas, values, societal norms, and the like perceived to be derived from the sacred. They are 
considered to be subject to change through the process of reinterpretation and reapplication, 
colouring individual, communal, and societal human practices, actions, and responses – in 
many cases similarly as culture does – recognisably but differently depending on the given 
time and space – this is, context. It is also considered that it is impossible to make clear cut 
distinctions between religious and cultural elements, for religion may ‘inform’ culture and 
culture may ‘inform’ religion. 
 
Religious expertise refers to the competence to gather and analyse information about religious 
– and cultural – elements and actors, to inform and advise others on their specific features and 
how to take them into account, and to engage with religious leaders, actors, communities, and 
organisations – with the intention of increasing understanding, improving interaction, and 
resolving conflicts. Religious experts, in turn, are individuals who possess this sort of 
competence. 
 
The term local religious leaders, or simply religious leaders, refers to indigenous religious 
leaders of original parties of conflicts, this is, rabbis, priests, and imams, among others. 
 
In this study conflict resolution is used as a wide umbrella term encompassing activities all 
the way from peace enforcement operations to voluntary processes of reconciliation (see e.g. 
Ramsbotham & al. 2016, 15–18). Religious approaches to conflict resolution, which are 
central to this study, are seen as just one ‘tool’ in the ‘toolbox’ of conflict resolution activities 
(Kriesberg 2007, 35–36). 
 
Crisis management refers to military interventions and operations which may take place when 
warfighting is still ongoing between original conflicting parties. The mandates of this sort of 
operations may allow the active use of force and adoption of peace enforcement measures for 
the purpose of coercing disputant parties to reduce or end violence. (See Liesinen 2018b, 24.) 
 
Peacekeeping consists of military operations which aim to monitor and secure the fulfilment 
of cease-fires and treaties between original conflicting parties. Usually the use of force in 
these operations is passive and defensive in nature. (See Liesinen 2018b, 24.) 
 
Peacebuilding is used to refer to various methods (see below) of conflict resolution which do 
not involve the use of force and address structural and relational issues between conflicting 
actors and parties. 
 
Mediation refers to a non-violent third-party intervention usually voluntary for original parties 
of conflicts. It aims at supporting and encouraging the parties to start negotiations and look 
for solutions in order to manage and resolve their conflict. Reconciliation is understood as the 
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long-term process of transforming an active or potential violent conflict into a state of 
peaceful and mutually respectful coexistence. (See e.g. Ramsbotham & al. 2016, 35–36.) 
Facilitation is used to refer to organising support for beneficial interaction, dialogue 
processes, conflict resolution trainings, and the like, by bringing together relevant knowledge, 
actors, and resources. 
 
In the Finnish context peacekeeper is a general term for a member of military personnel, i.e. 
individual soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, and others, both regular staff of the 
Finnish Defence Forces and reservists, who are participating – or have participated – in 
military peacekeeping or crisis management operations. 
 
Rotation is a peacekeeper’s tour of duty in an operation which usually lasts from some 
months to half a year. Pre-Deployment Training (in Finnish: rotaatiokoulutus), which usually 
lasts up to six weeks, is the training which prepares the peacekeeper for his duties in an 
operation. 
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Appendix III: Interview Protocol in English and Finnish 
 
0. Background Information / Taustatiedot 
• Current duties  
• Nykyiset tehtävät 
• Experience from International Operations  
• Kansainväliset tehtävät 
 
1. The Role of the Military Chaplain / Sotilaspapin rooli 
• According to your opinion, what is the role of the military chaplain in the 
Finnish Defence Forces’ international operations? 
• Mikä on mielestänne sotilaspapin rooli Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisissä 
operaatioissa? 
 
2. Religious Expertise and the International Operations of the Finnish Defence Forces / 
Uskonnollinen asiantuntijuus ja Puolustusvoimien kansainväliset operaatiot 
• According to your perception, what is the role of religion in modern conflicts? 
• Mikä näkemyksenne mukaan on uskonnon rooli nykyajan konflikteissa? 
• How religious elements of an area of operation are considered in the 
international operations of the Finnish Defence Forces? 
• Miten toimialueen uskonnolliset elementit huomioidaan Puolustusvoimien 
kansainvälisissä operaatioissa? 
• How would you assess the significance of religious expertise in comparison to 
other capabilities needed in the international operations of the Finnish Defence 
Forces? 
• Miten suhteuttaisitte uskonnollisen asiantuntijuuden muihin Puolustusvoimien 
kansainvälisissä operaatioissa tarvittaviin kykyihin?  
 
3. The Military Chaplain’s Advisement Activities in Regard to the Religious Elements in 
the Area of Operations / Sotilaspapin neuvonantotoiminta suhteessa toimialueen 
uskonnollisiin elementteihin 
• In which matters the military chaplain may act as an advisor and to whom? 
• Missä asioissa sotilaspappi voi toimia neuvonantajana ja kenelle? 
• What sort of experiences do you have of these activities? 
• Millaisia kokemuksia teillä on kyseisestä toiminnasta? 
• What are the things which either foster or hinder these activities? 
• Mitkä asiat mahdollistavat tai rajoittavat kyseistä toimintaa? 
• How would you assess the potential of these activities? 
• Millaiseksi arvioisitte toiminnan potentiaalin?  
 
4. The Military Chaplain and Engagement of Local Religious Leaders / Sotilaspappi ja 
paikallisten uskonnollisten johtajien kohtaaminen 
• When can the military chaplain be utilised in religious leader engagement? 
• Milloin sotilaspappia voi hyödyntää paikallisten uskonnollisten johtajien 
kohtaajana? 
• What sort of experiences do you have of these activities? 
• Millaisia kokemuksia teillä on kyseisestä toiminnasta? 
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• What are the things which either foster or hinder these activities? 
• Mitkä asiat mahdollistavat tai rajoittavat kyseistä toimintaa? 
• How would you assess the potential of these activities? 
• Millaiseksi arvioisitte toiminnan potentiaalin? 
 
5. Religious Expertise, Education, and Training / Uskonnollinen asiantuntijuus ja 
koulutus 
• How has this thematic been present in your own education/training (previous / 
operation-specific)? 
• Miten aihepiiri on näkynyt omassa koulutuksessanne (aiempi / 
operaatiokohtainen)? 
• In your conception, what is the significance of previous education/training in 
regard to the military chaplain’s advisement and religious leader engagement 
activities? 
• Millaiseksi koette aiemman koulutuksen merkityksen suhteessa sotilaspapin 
neuvonanto- ja paikallisten uskonnollisten johtajien kohtaamistoimintaan? 
• How about the significance of the operation-specific training? 
• Entä operaatiokohtaisen koulutuksen merkitys? 
 
6. Military Chaplains, Religious Expertise, and the Future International Operations of 
the Finnish Defence Forces / Sotilaspapit, uskonnollinen asiantuntijuus ja tulevat 
Puolustusvoimien kansainväliset operaatiot 
• How would you assess the potential of utilising the military chaplain as a 
religious expert from the point of view of future operations? 
• Millaiseksi arvioitte sotilaspapin uskonnollisena asiantuntijana hyödyntämisen 
potentiaalin tulevaisuuden operaatioiden näkökulmasta? 
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Appendix IV: Interview Quotations in Finnish 
                                               
i [M]ikä toi on? 
 
ii [K]un olin siellä, porukasta oli kantahenkilökuntaa yli puolet, ja siel oli paljon semmosia, 
jotka oli jo monennessa operaatiossa, että ne ei paljon papin opetusta kaivannu. Yhden 
oppitunnin pidin, lääkärin kanssa […] Defusingista pidin […] ja ne tykkäs siitä, vaikka ensin 
tuli vähän silleen, että mitähän noi pappi ja lääkäri luulee tietävänsä, ni oli ehkä yllättyneitäki 
siitä, että hei, niillähän onkin jotain semmosta asiantuntemusta, mitä meillä ei oo […] 
 
iii [S]illon kun nuoria reserviläisiä on vähän ja niin kauan, kun mitään ei satu, niin eihän sitä 
kriisitukiryhmää niinkun sellasenaan oikeestaan tarvita. Mutta olis voinu tarvita ja jos aattelee 
vaikka niinkun niitten komentajien näkökulmasta, jotka oli SKJA:ssa siihen aikaan, niin 
minusta tuntu, että eihän he tarvinnut pappia muuhun kuin a) jouluun, ja b) siltä varalta, että 
joku kuolee. Minun aikanani ei kukaan onneksi kaatunut.  
 
iv No mun mielestä, se tietysti se pää, ykköstehtävä on omien joukkojen sielunhoito ja se 
henkinen tuki ja sanottaisko… sotilaspappi on yhdessä, muitten toimijoitten kanssa, ni on 
keskeinen tässä debriefingissä ja näissä, mut et, se on niiku se ykkönen, 
 
v Ja paikallisille papin läsnäolo just tässä tapauksessa oli se, et se tarkottaa, et nää on siis siinä 
mielessä vakavasti otettavia ihmisiä, koska ne huolehtii myös ihmisen hengellisistä tarpeista, 
et sillä tavalla niin papin läsnäololla voi olla sille joukolle, paikallisten silmissä, tavallaan 
meille aavistamaton merkitys. Että siinä mielessä, ni, meiän tehtävä, kunnes jotain 
vakavampaa läsähtää, on aikalailla läsnäoloa, ja sehän nyt on meidän tehtävä muutenkin 
pappeina, et me läsnäolollamme muistutetaan pyhän läsnäolosta ja se sitten välittyy 
paikallisille. […] Mut ylipäänsä se, et… siis mä ajattelen tyyliin sitä, että kyllä me pidetään 
Jumalanpalveluksia tai hartauksia tai paraatien yhteyksissä on pieni rukous tai tämmösiä, niin 
tota, nii se voi herättää sit omalla tavallaan luottamusta, et ahaa, ne ottaa kuitenki nää 
huomioon nää asiat… 
 
vi Ni jos nyt ajatellaan, et meil on pataljoona ulkona, ja meillä ei oo sotilaspappia siellä, niin 
kyllä paikalliset pitää sitä ihmeellisenä, kristityt, ja muut joukot, esimerkiks italialaiset tai 
irlantilaiset, jotka on niiku ns. uskonnollisempia […] niin kyllähän, jos me todetaan, et ei meil 
mitään pappia tääl oo, niin kyl siel joku kattoo vähä kieroon, et minkälaista barbaarilaumaa 
toi on, et tuolta pohjosesta tullu. 
 
vii [S]e riippuu tietysti persoonasta myös, ja omasta papin tausta-ammattitaidosta, mut mä 
nään myös hänet äärimmäisen tärkeenä konsulttina niin sinne paikalliseen uskonnolliseen 
yhteisöön […] ja sanotaan näin, et se ns. konsultin rooli niin se korostuu erityisesti sellasissa 
operaatioissa, missä uskonto on niin merkittävässä asemassa niinkun esim. Afganistanissa. 
 
viii Ja myös häiritsee ammattihenkilönä se, että se tietotaito mikä mulla koulutukseni ja 
ammattini kautta, että se aivan liian usein sidotaan siihen, minkälainen olen tai en ole 
henkilönä, joka sit taas vuorostaan rakentuu, Luoja yksin tietää mistä. Kunkin upseerin, noh 
yleensä tässä tapauksessa upseerin, henkilökohtasesta kokemuksesta jostain muista 
sotilaspapeista tai yleisistä käsityksistä, papin pitää olla tollanen tai tällanen, niin se on kyllä 
äärimmäisen turhauttavaa siinä kun mietitään asiantuntijuutta, ettei sitten pystytä 
suhtautumaan samalla luontevuudella kuin suhtaudutaan huollon asiantuntijaan tai lääkäriin 
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lääkinnänhuollon asiantuntijana, tai juristiin lakiasiantuntijana, niin… Mä luulen, että meillä 
on joskus vähän vaikeeta erottaa julistustyö ja neuvonanto.  
 
ix [O]sa osaa hyödyntää sen sotilaspapin, osa pitää sotilaspappia taakkana.  
 
x [P]appi ite näkee oman roolinsa ja tehtävänsä yhdellä tavalla, mut toi, ympärillä olevat 
ihmiset näkee sen taas toisella tavalla, ja toi, se johtuu tottakai heidän kokemuksistaan ja 
näkemyksistään, […] Et joku näkee, et sieltä tulee herra sanansaattaja ja joku näkee sit jotain 
muuta, et sielt se kuoleman enkeli saapuu, tai mitä kenelläkin, et siihen törmää, jos ei nyt 
päivittäin niin viikoittain. Et se on niiku tän homman yks haaste myös se, et niiku, et mikä toi 
on? 
 
xi se ei oo ihan helppo pelikenttä 
 
xii …käy näin kirkossa ja pyöritellään helminauhaa […] mutta sit ku menee huonosti, niin se 
saa suuremman merkityksen ja helminauha pyörii kiivaammin. 
 
xiii [E]n minäkään näkis, että ainakaan useimmissa kansainvälisissä operaatioissa, että 
konfliktin lähtökohta olisi uskonnollinen, mutta tota, se että, siellä missä tavallisten ihmisten 
arkielämässä uskonto on hallitsevampi, kun mitä se sekularisoituneissa länsimaissa yleensä 
on, niin tottakai sillon voi olla hyvin tärkeää, että päästään esim. paikallisten uskonnollisten 
johtajien kanssa juttuun. Ja tottakai uskonnolliset, niin kuin muutkin juhlat esim., juhla-ajat on 
semmosia, jollon täytyy olla, se vaan täytyy ottaa huomioon, että siinä voi tietämättömyyttään 
hölmöyksissään tehdä niinkun paljon hallaa omalle operaatiollensa ja sen pyrkimyksille, jos ei 
osaa kunnioittaa ihmisten kulttuuria. Että tota. Mä oon monesti verrannut sitä, että jos 
Suomessa olis ollu brittiarmeijan tukikohtia viimeset kymmenen vuotta, niin vaikka ne 
lähtökohtasesti ois meidän hallituksen puolella, elikkä niinkun suurin osa kansasta 
periaatteessa poliittisesti on samalla puolella kun ne, ei me tykättäis siitä, että täällä on 
brittiarmeijan tukikohtia, niittenkin ois viisasta pitää aika matalaa profiilia siviiliväestöön 
nähden pääasissa, ja varsinkin sillon kun meillä on juhla-aika. Et jos ne töräyttäs paikalle 
vaikka harjotusmielessä vaan jollaki panssarikolonnalla just kun meillä on menossa joku 
itsenäisyyspäivän seppeleenlasku tai jotain muuta, niin se muistettas. Et jos tämmösille 
asioille ei osaa olla sensitiivinen, niin siinä toheloi aika raskaasti.  
 
xiv [M]eillä on hyvin tietoa, mutta se, että meillä olisi ehkä mahdollisuus tällä saralla 
hyödyntää vielä enemmän sitten. Varsinkin silloin kun meillä on puolustusvoimien omia 
pappeja, mutta miksei myös reserviläisiä, ni toteuttamassa papin tehtävää, niin tota... Hiukan 
enemmän fokusoimalla heidänkin, kysehän on siitä, että minkälaisia asioita otetaan esille 
siellä koulutusvaiheessa, mikä on se tavallaan, kuinka hyvin pohjustetaan toimimaan tuola. 
Niin tota, siinä voisi olla jopa petraamisen paikka. Kyse on kuitenkin ison kokonaisuuden 
hallinnasta ja jokainen joka siitä jotain ymmärtää niin se on kyllä tervetullutta tuoda siihen 
jotain lisätietoo. 
 
xv No, sanosin näin, et se riippuu operaatiosta, et se asiantuntijuus, se voi olla joko tuki, ikään 
kuin siellä taustalla, kun suunnitellaan ja toteutetaan operaatioita, niin sieltä tulee tää niinkun 
tieto siihen, tai sitten, riippuen tosiaan siitä operaatiosta ja toimialueesta, missä ollaan, niin se 
voi olla jopa osa sitä operaation rakennetta. Et esim. jos me tiedetään, että kyläpäällikkö on 
kyläpäällikkö, mut oikeesti sitä kylää johtaa se uskonnollinen johtaja, niin tää pitää tottakai 
ottaa huomioon, että meiän pitää tietysti osottaa arvostusta sille kyläpäällikölle, mutta meiän 
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ehkä pitää niinkun miettiä, että lähestytäänkö me sitä haasteen ratkasua sen uskonnollisen 
johtajan kautta. 
 
xvi Vaikee nähdä, että tulevaisuudessakaan tästä alasta tulis semmonen game changer, […] 
mutta se kriittinen tekijä, jolla hävitään, ni se siitä voi tulla. Koska tolla alalla kun saa sukset 
ristiin jonkun kanssa, niin, tuolla kv operaatiossa niin, on sitten kyse omien joukkojen 
toiminnasta tai ulkopuolisten tekijöiden toiminnasta, niin sillä voi olla katastrofaaliset 
merkitykset […] 
 
xvii Kaikki mikä lisää paikallisten ihmisten keskinäistä ymmärrystä ja hyväksyntää, niin 
kaikella sillä on potentiaalia ja tilausta, ja voisin jopa ajatella niin, että tällä toiminnalla ois 
varmaan enemmänkin mahdollisuuksia […], jos sitä osattais vaan paremmin hyödyntää. Mut 
se on taas kiinni niistä esimiesasemissa olevista, lähinnä pataljoonan komentajasta, ja itse olen 
sitä mieltä, että UNIFIL:ssa pitäis olla tämmönen pääpappi, joka koordinois sitä toimintaa, 
koska se voidaan nähdä myös operatiivisena asiana […] 
 
xviii [E]hkä se ristin kanssa kulkeminen siellä voi herättää vähän epäluottamusta. 
 
xix [H]aluaisin ajatella, et sen pitää olla niiku nimenomaan kuitenkin suunniteltuu ja 
suunnitelmallist, et ei se niiku oo sellane et papiston on kiva tavata paikallisii uskonnollisii 
johtajii, vaan kyl sen imputin pitäis tulla jostain muualta. Tai ainakin se olis mun mielestä 
hienoo, et se olis osa jotain isompaa kokonaisuutta.  
 
xx [J]a se on mun mielestä kaiken kaikkiaan kriisinhallinnan ja rauhanturvaamisen iso haaste, 
että me mennään johonkin täysin erilaiseen kulttuuriin me länsimaiden edustajat, ja me 
lähdetään niinkun, lähtökohtasesti dissataan se koko sen maan historiaperimä, traditiot ja 
kulttuuri ja lähdetään niinkun prässäämään sitä omaamme […] 
 
xxi [E]t osaa esim. sen, että jos joku sheikhi kysyy sitten et oliko […] Jeesus niin myös 
Jumalan poika, niin, voi olla viisaskin vastaus, että me kristittyinä ajatellaan näin, mutta en 
halua siitä lähteä, et siitä ei sillä tavalla en lähde perustelemaan […]. Sehän on niinko 
mielenkiintoinen, miten sä vastaat siihen. Nämä on niitä uskonnollisia kysymyksiä, että 
kristitythän ajattelee näin, mutta […] tiedän, että se teidän näkökulmasta on vaikkapa 
järkyttävää. […] mut se ajatus siitä, et toisaalta niiko ihmiset saa kysyä kaikkea, mutta se on 
taito sitten sen oman roolin vuoksi niiko osata sitten, että tätä kysymystä ei tarvitse niiko 
lähteä meidän käsittelemään. Vaan kunnioittaa sitä, vastaa niinko yleisellä tasolla sen 
enempää, säilyttää vilpittömyys, joo, me ollaan kristittyjä, tiedät varmasti mitä me 
ajattelemme sen tyyppisistä, mutta tulin tapaamaan sen vuoksi, että tässä niiko haluaa 
arvostaa teitä niinko, antaa tilan teille, tämmösille niinko uskontoina ja yhteiskunnallisina 
vaikuttajina, ja ehkä tästä ei oo hyvä nyt tässä niiko lähtee… 
 
xxii [T]äs on se mun mielestä ehkä se isoin haaste täs kuviossa, että lähtökohtasesti mun 
mielestä sotilaspappia pitää hyödyntää, ja se pitää niinku olla vielä sillä tavalla, että jos mä 
menen pataljoonan komentajana tapaamaan uskonnollista johtajaa, mä en mee sinne yksin, 
vaan mulla on se pappi mukana, mutta sit niinkun sanottu, sit tullaan tähän kysymykseen, että 
miten se jää ikäänkun murretaan, jos mä menenkin naispuoleisen sotilaspapin kans sinne. Et 
onko se sitten parempi niin, että mä kohtaan sen paikallisen uskonnollisen johtajan, ja se 
sotilaspappi, nainen on briiffannu mut riittävän hyvin tähän asiaan, ja hän on antanut 
taustatuen ja taustatiedot, ja sitten ku mä oon sen kohtaamisen tehnyt, niin saman tein istutaan 
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alas ja mä kerron, ja sit hän ikään kuin analysoi, ja antaa mulle sitte analyysin tulosta 
seuraavaa kohtaamista varten. 
 
xxiii se on selvästi ollu koulutuksellisesti, että se on papin omaa aktiivisuutta. Että tajuta se 
rooli ja perehtyä siihen itse. 
 
xxiv [M]ä olin siellä enemmän opettajana, ku oppimassa, mitä liittyy tähä nyt uskontojen 
kohtaamiseen ja kulttuuriin 
 
xxv [S]ehän vaatii tietysti vaatii teologille tai papilleki ihan yhtä lailla, niikun vaatisi, jos aikoo 
antaa neuvoa, ni se vaatisi sitä, että sulla on aikaa paneutua ja sä saat sitä paikallista tietoa ja 
pääset sillä tavalla vähän sisään, et sillä tavalla sun ymmärrys kasvaa, et... […] toi on 
itseasiassa aika hyvä asia ottaa huomioon siinä, kun puhutaan papin valmistautumisesta tai 
papin kouluttamisesta tehtävään, niin tota, ehkä vähän liian ylimalkasesti mennään sillä, että 
”sähän oot pappi, sähän tiedät”. 
 
xxvi [J]os sen taustakoulutus on jotenki heikko näihi asioihi, niin, hankala sitä on puristaa 
rotaatiokoulutukses toisenlaiseks. 
 
xxvii [S]it ehkä se missä pikkusen enemmän nyt jälkikäteen voi sanoo, että asiaa kannattaisi 
vähä pönkittää on juuri se operaatiokohtainen koulutus etukäteen Suomessa. Hänen niiku 
asema ja perehtyneisyys siihen ni tota voisi näkyä selkeämmin, jolloin voi olla, siis voi olla, 
että olisimme keksineet jotakin enemmän. Vaikee mennä sanomaan, mut […] vielä enemmän 
olisi voinut olla siellä missä minuakin koulutettiin, jotta hän näkee kaikkia niitä asioita ja tota 
kuulee… toki oli osassa, mutta ei kaikissa. 
 
xxviii …puhutaan vähän niinku samaa kieltä… 
 
xxix [M]eil on tälläkin hetkellä firmassa ihan siis niinkun sotilasvirassa olevia pappeja, siis 
sotilaspappeja, en tarkota nyt näitä pappeja, jotka esim. lähtee reservistä 
kriisinhallintatehtävään, vaan ihan PV:n pappeja, […] Meil on hyviä pappeja paljon, mut sit 
meil on muutamii semmosii pappeja, että, mä tiedän, että jos näistä muutamista papeista joku 
lähtis johonkin, heittona, et mä olen vaikka pataljoonan komentaja jossain operaatiossa, 
Afganistanis esim., niin mä en suin surminkaan ottais tällasta pappia mukaan. 
 
xxx [K]un mä järjestin papin retkiäni, ni me käytiin esim. […] luostarissa tutustumassa sinne, 
niiku tähän, ja pidettiin siellä ehtoollispalvelus, […] niin ne on uskonnollisessaki mielessä 
opetustilaisuuksia rauhanturvaajalle. 
 
xxxi Afganistanissa, siel ei ollu mitään niinkun joukko-osastolle, eikä sotilaita ees kiinnostanu 
niinkun mikään vähäi… siis ei oikeestaan mikään. Se pieni opas, mikä tervetuloa ISAF-
operaatioon vai mikä se oppaan nimi oli, mikä jaettiin kaikille sotilaille, niin siellä oli 
semmonen vajaan sivun verran informaatiota islamista ja Afganistanin poliittisesta tilanteesta, 
ja se oli oikeestaan se ainut yleinen osa, mikä sotilaille jaettiin. 
 
xxxii Niin siinä tilanteessa mä sitte järkkäsin kolme sellasta pientä luentoo viikottaisen 
puhuttelun yhteyteen, […] liikuin ruottalaisten kaa ja saksalaisten kaa siellä, niin, tietysti nyt 
muittenki, siel oli hollantilaisia ja kaikkee muutaki […] Saksalaisilla oli tällanen, mikäs sen 
nimi olikaan, cultural officer, tai joku tämmönen, ja hänellä oli aika hyvä tieto siitä, mitä sillä 
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alueella tapahtu yleisestiki ottaen, ja mä pyysin sit häntä luennoimaan, siitä mitä hän pysty 
tälle porukalle jakamaan, ja sit mä pyysin yhtä poliisia, siellä oli poliisin EU-missio siellä, 
operaatio, niin yhtä poliisii sitte siihe kertomaan mitä he tekee siellä yhteistyössä paikallisen 
poliisin kanssa, ja sit mä kysyin yhtä, joka toimii YK:n jossain näissä avustustoimissa siinä, 
niin vähän sit kertomaan, et mitä he tekee, ihan vaan antaakseni sille porukalle vähän 
semmosta, niinkuin silmiä porttien ulkopuolelle, ni sillä ajatuksella mä aattelin, et mä 
järkkään tämmöset luennot. Tavallaan käytin niitä yhteyksiä, mitä sitte pysty luomaan, ni, 
yritin käyttää niitä joukon hyväksi. 
 
xxxiii [T]ää religious and cultural affairs -toimisto, niin käy sitten kylissä ja puhuu siitä, mitä 
ISAF-joukot sillon tekee, ja painotuksella, että ISAF-joukot eivät ole täällä tekemässä 
lähetystyötä, he ovat täällä tukemassa Afganistanin valtiota, ja kyllä, meidän sotilaille 
opetetaan islamia, kyllä, he käyvät moskeijassa rukoilemassa perjantaisin. Ja tällä tavalla 
halutaan myös kumota näitä, tai siis halutaan kumota näitä Talibanin lietsomia huhuja, että 
yhteistyössä länsi… länsimaisten kanssa yhteistyötä tekevät sotilaat, ni ei ole oikeaoppisia 
muslimeja, että ne on harhaantunu oikeesta uskosta, ja ISAF on täällä tekemässä ristiretkeä. 
 
xxxiv [K]un siellä piti osallistua sen leirin ylläpitotehtäviin ja oltiin sulkemas paikkoja ja 
pakkaamassa ja muuta tämmöstä näin niin se oli yleinen naurunaihe, että pappi pitää 
kirjaroviota, […] minulla oli sellanen valtava vanha öljytynnyri, jossa minä tuntikausia poltin 
kirjoja ihan siks, että turhaa painolastia turha viedä, ja sitte karttoja siks, että ne operatiivisista 
syistä piti hävittää, niin se nyt oli papille sopiva tehtävä, kun kaikki oli siellä jotain 
pakkaamassa tai purkamassa. Et se, uskonnollinen neuvonantaja kuulostaa niin hirveen 
juhlalliselta, kun aattelee, mitä minä siellä tein, pidin kirjarovioo ja paistoin vohveleita.  
 
xxxv [K]oska ne papit, mitä mä, joiden kaa mä olin tekemisissä, niin heil oli se taustatieto ja 
ymmärrys islaminuskosta, niin he osas ensin mut briiffata, sillä tavalla, että mä tiesin, että 
miten esim. käyttäytyy ja toisaalta sit siinä itse tilanteessa he pysty lainausmerkeissä 
tulkkaamaan mulle niitä juttuja, mitä tää uskonnollinen johtaja puhu, et mitä se niinku 
tarkottaa. Et vähä niiku, ikään kuin uskonnollisen slangin kääntämistä ymmärrettäväks 
kieleks. 
 
xxxvi [N]iiku mä aikasemmin sanoin, mun mielestä se osallistuminen siihen rauhanturvaajan 
peruspartiointiin, vartiotehtäviin, sitte oltiin välillä 50:llä […] se saatto olla viikonkin siellä 
etutukikohdassa kattelemassa, niin sillä oli aika iso merkitys, ei pelkästään sen takia, että se 
sai sen henkilökohtasen kontaktin siihen paikalliseen väestöön ja siinä niihin tapahtumiin, 
vaan se oli mukana osana sitä rauhanturvaajajoukkoa, jollon, kun joku kaveri tuli sitten 
puhumaan partioinnin pitkästyneisyydestä ja kyllästyneisyydestä, […] niin se kaveri tiesi, et 
se pappi on ollu viis kertaa samassa partiossa hänen kanssaan, et se tietää mistä hän puhuu, ja 
se on tärkee ulottuvuus. […] että sä puhut niiku siitä asiasta sitte ja kuuntelet ja annat niitä 
neuvoja ja vinkkejä siinä sielunhoidossa […], niin se edellyttää sitä, että sä tiedät, mitä se työ 
on, ja se on niiku hyvin tärkee siinä...  
 
xxxvii vähän jo meinas ovet avautua 
 
xxxviii [M]ä väitän, että ne resurssit, mul ei ollu pappina resurssia, tarkemmin tulkkien kanssa 
vielä etsiä mahdollinen shiiajohtaja ja perustella hyvin, kohdata, ehkä olla UNIFIL:in 
esikuntiin yhteydessä, miten siellä on saatu ne johtajat, 
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xxxix [M]illai mä sanosin… ainakin meikäläisellä käsitteistöllä ni kyl se on melko 
konservatiivista, ja siin olet sit aika usein kieli keskellä suuta ku, olen ollu tilanteessa, ku on 
ollu ihminen, joka on tienny vähä niitä ja näitä, siitä et mikä meininki tääl pohjolassa on, ni, 
siin on sit kieli keskellä suuta koettanu vastailla, et toi, kysymyksiin kaikist samaa sukupuolta 
olevien avioliitoist ja naispappeudest ja tällasii, ni toi, et kyl se niiku sillai pitää tuntea se oma 
kulttuuri ja pitää ymmärtää niiku… […] siit pitää pystyä keskustelee ihan oikeesti niiku, siellä 
laitetaan enemmän koville ku kotimaassa ku lähetää keskustelee uskonnosta, se on mun 
kokemus. […], mut kyl siitäkin ihan kättä puristaen lähdettiin siit tilanteesta pois…  
 
xl [T]uommosessa Libanonin tyyppisessä operaatiossa, niin se iso ongelma on siinä se, että 
niitä toimijoita on siellä alueella niin perhanasti. Jos sä mietit sen kyläpäällikön kannalta, niin 
siellä käy sen, siellä käy niiku UNIFIL:in esikunnan porukka, sit siellä käy UNIFIL:in CIMIC 
porukka, sit siellä käy Italialaisen prikaatin, monikansallisen prikaatin esikunnan väki ja 
niitten CIMIC ryhmät, sit siellä samassa kylässä käy se aluevastuussa oleva pataljoona, ja 
sitte sen jääkärijoukkueet, ja se komppanianpäällikkö, […] ja sitte siellä käy YK:n muut 
avustusjärjestöt ja sitte paikalliset avustusjärjestöttoimijat, ni siellä saattaa käydä sen 
paikallisen johtajan toimistossa viis ryhmää päivässä. Pelkästään juomassa kahvia ja 
kysymässä samoja keskusteluja, et onko näkyny mitään, onko satanu viimeaikoina ja muuta, 
johan ne turhautuu siihe.  
 
xli [M]ä luulen, osittain komentajasta, ja varmaan osittain operaation senhetkisestä luonteesta. 
[…], ISAF-operaatioo oltiin ajamassa alas. 
 
xlii Tietysti ymmärrettävä kans se, että ne ihmiset, jotka on länsimaalaisten kanssa tekemisissä, 
niin ISAF on ollu siellä nyt jo 15-16 vuotta, niin onhan ne tottunu, että kylhän ne tietää, ketä 
niitten vastapuolella on, ja siinä sit kasvattaa myös toleranssii siihen, että nää nyt ei vaan 
ymmärrä nää länsimaalaiset välttämättä 
 
